3
Wednesday, May 24, 1972
* the fireboats tackled the blaze as quickly and capably as
they wore able, but it may be that the stationing of one small fireboat in Aberdeen Harbour is not sufficient in
present conditions;
* the Jumbo was consumed entirely except for the basic hull
and superstructure;
if completed and used as intended the Jumbo would have presented a risk to life in the case of fire.
On the rapid spread of the fire to the remainder of the vessel,
the Commission says this was caused by the open plan design coupled with
the chimney effect of the central staircase complex, the highly inflammable
decorative material lining the inside and outside of the Jumbo, the
indiscriminate distribution of dangerous goods and other combustible
material, and the uninsulated steel construction of the hull and superstructure.
Fire Alarm System
Commenting on the loss of life, the Commission says this may
be attributed to the lack of an adequate fire alarm system, the rapid
spread of the fire, and the lack of safe escape routes.
On the question of criminal liability, the Commission makes
this observation: "We have deliberately refrained from any attempt to
apportion the responsibility between the parties we have just mentioned
or to determine their civil liabilities to each other, to their respective
workmen or to third parties. These are matters which should, if necessary,
be properly left to the regular courts of law. We have considered, only
to reject apart from matters within the Dangerous Goods Ordinance
the question of criminal liability. The acts and the commissions wero
negligent. They caused death. But in no instance do we think they reached
that high degree of negligence or recklessness that is necessary to bring
them within the realm of manslaughter.'
/On the