CO885-5 — Page 77

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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LHC.O. 885

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5 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

First Report, paragraphs 5-10.

Third Report, paragraphe 30-38.

Third Report, paragraph 84.

Third Report, paragraphs 35-46.

3

Aden.

A careful consideration of the relative importance of the Suez Canal and Cape routes to the East led the Commission to the conclusion that the former route might become so precarious in time of war that it would have to be abandoned. Even if the continued use of the Canal could be assured, the voyage through the Mediterranean would in certain contingencies be attended with great risk. The Mediterranean, owing to its length and the number of ports which it contains, is peculiarly favour- able to the operations of the cruizers of any of the surrounding Powers; and notwith- standing the support of Malta and Gibraltar, it is doubtful whether in a serious war a sufficient naval force could be spared to maintain British naval supremacy in this A temporary loss of supremacy in the Mediterranean might enable hostile ships to be sent through the Suez Canal for the purpose of attacking British posses- sions and trade in the Indian Ocean, and this consideration points to the importance of Aden.

sca.

A fleet resting upon Aden, which is situated at a distance of 100 miles from the entrance to the Red Sea, would be in a position to close the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, and prevent an enemy's ships from entering the Indian Ocean. Aden is also valuable as a coaling-station for ships using the Suez Canal route, and the loss of so com- manding a position would be disastrous. The estimated cost of defending Aden is 235,000%, which the Commission think should be equally divided between the Imperial Government and the Government of India. A garrison of 2,000 men will be required, and should, as now, be provided by the Government of India. Connected with the defence of Aden is the question of deepening the harbour. At present ships lying in the roadstead would seriously interfere with the action of the batteries while receiving little protection themselves. If the inner harbour were deepened, large ships could lie inside, where they would be sheltered, and out of the way of the batteries. The Commission are of opinion that no small expenditure should stand in the way of this improvement.

Proposals have been made to defend Perim instead of Aden; but the Commission, while they recognize the advantages which in some respects Perim possesses over Aden, do not concur in this suggestion.

Colombo.

9

abandon Trincomalee altogether, and to dismantle and raze the existing fortifica- tions. Upon this point Sir Alexander Milne differed from the other Commissioners, and his reasons will be found annexed to the third Report. The expense of defending Colombo is estimated at 95,2607.; and the Commission think it would be fair that the Imperial Government should supply the armaments and the torpedo-boats (valued at 74,4407.), while the Colony bears the cost of altering gun and and completing the fortifications (20,8201.), and provides sufficient land in Colombó Harbour to form a moderate naval establishment.

The Imperial troops in Ceylon number at present 1,218. If the detachment Third Report, at Galle were withdrawn, and Trincomalee were given up as a naval station, this paragraphe 47-40. force might be reduced. The Colony pays an annual military contribution of 120,000, the approximate expense of all the troops in the island, except the garrison of Trincomalee. The Commission consider that this arrangement might be modified on the removal of the naval establisment to Colombo, so that the Imperial Government should bear one quarter, and the Colonial Government three quarters of the cost of the European troops.

Singapore.

Singapore is a position of great military, commercial, and political importance. Third Report, It guards the southern end of the Straits of Malacca, controls to some extent the paragraphs 60-71. Straits of Sunda, and is favourably placed for observing the French port of Saigon and the ports of the Dutch East Indies. British trade, to the value of 77,000,000l., passes annually through the Straits, and Singapore has become not only a port of call, but a great commercial centre with extensive wharves, docks, and appliances for repairing large ships. Singapore is also the scat of British Government and the centre of influence in the peninsula. It is a place which ought, without doubt, to be put in a thorough state of defence.

The inner or new harbour comprising the docks, the coaling wharves, and the mercantile portion of the town is easily defensible, but the roadstead, the Govern- ment offices, the native town, and the northern suburbs are less favourably situated. "The protection of the inner harbour would satisfy the requirements of the Royal Navy, and would also provide to a large extent for the security of the mercantile marine. These defences, however, would not prevent the disembarkation of a hostile force north of the Singapore river, which would lay the inner harbour open to comparatively easy attack, neither would they protect that portion of the town which contains Government House, the public offices, the private residences of the European settlers, the native port, and the large native population." The defence of the inner harbour alone would cost 204,3401., and of the inner harbour and road- stead together 500,2051. So dependent are the wealth and prosperity of the Colony upon the security of the port, native town, and roadstead, that, in the opinion of the Commission, the larger scheme for the defence of the harbour and roadstead ought to be carried out. upon to contribute substantially to the first cost and maintenance of the works, and At the same time they think that the Colony may well be called also to the garrison. The division of expense which the Commission suggest is that harbour for a depôt for the Royal Navy, and should bear in addition half the cost of the fortifications and barracks. The Imperial Government to undertake the other half, and to provide the armament and the gun and torpedo-boats.

The Imperial troops in the Straits Settlements number 1,030, of whom 140 are stationed at Penang. defences, and might consist largely of native troops, so that if the detachment at A garrison of 3,000 will be required for the proposed Penang were withdrawn to Singapore little more than 100 additional men, together with a complement of officers for the native auxiliaries, would be required from the Imperial army. The Colony pays an annual military contribution of 50,000%. The Commissiou think that the whole cost of maintaining the proposed garrison and the gun and torpedo-boats, should be equally divided between the Imperial and Colonial Governments. They add that the full strength of the garrison should be maintained

Penang is a place of such commercial importance that the advisability of Third Report, defending Georgetown has often been urged.

dient to establish small isolated defences, and recommend that the troops

But the Commission think it inex- paragraplım 72–74- should be withdrawn from Penang, and that a force of police to take their place

Of the three chief ports in Ceylon: Colombo, Galle, and Trincomalee, the first is the most important. Colombo is the commercial capital, the principal coaling-station, and the only place in the island where machinery can be repaired. The works undertaken, at great expense, for the improvement of the harbour are far advanced; the break-water affords perfect shelter during the south-west monsoon; and docks will probably be made before long. Galle has ceased to be a place of importance owing to the removal of the coaling establishments to Colombo, and the Commission recommend that the existing defences should be dismantled. Trincomalee is the station of Her Majesty's ships, but this magnificent harbour being out of the course of trade, is of no value either to commerce or to the Colony. The naval establishment is small, and is little more than a depôt of stores to which Her Majesty's ships sometimes resort for slight repairs. The cost of making the Colony should provide all land required for the works, and land within the Trincomalee a first-class naval station, including the necessary docks, is estimated at 500,0001.; and considering the means which exist at various ports in the Indian Ocean for repairing merchant ships, and the extensions which are being made to satisfy the increasing demands of trade, the Commission cannot recommend so great an expenditure. They believe that the requirements for a naval establish ment in Ceylon can be substantially satisfied at Colombo, and on this assumption they feel compelled to give the preference to Colombo over Trincomalee. It is, they say, impossible to leave undefended the commercial centre, where a large amount of stores and coal must always be found, and they cannot recommend two defended stations in Ceylon. If Colombo can be made to meet the requirements of the navy, the Commission see no advantage in maintaining the small naval establishment at Trincomalee, which, so long as it remains, must be protected. They point out that an enemy would scarcely venture to use the harbour so long as British

supremacy is maintained in those seas, and that Trincomalee deprived of coal and stores

would hold out no temptation. It would be possible to deny the use of the harbour to an enemy by constructing defences at a cost of 103,000, and maintaining permanent garrison of 350 men; but the Commission think it would be better

to

at all times.