TNAG-0003-FCO40-39-Commission-of-Enquiry-into-the-Kowloon-disturbances-addition-1968 — Page 133

PART VI

CONCLUSIONS

113

1-

th

th

of

of

2933528

le

ed

412. Nevertheless, it seemed to us that behind the early demonstrations and the movements of those concerned, there may have been a measure of organization which had not been uncovered by police inquiries and which we were not able to uncover in the course of our inquiry. As one or two highly responsible witnesses indicated, a public inquiry is at a disadvantage in this respect because of a natural reluctance amongst many people to come forward and give testimony in open forum. In view of the hazards involved, the possibility of antagonizing someone or of saying, on the spur of the moment when under close questioning, something unwise or foolish, together with the ever present danger of being misinterpreted or misreported, it requires both considerable courage and a high sense of public duty to expose oneself in this way. If the ordinary citizen is likely to feel a reluctance to speak, then anybody involved in organizing these demonstrations, whose activities were not already known, would be extremely unlikely to volunteer to speak of these activities in public. Whether if we had held our inquiry in camera they would have been less reticent must remain doubtful. In any event, the reticence of some of the witnesses as to what caused them to appear on the scene at certain significant moments and the untruths in which they tended to take refuge, left us with the impression that there was a greater measure of organization behind the earlier ng part of the demonstrations than they were prepared to disclose. It is difficult to credit that their appearances were as fortuitous and uninspired as they wanted us to believe.

he

ar

alt

est

he

CER 2 3 5 4

ies

en

le-

413. In particular, the presence of the banners and the movements of the group or groups which set out from Hong Kong for Kowloon on the Jordan ity Road and the Sham Shui Po ferries indicated, we think, the existence of a more

ley

lad

ice

the

hat

the

no

lice

also

ring

lese

de-

inks

d a

ime

be

trily

t if

calculated stimulant and motivation that was disclosed to us by the witnesses. But, if there was any organization at this stage, we do not think it went beyond 'peaceful demonstrations'-though, of course, with the hazards these entail. The violence which subsequently ensued may not have been desired or even contem- plated by the young people themselves or by those, possibly not so young, who may have been encouraging or directing their activities at this time; yet, given the crowded conditions of the areas in which these young people were seeking to operate, the readiness with which crowds could gather and be swept along by mass excitement, stimulated perhaps in some instances by active ill-will, the danger of riotous behaviour was an ever present peril.

414. The theory of massive discontent. We also considered the theory that the riots arose from a spontaneous explosion of serious public discontent at rising costs or other factors, but found that this was not borne out by the evidence.

415. Discontent at social or economic conditions is seldom sufficient by itself to make people riot. Moreover, conditions in Hong Kong have been improving for the bulk of the population, although there has been some increase in the expression of dissatisfaction in recent years. This is by no means an uncommon