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Australia, and from all our stations eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, would soon recapture the place or starve out the garrison.
But Gibraltar is differently circumstanced; it effectually commands the narrow entrance of the Mediterranean, and, together with the fortress and havens of Malta and Corfu, give England a preponderating power in that great European sea, which is becoming daily of more and more value in our intercourse with the Anglo-Eastern empire; moreover, Gibraltar is a valuable commercial entrepôt; at one period, 1,000,000l. sterling of cotton goods were exported through Gibraltar into Spain. As a fortress, Gibraltar is perfect; it is impregnable. The revenue of Gibraltar is fully adequate to its civil government, and averages upwards of 30,000l. per annum. The military expenses incurred by garrisoning Gibraltar saves the constant maintenance of a large fleet in the Mediterranean, preserves the balance of power, and materially helps to keep the peace of Europe. The remarks applicable to Gibraltar are also applicable to Malta and the Ionian Islands, both of which stations not only pay their whole civil expenditure without one shilling charge on the British Exchequer, but also contribute a considerable sum annually towards military defences and protection. Both of these places are also entrepôts of a large trade. Every colony of the British empire pays for its own civil government, except small sums which are voted annually in part for the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Falkland Islands, St. Helena, and Heligoland. But all these places are intrinsically valuable; the Bahamas, for the geographical position of their harbours; Bermuda, as a strong fortress and dockyard in the Western Atlantic; the Falkland Islands, for their important position in the Great Southern Ocean, near Cape Horn; St. Helena, as a strong fortress and recruiting station for our numerous ships doubling the Cape of Good Hope in the voyages to and from India, China, and Australasia; and in the event of war, the possession of St. Helena would be of great value to our merchants, and save us a large fleet in the Atlantic. Heligoland, in time of war, is a commercial depôt for the Elbe, and the northern ports of Europe. Its expense is only about 500l. a year. Numerous as are the colonies of the British empire, they are each of some utility to England; for their territorial extent as emigration fields to provide employment for a surplus population, for their production of sugar, coffee, corn, cotton, silk, indigo, timber, oil, wool, &c., trading emporiums, or fishing stations. I have in vain sought for one valuable quality in Hong Kong; for there are other good harbours around, and for 200 years we have not found the want of such. I can see no justification for the British Government spending one shilling on Hong Kong.
RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE.
The benefits derivable from our laws, institutions, and religion can never be conferred on the Chinese by our colonization of Hong Kong.
We are here, in fact, almost as much isolated from China, its people, and supreme government, as if we were located in the Eastern Archipelago. By the adroit policy adopted by the Chinese authorities, a "cordon sanitaire," if I may so express it, has been drawn round Hong Kong. No Chinaman is permitted to come here willingly, except he be a thief, a pirate or a spy. No respectable Chinese with their families, locate themselves in Hong Kong; if they did, their relations still remaining on the main land would probably be "squeezed," imprisoned, tortured, and considered as traitors to the Celestial Empire.
Hong Kong is viewed by the Chinese as a spot where adventurers and reckless characters may make something out of the English, and where burglars and robbers may resort with impunity, and live upon the profits of their villany.
I am strongly of opinion, from circumstances that have come to my knowledge, that the mandarins view with indulgence all vagabonds who propose to quit their own country and proceed to Hong Kong; that, in fact, direct encouragement is afforded them to do so, It is, therefore, the height of improbability to suppose that the possession of Hong Kong will ever enable us to disseminate our religion, language, and institutions in the Chinese empire. For 200 years we have had extensive and profitable intercourse with Canton, without our missionaries and other good men ever producing the slightest effect on the people or government. The inhabitants of the southern districts are decidedly hostile to us, and are daily becoming more and more filled with a deadly animosity, which the possession of Hong Kong will not remove. No converts are made by our missionaries on this island; but, were such the case, no converts from Hong Kong would be favourably viewed by the respectable Chinese on the main land. The Christian converts would be considered as coming from an island of thieves and pirates; they would be received with a suspicion which would check rather than advance the progress of Christianity. The missionaries with whom I have conversed, take this view of the subject. They consider it hopeless to attempt the spread of Christian doctrines in China by means of converts from Hong Kong, Thus, in a religious aspect, Hong Kong is as valueless as it is on financial and commercial grounds.
Were our colonial authority and establishment at some island or position to the north, near the central regions of China, we should most probably obtain considerable moral influence over an intelligent and respectable class of Chinese, who would communicate their favourable ideas to other and distant parts of the empire, and by extending a knowledge of our language, pave the way for the introduction of Christianity. An English city at Chusan, for example, surrounded by an extensive agricultural population (the best disposed and most orderly in China, as well as elsewhere), and evincing all the benefits of the science and skill of Europe, would have a remarkable effect on the Chinese, whose inquisitiveness...
148.
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1841-1886
COLONY OF HONG KONG, &c.
13
Australia, and from all our stations castward of the Cape of Good Hope, would soon recapture the place or starve out the garrison.
But Gibraltar is differently circumstanced; it effectually commands the narrow entrance of the Mediterranean, and, together with the fortress and havens of Malta and Corfu, give England a preponderating power in that great European sea, which is becoming daily of more and more value in our intercourse with the Anglo-Eastern empire; moreover, Gib- raltar is a valuable commercial entrepôt; at one period, 1,000,000Z. sterling of cotton goods were exported through Gibraltar into Spain. As a fortress, Gibraltar is perfect; it is impreguable. The revenue of Gibraltar is fully adequate to its civil government, and averages upwards of 30,000% per annum. The military expenses incurred by garrisoning Gibraltar saves the constant maintenance of a large fleet in the Mediterranean, preserves the balance of power, and materially helps to keep the peace of Europe. The remarka applicable to Gibraltar are also applicable to Malta and the Ionian Islands, both of which stations not only pay their whole civil expenditure without one shilling charge on the British Exchequer, but also contribute a considerable sum annually towards military defences and protection. Both of these places are also entrepôts of a large trade. Every colony of the British empire pays for its own civil government, except small sums which are voted annually in part for the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Falkland Islands, St. Helena, and IIeligoland. But all these places are intrinsically valuable; the Bahamas, for the geographical position of their harbours; Bermuda, as a strong fortress and dockyard in the Western Atlantic; the Falkland Islands, for their important position in the Great Southern Ocean, near Cape Horn; St. IIclena, as a strong fortress and recruiting station for our numerous ships doubling the Cape of Good Hope in the voyages to and from India, Chim, and Australasia; and in the event of war, the possession of St. Helena would be of great value to our merchants, and save us a large fleet in the Atlantic. Heligoland, in time of war, is a commercial depôt for the Elbe, and the northern ports of Europe. Its expense is only about 5001 a year. Numerous as are the colonies of the British empire, they are each of some utility to England; for their territorial extent as emigration fields to provide employment for a surplus population, for their production of sugar, coffee, corn, cotton, silk, indigo, timber, oil, wood, &c., trading emporiums, or fishing stations. I have in vain sought for one valuable quality in Hong Kong; for there are other good harbours around, and for 200 years we have not found the want of such. I can see no justification for the British Government spending one shilling on Hong Kong.
RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE.
The benefits derivable from our laws, institutions, and religion can never be conferred on the Chinese by our colonization of Hong Kong.
We are here, in fact, almost as much isolated from China, its people, and supreme govern- ment, as if we were located in the Eastern Archipelago. By the adroit policy adopted by the Chinese authorities, a "cordon sanitaire,” if I may so express it, has been drawn round Hong Kong. No Chinaman is permitted to come here willingly, except he be a thief, a pirate or a spy. No respectable Chinese with their families, locate themselves in Hong Kong; if they did, their relations still remaining on the main Innd would probably be "squeezed," imprisoned, tortured, and considered as traitors to the Celestial Empire.
Hong Kong is viewed by the Chinese as a spot where adventurers and reckless characters may make something out of the English, and where burglars and robbers may resort with impunity, and live upon the profits of their villany.
I am strongly of opinion, from circumstances that have come to my knowledge, that the mandarins view with indulgence all vagabonds who propose to quit their own country and proceed to Hong Kong; that, in fact, direct encouragement is afforded them to do so, It is, therefore, the height of improbability to suppose that the possession of Hong Kong will ever enable us to disseminate our religion, language, and institutions in the Chineso empire. For 200 years we have had extensive and profitable intercourse with Canton, without our missionaries and other good inen ever producing the slightest effect on the people or government. The inhabitants of the southern districts are decidedly hostile to us, and are daily becoming more and more filled with a deadly animosity, which the pog- session of Hong Kong will not remove. No converts are made by our missionarics on this island; but, were such the case, no converts from Ilong Kong would be favourably viewed by the respectable Chinese on the main land. The Christian converts would be considered as coming from an island of thieves and pirates; they would be received with a suspiciou which would check rather than advance the progress of Christianity. The missionaries with whom I have conversed, take this view of the subject. They consider it hopeless to attempt the spread of Christian doctrines in China by nicans of converts from Hong Kong, Thus, in a religious aspect, Hong Kong is as valueless as it is on financial and commercial grounds.
Were our colonial authority and establishment at some island or position to the north, near the central regions of China, we should most probably obtain considerable moral infiu- ence over an intelligent and respectable class of Chinese, who would communicate their favourable ideas to other and distant parts of the empire, and by extending a knowledge of our language, pave the way for the introduction of Christianity. An English city at Chusan, for example, surrounded by an extensive agricultural population (the best disposed and most orderly in China, as well as elsewhere), and evincing all the benefits of the science and skill of Europe, would have a remarkable effect on the Chinese, whose in
148.
quisitiveness
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15
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