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PUBLIC

RECORD OFFICE

C.O.

Reference :-

885/5 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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Antigua.

59. It appears to us that a secure coaling station in the neighbourhood of the Windward Islands is indispensable if your Majesty's navy is to operate in these seas. In reference to this two ports have been especially brought to our notice: English Harbour, in the Island of Antigua, and Port Castries, in the Island of St. Lucia.

60. English Harbour is a well sheltered port about 1,200 yards long and 200 yards broad, but so shallow that it can only be used for vessels of and under the Encounter" class. There is a small naval yard in the harbour, but owing to the proximity of Falmouth Harbour, from which ships drawing 5 fathoms of water might bombard it, the protection of the dockyard would involve the defence of Falmouth Harbour as well as English Harbour. It is, moreover, 160 miles from Fort de France, and is therefore not so favourably situated as Fort Castries, which is to windward of Martinique, and only 40 miles from Fort de France. Even if the necessary works were erected, English Harbour would only be available for small vessels, and it would still be necessary to provide a secure port for the larger ships of your Majesty's navy.

St. Lucia.

61. Port Castries is an inlet of the sea, about 3,000 yards long and 500 yards broad, with a depth of 9 fathoms over the greater part of its area. It is more easy of access than English Harbour, and is capable of receiving the largest ships, Port Castrics is well placed for the protection of the South Atlantic trade against cruizers belonging to the United States or any other power, and the Admiralty have recommended it as preferable to English Harbour. Objections have been taken on the score of unhealthiness, but recent accounts in this respect are more satisfactory, and we have come to the conclusion that Port Castries is the best station in the Windward Islands for coaling and refitting your Majesty's ships.

Barbados.

62. We have Reports from the War Department on the defences of Carlisle Bay, in front of Bridgetown, the capital of Barbados.

Carlisle Bay is an open roadstead on the west or leeward side of the Island of Barbados, and is a safe anchorage, except during four months of the year, when it is exposed to dangerous hurricanes. There are several old batteries, one of which, Fort Charles, on Needham Point, has recently been remodelled to receive 7-mch 7-ton R.M.L. guns and 64-pounders. The works, however, are totally insufficient for the protection of ships in the bay, or of Bridgetown. It is reported that the low coast line affords few facilities for defence, and that all that can be done by fortifications, unless a very heavy outlay is incurred, is to deny the anchorage to an enemy, without, however, protecting the ships in it, or the town, from bombardment. Under these circumstances we cannot recommend that any additional measures should be taken for the protection of this roadstead. The garrison might, if necessary, be withdrawn to strengthen other positions in the West Indies. We do not doubt that the well-known loyalty and patriotism of the colonists will secure the raising of an efficient local force, which might be of considerable service in time of war, and towards which we think that every encouragement should be given.

Trinidad,

63. There are no defensive works in Trinidad, but a small force of regular troops is stationed in the island. A police force armed with Snider rifles is also maintained. Considering the rapidly increasing importance of Trinidad, we are of opinion that, as in the case of Barbados, every encouragement should be given to the Local Government to organize defences, especially against marauding expeditions. We cannot recommend that Imperial troops should be retained in the island, nor expense incurred by the Imperial Government, which, by undertaking the defence of Port Castries, will contribute largely, to the security of the Colony and its trade.

Bahamas,

64. Nassau is the best harbour in the Bahamas, but will only admit vessels drawing 15 feet of water. The defence of this harbour, which, in consequence of the great depth of water outside, might be attacked by the largest ships, would, according to a Memorandum laid before us by the

War Department, involve a large outlay and a considerable garrison. The local interests are 80 small, and the harbour is so shallow, that we do not consider there is any justification for such an expenditure.

65. To sum up this part of the case, the defended ports on the whole Atlantic coast of America, according to our views, should be Halifax, Bermuda, Port Castries, and Port Royal.

Garrisons for the West Indies.

66. The difficulty of providing Imperial troops for the West Indies is so great that they should not, if possible, be employed for police or kindred purposes, and their advantageous distribution is of the highest importance.

67. Of the six Colonies over which the present force is distributed, Jamaica is the only one in which we recommend the establishment of a strongly protected coaling and refitting station.

68. In our first Report, when dealing with a question relating to Honduras, which had been specially referred to us, we expressed our opinion that in the event of war with a maritime Power it would be imperatively necessary to withdraw the small dotachments which are now kept in some of the less important Colonies mainly for the maintenance of internal peace and order. We recommended that the Colonies so situated should take prompt measures to organize their police, with a view to the troops being ultimately withdrawn. Our recommendations with reference to Honduras apply equally to the four other stations, Barbados, Trinidad, Demerara, and Bahamas. By withdrawing these detachments, the whole force now in the West Indies would be available for the garrisons of Port Custries and Port Royal. We recommend, in the interests of the Colonies, that this withdrawal should take place without unnecessary delay, and during peace.

VI. THE ROUTES BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND PORTS IN SOUTH AMERICA.

The Falkland Islands.

69. Much of the British trade which passes round Cape Horn, or through the Straits of Magellan, will be diverted to the Panamá route when the Panamá Canal is completed, and we have come to the conclusion that the Falkland Islands will, at no remote period, cease to be of military importance.

CONCLUSION.

70. We have now completed a review in detail of the measures which we consider necessary for an organized system of defence of the more important colonial ports and naval stations belonging to your Majesty, which, in our opinion, constitute the coaling-stations of the first class, We conclude our final Report by offering a few observations from a general point of view.

71. The protection of trade within the home seas does not fall within our inquiry, but it is obvious that unless due protection be afforded to British commerce near the shores of the United Kingdom, any measures for its defence in more distant parts of the world will be of little avail.

72. No addition to the number and fighting power of your Majesty's ships will make up for the want of coaling-stations, which, to be of use, must be able to defend themselves. We desire to impress upon your Majesty's Government the paramount importance to the British Empire of secure coaling-stations. The agency of steam has revolutionized naval operations as much as it has altered the ships themselves. The change affects ships of war even in a greater degree than merchant- ships. In a man-of-war, the limited capacity for carrying coal, taken in connection with the high rate of consumption, necessarily limits the range of effective action. Without secure and well- placed coaling-stations your Majesty's ships, however numerous and powerful, will be unable to protect trade, or perhaps even to reach distant parts of the Empire.

73. Two classes of coaling-stations are required.

(1.) Refitting stations and harbours of refuge, in which coal is stored in large quantities. We have entered into detail on the defences necessary for the important stations which fall within this category. They must be strong enough to resist such attacks as may reasonably be expected. Their defences will involve a heavy expenditure of money and large garrisons; their number, therefore, must be as limited as possible.

(2.) Stations at which coal is and must always be kept for the navy, but for which it is unnecessary to provide an extensive system of defence. We have not thought it right to delay our Report by attempting an investigation in detail of the defences necessary for any secondary

stations.

74. Not until the important coaling-stations shall have been made secure can the strength of the British navy be adequately exerted at sea. When, however, this has been accomplished, no other Power will possess equal facilities for keeping fleets at sea, or equally good lines of communications.

75. Leaving out of consideration the route to the East by the Suez Canal as liable to inter- ruption, Gibraltar and Sierra Leone, with such assistance as can be derived from St. Helena, will, when defended, put your Majesty's fleet in the best position for protecting the line of trade from

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