CO885-5 — Page 78

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference :-

CO. 885/5

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO

Third Raport, paragraphs 79-81.

Third Report, peragraphs 82, 88.

Third Report,

paragraphs 84-87.

Third Roport, paragraphs 80, 83.

Third Report, paragraphs 89, 90.

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should be organized without delay. In an emergency assistance could be speedily obtained from Singapore.

Hong Kong.

Hong Kong is the chief centre of British trade in the China Sea, and the only British possession from which that trade can be protected. The Commission "have no hesitation in saying that Hong Kong must be adequately defended and garrisoned, and that no time should be lost in making it strong enough to withstand for some time, alone and unaided, the attack of an enemy.'

The harbour is a safe anchorage, and can be made secure as a first-class naval station and port of refuge; but the existing defences are unsatisfactory, and an expenditure estimated at 370,1937. will be required to place them in a proper condition.

"

A peculiar source of danger which exists at Hong Kong should be noted. The barracks are separated from each other, and the Ordnance stores are in five different places, so that, in the event of an outbreak of the overwhelming Chinese population, these establishments could afford each other no support, and would be liable to be destroyed in detail. To meet this difficulty it has been proposed to concentrate the whole of the naval and military establishments on a new and con- venient site. This scheme finds favour in the Colony, and would enable great improvements to be effected in the town without cost, as it is estimated that the sale of the sites now occupied would more than defray the cost of the new works. The question is one which calls for an early decision. Assuming that this scheme will be adopted, the Commission think it would be reasonable that the Colony should pay for the execution of all local works, including the construction of barracks, naval and store establishments, forts and batteries; receiving in return the sites now occupied in the town by the naval and military establishments, while the Imperial Government should supply armaments, submarine mines, and floating defences, valued at 162,0457.

The existing garrison numbers 1,212. This number will need to be raised to 2,672. Little assistance can be looked for from resident Europeans, who number less than 1,000; and there are grave objections to the enlistment of Chinese as soldiers. Thus the garrison can only be brought up to the required strength by sending more British troops, or by obtaining men from India. The garrison, in whatever manner constituted, must be kept up to its full strength in time of peace.

The largest of the docks at Hong Kong is situated outside the line of the proposed defences. The construction of other docks within the harbour is under- stood to be in contemplation, and the Commission suggest whether, by some arrangement with the owners, these docks might not be made to fulfil the require- ments of the navy. Another subject requiring consideration is the water supply. The Commission suggest that inquiry should be made whether a sufficient supply for the town could not be obtained within the proposed defences before further steps are taken in the construction of the new reservoir, which is outside the line of defence.

Hong Kong is at present the most advanced of British possessions in the East. An additional station further north is much required, looking especially to the fact that Russia has of late years been increasing her power, naval and military, in this part of the world, and is believed to aim at extending her influence southward by obtaining a port in Corea. The Commission believe that the best mode of dealing with Russia in the Pacific in time of war will be by strengthening the China Station," and they even suggest the transfer of the Pacific squadron from the eastern side of the Pacific to the China seas. The naval authorities have urged

that Port Hamilton, a small island off the south-east coast of Corea containing a good and defensible harbour, should be occupied. "The occupation of Port Hamilton would greatly strengthen our position in those seas as against Russia, and add materially to the security of Hong Kong and of the trade to the north of it. Indeed, without some outpost of this kind, it would be impossible, owing to the prevailing wind, to protect trade north of Hong Kong, or to act with effect against the Russian ports." "We desire," the Commission says in conclusion, "to impress upon your Majesty's Government the importance of at once opening_negotiations with a view to securing possession of this commanding station. Failing negotiation, any further steps in regard to obtaining possession of Port Hamilton must be matter for the consideration of your Majesty's Government.”

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Connected with the protection of British commerce in the Pacific, which, Third Report, in the view of the Commission, centres in Hong Kong, is the question of defending Esquimalt, the station of Her Majesty's fleet in the North Pacific. Esquimalt

paragraphe 124-138. is the most remote and isolated of all the naval stations. possessions, Fiji and Hong Kong, are at so great a distance that they could give it The nearest British no support; and on the line of communication with England there is no British territory nearer than the Falkland Islands, 7,400 miles distant. The Pacific squadron depends for coal upon a number of foreign ports on the western coast of the American Continent, and in time of war two British coaling-stations between Esquimalt and the Falkland Islands will be indispensable if communi- cation is to be kept up. So strongly has this need been felt that the Admiralty have more than once had under consideration suggestions for occupying certain islands in the Pacific off the coast of America. To such a course," the Commission think," there are grave objections. The islands belong to independent Powers, and even if they could be obtained by negotiation, it is almost certain that their occupation would lead to serious difficulties with the United States.'

The situation of Esquimalt with reference to the territories of Maritime Powers is such that there would appear to be little likelihood of attack, except by the United States and, perhaps, Russia. Esquimalt cannot be defended against the United States. The defence of the place against Russia would cost 104,5001, and would involve the maintenance of a permanent garrison of 1,300 regular troops; but British trade in the North Pacific is insignificant in amount, and with the exception of the naval arsenal, there is little in British Columbia to invite a Russian attack. On the other hand, "if a British squadron is to be maintained on the western seaboard of America, Esquimalt must be fortified. Until the defences are adequate at least to meet the attack of a squadron, Esquimalt cannot be pronounced to be a safe coaling and refitting station. The Pacific squadron cannot be kept permanently at Esquimalt for the defence of the harbour, and it must be remembered that the destruction of the stores and munitions would place Her Majesty's ships in a position of extreme danger with no help nearer than Hong Kong, distant 5,700 miles."

These considerations brought the Commission to the conclusion "that, from a military point of view, and in the present stage of commercial development of the province, it would be inexpedient to construct powerful works of defence at Esquimalt and to establish a large garrison;" and failing to see how the fleet when deprived of coaling-stations could continue active operations on the western seaboard of America,, they "think it matter for grave consideration whether the squadron would not be of more service for the protection of British interests in the Pacific if employed to reinforce the China Station. In that event the present naval establishment at Esquimalt might be dispensed with. It does not follow from this that British interests on this coast need be neglected. proceed, "that visits by a flying squadron or occasional cruizers would afford as efficacious protection as that now in fact given by the Pacific squadron. The We consider," they changes which we recommend are a transfer and redistribution of our naval power, rather than a diminution of our force in the Pacific." The Commission, however, "do not overlook the fact that in the Dominion the wish may be strongly entertained that Vancouver Island should continue to be the station of the Pacific squadron, and that Esquimalt should be so defended by permanent works as to render it a coaling and refitting station to which, except in the case of war with the United States, the squadron could at all times resort with confidence. Should this be found to be the wish of the Dominion, and should the Canadian Government determine to provide adequate works and garrison for the defence of Esquimalt," the Commission "are of opinion that Her Majesty's Government should supply the armament, and should give any professional assistance that may be desired." They add that "no serious change in the disposition of the naval forces in the North Pacific which can affect Esquimalt should be made without the fullest and most frank communication with the Dominion Government."

The question of Esquimalt is difficult, and two of the Commissioners were Third Report, unable to join in the recommendations of their colleagues. Sir Alexander Milne pp. 32 and 33. and Sir Henry Barkly consider that the present Pacific squadron should not be transferred to the China command, and that the naval station at Esquimalt ought not to be abandoned.

The Admiralty attach importance to Fiji, but the only recommendation which Third Report, the Commission make with regard to Fiji is that fitting sites should be secured paragraphe 148-145.

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