TNAG-0029-FCO40-65-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 149

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and if the Communist rank and file continue e.g. to mount

disturbances outside police stations, we shall have to deal with them as firmly and swiftly as in the past. The question is, however, whether there is any action that we could take simultaneously to give the Communist leadership a chance to claim that their moderate policies are paying dividends and thus to strengthen their control over the more militant rank and file. The prospect of "releasing to China" a substantial number of prisoners or detainees would certainly be attractive from our point of view, but I am afraid that our experience with the film stars up to the time of drafting this shows that it is most unlikely that it will be acceptable to the Chinese. It is hard to think of other ways in which we could make any overt moves in the direction of a settlement without risk to Hong Kong, though I agree that the idea of a public statement on the lines indicated in paragraph 6 of the telegram under reference is worth consideration.

4. This does not mean however that it would not be useful to try to discover more clearly what the Chinese mean by asking us to "reply" to their demands. There are obvious dangers in embarking on discussions of the matter through official channels, either here or in Peking; we could only too easily be drawn into a Macao-like situation. But I do not think that we need be too frightened of exploratory discussions through an unofficial intermediary. The approach by the source indicated in paragraph 2 does provide us with a means of testing out the ground that is less risky than most.

He has undeniably close contacts with the Communists; but he has taken a firm anti-Communist line during the disturbances; and he would have a good deal to lose if he tricked us or let us down. On the other hand anything that we said to him could, if necessity arose or negotiations went sour, be disowned or repudiated much more easily than communication through official channels.

5. So far we have done no more in response than to express interest in the implications of what we have been told and to say that it would take us some days to consider it. But, if we are not to ignore the approach completely, we should be prepared to give a general indication of our reaction not later than say next Tuesday (19th). Subject to your views, I would propose that a fairly senior official should meet the source and speak on the following lines:-

(a) We were considerably interested in his message. It is certainly our aim to reduce tension in Hong Kong; though of course we could not do so at the expense of maintaining law and order.

(b) If we were to enter on any talks with him they would be entirely on an unofficial, exploratory and confidential basis and we would not regard ourselves as committed by anything said in the discussions.

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/(c) There would