TNAG-0029-FCO40-65-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 148

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CONFIDENTIAL

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EDIATE HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

RECEIVED IN APCHATS No. 63

18 MAR 1968

Telno 330

15 March 1968

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Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 330 of 15 March. Repeated for information to Peking, Washington and Singapore.

Peking telegram No. 179 to Foreign Office:

relations.

Sino-British

I agree with much of the analysis in the first four paragraphs of the telegram under reference. There are admittedly some disquieting factors of which account should be taken. In Hong Kong the incidents at Kwun Tong and North Point reported in my telegrams Nos. 88 and 93 to Peking have provided renewed evidence of the militancy of the Communist rank and file, although they have been reported in a relatively restrained fashion by the bulk of the Communist Press. In China itself the Vickers Zimmer case and possibly also the affair of the Demodocus may be a warning that tougher policies can be used against us.

2. We ought not to exclude the possibility that important elements in the Communist leadership in Hong Kong and Canton at any rate would favour, even in the short term, the tougher policy towards Hong Kong set out in paragraph 3(a) of the telegram under reference (nor can it be excluded that it is the long term aim of the Chinese Communists as a whole). Nevertheless, I agree that the tone and circumstances of the communication by the Vice Minister suggest that the present aim of the Foreign Ministry at any rate is to pursue the softer policy set out in paragraph 3(b). My immediately following top secret telegram (not to all) contains a further indication that the milder policy is at present favoured by Chou En lai himself.

It is, of course, impossible to be sure that our source nas given us a wholly accurate account of what he has been told by his influential contacts here. But in general his story rings true: and it seems to fit in neatly with Her Majesty's Charge D'Affaires impression of what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were trying to get across in their statement to him. It would be not at all unlike the Chinese to brandish the big stick of more rigid treatment for our Mission in Peking while offering the carrot of negotiation in Hong Kong.

3. What action we should now take obviously requires most careful thought. In general, of course, our aim must be (as it has been) to try to keep the situation calm in Hong Kong. Obviously, however, we cannot do this at the expense of a failure to maintain law and order:

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