Hong Kong Annual Administration Reports, 1841–1941
PAPERS RELATING TO THE
quisitiveness and imitative powers would soon induce them to copy those things which would conduce to their physical, and, ultimately, to their moral and religious improvement.
IN A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW.
Hong Kong was occupied by our troops and merchants in 1840-41, at a period when our trade was driven from Canton, when we were in hostility to the Chinese Government, and when the Portuguese authorities at Macao had expressed their inability to permit, as usual, British residence and resort to that port. At this period, the views of Captain Elliot were solely directed towards Canton. Hong Kong was then deemed the most eligible spot for British occupation on political and military grounds; and so it proved, as long as the operations were being directed against Canton, and we were excluded from China, but on our proceeding to the northward, occupying Chusan, and ultimately making peace and opening five ports (including Canton) for free commercial resort, English residence, and the establishment of a ship of war at each port, the political and mercantile value of Hong Kong entirely ceased. The late war has shown us the vulnerable point of China, namely, the Yang-tze-Kiang River, which is aptly denominated by the Chinese the "Girdle of the Empire." In the event of any future hostilities, our force would be directed at once toward Nankin, and other places on the Yang-tze-Kiang River, and not against Canton. It is by interrupting the supplies of grain and salt to Pekin, and cutting off the trade of the great artery or canal, that we can with the least expenditure of blood or treasure terminate hostilities with China.
To accomplish this most desirable result, Hong Kong is utterly valueless; our position must be Chusan, from its contiguity to the seat of war, from its comparative salubrity, safe haven, and capability of supplying provisions both from the resources of the island itself, and from the contiguous coasts. A fleet of ships of war and transports may rendezvous at Chusan, and select at will the most fitting period of the year for offensive operations; no attack need be apprehended from the Chinese; coal is abundant in the Yang-tze-Kiang for the use of steamers; ships from Singapore and the southward can now, by reason of a greater knowledge of the winds and currents, reach Chusan even against the monsoon, in nearly the same time they would occupy in reaching Hong Kong; and, finally, the Chinese Government, aware of our position, would be the less disposed to break the peace, and would cease to rely so much as they do now, on the strength of the forts in the Canton River. The policy of the Chinese Government is to keep foreigners at the extremity of the empire; but the sagacious reasons which dictate this policy ought to render us more anxious to operate in a counter direction. There are now seven fortifications, very strong and apparently well provided with artillery at the Bogue; with Chinese gunners, these forts would prove even at present formidable to an invading force, but well manned by European or American artillerymen, the Bogue would be almost as impregnable as the Dardanelles.
On a review of the whole case, there are no assignable grounds for the political or military occupancy of Hong Kong, even if there were no expense attending that occupancy. The Government of China is sufficiently civilised to respect the persons and property of British subjects at Canton before any declaration of war took place (which, however, is an event of very remote probability for many years to come), and as the treaty with China provides for the stationing of a ship of war at Whampoa or Canton, a better security is thus provided for any British residents at Canton than Hong Kong could afford. The climate of Hong Kong will not admit of the island being a garrison for troops, and in the event of another war with China, an invading army must proceed from India; but a very small effective force can be maintained here unless at an enormous expense, and the impracticability of fortifying an island which is commanded by the hills around, and by any large battery erected on the opposite shore, is now generally acknowledged, and is in further corroboration of the inutility of Hong Kong. On a review of the whole question, and examining the island in all aspects, making every allowance for the newness of the settlement, and admitting, for argument's sake, that ultimately there may be some trade at Hong Kong, it appears to me very advisable that if Hong Kong be retained as a British station or colony, that the civil establishment of the colony be cut down to a scale commensurate with the resources and wants of the island, and that the supernumerary officers be provided for in other colonies as vacancies occur; that the European and sepoy troops be removed, and a portion of the late Ceylon Regiment (Malays) be kept at Hong Kong in aid of the civil power; that a frigate or sloop of war be always stationed in the harbour, with an extra complement of marines, to be landed only in case of emergency; that the British and other respectable inhabitants who are householders be formed into a municipal body, with power to assess themselves for the police, lighting, drainage, and street-making, &c., of Victoria; that the harbour be a free port, open to ships under every flag; and that encouragement be given for the resort to and settlement on the island of other European nations.
If this be done, a few years will determine whether it be possible to create any trade or induce any resort to Hong Kong. Large Government establishments, and an immense outlay of the public money for the last three years, have produced no beneficial result; let the opium traders, and those who choose to resort thither, have a voice in the management of the affairs of the colony. There can scarcely be less general trade, less prosperity, less security to life and property, than now exists with a large garrison on shore and a fleet in the harbour.
If there were any one advantage, political, commercial, financial, or religious, present or prospective, derivable to England from the existing establishment at Hong Kong, there
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Hong Kong Annual Administration Reports, 1841–1941
PAPERS RELATING TO THE
quisitiveness and imitative powers would soon induce them to copy those things which would conduce to their physical, und, ultimately, to their moral and religious improve-
ment.
IN A POLITical Point OF VIEW.
Hong Kong was occupied by our troops and merchants in 1840-41, at a period when our trade was driven from Canton, when we were in hostility to the Chinese Governinent, and when the Portuguese authorities at Macao had expressed their inability to permit, as usual, British residence and resort to that port. At this period, the views of Captain Elliot were solely directed towards Canton. Hong Kong was then deemed the most eligible spot for British occupation on political and military grounds; and so it proved, as long as the opera- tions were being directed against Canton, and we were excluded from China, but on our proceeding to the northward, occupying Chusan, and ultimately making peace and opening five ports (including Canton) for free commercial resort, English residence, and the estab- lishment of a ship of war at cach port, the political and mercantile value of Hong Kong entirely ceased. The late war has shown us the vulnerable point of China, namely, the Yang-tze-Kiang River, which is aptly denominated by the Chinese the "Girdle of the Empire." In the event of any future hostilities, our force would be directed at once toward Nankin, and other places on the Yang-tze-Kiang River, and not against Canton. It is by interrupting the supplies of grain and salt to Pekin, and cutting off the trade of the great artery or canal, that we can with the least expenditure of blood or treasure terminate hos- tilities with China.
To accomplish this most desirable result, Hong Kong is utterly valueless; our position must be Chusan, from its contiguity to the seat of war, from its comparative salubrity, safe haven, and capability of supplying provisions both from the resources of the island itself, and from the contiguous coasts. A fleet of ships of war and transports may rendezvous at Chusan, and select at will the most fitting period of the year for offensive operations; no attack need be apprehended from the Chinese; coal is abundant in the Yang-ize-Kiang for the use of steamers; ships from Singapore and the southward can now, by reason of a greater knowledge of the winds and currents, reach Chusan even against the monsoon, in nearly the same time they would occupy in reaching Hong Kong; and, finally, the Chinese Government, aware of our position, would be the less disposed to break the peace, and would cease to rely so much as they do now, on the strength of the forts in the Canton River. The policy of the Chineso Government is to keep foreigners at the extremity of the empire; but the sagacious reasons which dictate this policy ought to render us more auxious to operate in a counter direction. There are now seven fortifications, very strong and apparently well provided with artillery at the Bogue; with Chinese gunners, these forts would prove even at present formidable to an invading force, but well manned by Euro- pean or American artillerymen, the Bogue would be almost as impregnable as the Dardanelles.
On a review of the whole case, there are no assignable grounds for the political or military occupancy of Hong Kong, even if there were no expense attending that occupancy. The Government of China is sufficiently civilised to respect the persons and property of British subjects at Canton before any declaration of war took place (which, however, is an event of very remote probability for many years to come), and as the treaty with China provides for the stationing of a ship of war at Whampoa or Canton, a better security is thus provided for any British residents at Canton than Iong Kong could afford. The climate of Hong Kong will not admit of the island being a garrison for troops, and in the event of another war with China, an invading army must proceed from India; but a very small effective force can be maintained here unless at an enormous expense, and the impractica- bility of fortifying an island which is commanded by the hills around, and by any large battery erected on the opposite shore, is now generally acknowledged, and is in further corrobora- tion of the inutility of Hong Kong. On a review of the whole question, and examining the island in all aspects, making every allowance for the newness of the settlement, and admitting, for argument's sake, that ultimately there may be some trade at Hong Kong, it appears to me very advisable that if Hong Kong be retained as a British station or colony, that the civil establishment of the colony be cut down to a scale commensurate with the resources and wants of the island, and that the supernumerary officers be provided for in other colonies as vacancies occur; that the European and sepoy troops be removed, and a portion of the lat Ceylon Regiment (Malays) be kept at Hong Kong in aid of the civil power; that a frigate or sloop of war be always stationed in the harbour, with an extra complement of marines, to be landed only in case of emergency; that the British and other respectable inhabitants who are householders be formed into a municipal body, with power to assess themselves for the police, lighting, drainage, and street-making, &c., of Victoria; that the harbour be a free port, open to ships under every flag; and that encouragement be given for the resort to and settlement on the island of other European nations.
If this be done, a few years will determine whether it be possible to create any trade or induce any resort to Hong Kong. Large Government establishments, and an immense outlay of the public money for the last three years, have produced no beneficial result; let the opium traders, and those who choose to resort thither, have a voice in the management of the affairs of the colony. There can scarcely be less general trade, less prosperity, less security to life and property, than now exists with a large garrison on shore and a fleet in the harbour.
If there were any one advantage, political, commercial, financial, or religious, present or prospective, derivable to England from the existing establishment at IÏong Kong, thero
would
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