TNAG-0003-FCO40-39-Commission-of-Enquiry-into-the-Kowloon-disturbances-addition-1968 — Page 132

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PART VI CONCLUSIONS

activities had, we think, a powerful effect on the demonstrators and strongly in- fluenced the decision to intensify the demonstrations by marching through Kowloon. At this stage, in our opinion, the demonstration lost direct touch with opposition to ferry fares and developed a momentum of its own. Many passages of the evidence point to this conclusion. It is also supported by the photographs of the marchers; their age and appearance indicate that they could have little knowledge of the issues at stake, certainly no more than those who appeared before us.

The Transition to Violence

409. Before going on to express our own views as to how and why the demon- strations thus begun erupted into violence, it seems desirable to look at the theories which appear to have gained most currency.

410. Although the majority of commentators immediately after the riots appear to have accepted that the demonstration march on April 5th was the direct result of the agitation against Star Ferry fare increases, the 'hunger strike' and the arrest of SO Sau Chung, there was considerable reluctance to accept the possibility of the rioting having sprung directly from the demonstrations, or of the rioters having been in many cases the same people as the demonstrators. Broadly, the theories of causation propounded at that time suggested either that the rioting had been planned by some person or organization or was a spontaneous explosion of wide- spread discontent in the population..

411. The theory of prior organization. We examined closely the possibility of the riots having been organized. The most obvious explanation was that they had been organized or exploited by either of the political factions or by the triad societies. These were, however, excluded by unqualified statements from the Police that there was no indication of any political or triad control or exploitation of the situation. This view was confirmed by the evidence of the participants, and by that of most eyewitnesses, who agreed that the damage was indiscriminate, that the actions were spontaneous and unco-ordinated and that there appeared to be no central organization or control. A similar statement was received from the Police in respect of the possibility of organization by criminal gangs in Kowloon.(1)

(1) Sir Lindsay RIDE wishes to add that the views expressed in this paragraph are also supported by the fact that although SO's demonstration took place mainly during the day, the demonstration marches and riots appeared only at night; had these latter been under the control of lawless factions they would probably have de- veloped into round-the-clock disturbances, at any rate, in certain areas. He thinks it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the disturbances had not reached a tempo sufficient to attract the open participation of lawless factions by the time the police had re-established their complete control of the area, and it would be dangerous to believe that no evidence of the activity of lawless factions necessarily means that they were not carefully observing the situation, ready to exploit it if and when they considered the time propitious.

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