TNAG-0029-FCO40-65-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 194

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C

may try to make propaganda out of our concession.

If thera

has been no progress over kr. Grey, pressure will build up for action to help him, possibly in the form of tough measures ¤geinot B.C.NA., Just at a time when this would not do him

If this

or our general relations with the Chinese any good. happens Sir D. Hopson has suggested in paragraph 4 of his

Flog telegram No. 159 the line we should tako, namely that denying

entry visas to F.C.N.A. (or presumably any other punitive

зева

action against them) would not assist kr. Gray's chances and

that there was no question of sacrificing Br. Greg. to the interesty of our own Mission because we were not intending to

withdraw it but merely to replace staff. I think that these arguments would hod up, provided that we could persuade Routers to accept then and to use their influence to prevent hostile prese treatment. (At the beginning of the year, Sir D. Hopson

volunteered to stay on indefinitely in Teking, if we thought this would serve to underline sur concern about Hr. Grey.)

8. As regards the tactics of negotiation, I personally believe

that, if the issue had been presentod in the way ve bulgeeted (paragraph 3 above), there was a good chance that we would have

succeeded in excluding R.C.H.A. from a bargain covering the Missions in Lendon and Faking. But I now think that, the way things have doveloped, we must accept Sir D. Hopson's centen-

tion that the Chinese oro adamant that without entry visas for

B.C.H.A., there will be no exit visas for the Missian. This

does not mean that our policy of fireness in the past has been

ineffective. By our firmness we have persunded the Chinese

that we are not prepared to make major concessions in Hong

/Kong

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