TNAG-0028-FCO40-64-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 197

Cy

Cat A

253

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH

Telno 48

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

15 January 1968

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 48 of 15 January. Repeated for information to Hong Kong.

244) Your telegram No. 49: Grey.

I think that first question to decide is what action if any we are prepared to take against NCNA in London. For the reason given in my telegram No. 42, which crossed yours, I think that action such as restraint on moves would be ill advised and would rebound on my staff here.

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2.

A threat to close NCNA office would almost certainly fail to make Chinese release Grey. We should therefore have to carry the threat out which would deprive us of hostages while having Grey in Chinese hands. Closure might provoke Chinese with persona non grataing some of my staff. This has superficial attractions but as explained in previous correspondence the Chinese would probably choose those members we could least afford to lose at present. Most important, closure of NCNA office or restraint on their movements would be an act of escalation and would reverse the trend towards a detente which I am convinced we must maintain if we are to extricate Grey or ourselves. It would add rather than remove difficulties.

3.

I, therefore, recommend that at this stage we should confine ourselves to action on residence permits as suggested in my telegram. I agree with your telegram No. 52 that any renewals might be for 3 months only.

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4. If it is felt we must go further in answer to public pressure it might be possible to convey thoughts in a Parliamentary statement or that if no progress is made over Grey serious consideration would have to be given to further steps and we might have to look closely at the position of NCNA in London. This would not commit us to action and would be noted by the Chinese, but has risk of getting us on slippery slope towards escalation.

5. As regards publicity for Grey's case there may be advantage in our giving the Press some guidance, providing always we are sure of not making it hard to confine ourselves to action as in paragraph 3 above. If there is any doubt on this point the less publication the better.

6. The essential point about Grey is that his fate is related to prisoners, particularly NCNA prisoners, in Hong Kong; strong action against NCNA in London is unlikely to help him. His best chance is if we can maintain move towards detention and arrange their release or deportation. The fact that Hsueh was initially cool to the idea of a

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CONFIDENTIAL