XN000022-1972-05-24 — Page 3

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Wednesday, May 24, 1972

* the fireboats tackled the blaze as quickly and capably as

they wore able, but it may be that the stationing of one small fireboat in Aberdeen Harbour is not sufficient in

present conditions;

* the Jumbo was consumed entirely except for the basic hull

and superstructure;

if completed and used as intended the Jumbo would have presented a risk to life in the case of fire.

On the rapid spread of the fire to the remainder of the vessel,

the Commission says this was caused by the open plan design coupled with

the chimney effect of the central staircase complex, the highly inflammable

decorative material lining the inside and outside of the Jumbo, the

indiscriminate distribution of dangerous goods and other combustible

material, and the uninsulated steel construction of the hull and superstructure.

Fire Alarm System

Commenting on the loss of life, the Commission says this may

be attributed to the lack of an adequate fire alarm system, the rapid

spread of the fire, and the lack of safe escape routes.

On the question of criminal liability, the Commission makes

this observation: "We have deliberately refrained from any attempt to

apportion the responsibility between the parties we have just mentioned

or to determine their civil liabilities to each other, to their respective

workmen or to third parties. These are matters which should, if necessary,

be properly left to the regular courts of law. We have considered, only

to reject apart from matters within the Dangerous Goods Ordinance

the question of criminal liability. The acts and the commissions wero

negligent. They caused death. But in no instance do we think they reached

that high degree of negligence or recklessness that is necessary to bring

them within the realm of manslaughter.'

/On the