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may try to make propaganda out of our concession.
If thera
has been no progress over kr. Grey, pressure will build up for action to help him, possibly in the form of tough measures ¤geinot B.C.NA., Just at a time when this would not do him
If this
or our general relations with the Chinese any good. happens Sir D. Hopson has suggested in paragraph 4 of his
Flog telegram No. 159 the line we should tako, namely that denying
entry visas to F.C.N.A. (or presumably any other punitive
зева
action against them) would not assist kr. Gray's chances and
that there was no question of sacrificing Br. Greg. to the interesty of our own Mission because we were not intending to
withdraw it but merely to replace staff. I think that these arguments would hod up, provided that we could persuade Routers to accept then and to use their influence to prevent hostile prese treatment. (At the beginning of the year, Sir D. Hopson
volunteered to stay on indefinitely in Teking, if we thought this would serve to underline sur concern about Hr. Grey.)
8. As regards the tactics of negotiation, I personally believe
that, if the issue had been presentod in the way ve bulgeeted (paragraph 3 above), there was a good chance that we would have
succeeded in excluding R.C.H.A. from a bargain covering the Missions in Lendon and Faking. But I now think that, the way things have doveloped, we must accept Sir D. Hopson's centen-
tion that the Chinese oro adamant that without entry visas for
B.C.H.A., there will be no exit visas for the Missian. This
does not mean that our policy of fireness in the past has been
ineffective. By our firmness we have persunded the Chinese
that we are not prepared to make major concessions in Hong
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