CO885-5 — Page 445

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference :-

C.O.

8855 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO

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IV. THE ROUTES BETWEEN SINGAPORE, THE CHINA SEA, AND AUSTRALIA.

Singapore.

38. Singapore is, as regards the whole of your Majesty's possessions in the East, a position of great military and commercial importance, guarding the southern end of the Straits of Malacca, the main entrance to the Indian Ocean from the eastward,-and in some measure controlling the Straits of Sunda, 450 miles distant. It is a base for your Majesty's ships employed in the protection of trade. Singapore must certainly 1 laced in a thorough state of defence.

39. Owing to an advantageous position, and a fin atural harbour and roadstead, Singapore has become not only a port of call, but a great commercial centre. Extensive wharves, with three docks, capable of accommodating merchant vessels of the largest class, and appliances for effecting the heaviest repairs, have been provided. They are frequently used by Dutch ships of war, and are, of course, available for ships of the Royal Navy. The average quantity of coal in the port in 1876 was 93,000 tons, when the number of steamers calling yearly was about 1,000, but this number having now risen to 1,700, from 12,000 to 15,000 tons are required cach month. Singapore is also the seat of British Government, the centre of influence in the Peninsula, and is growing every year in commercial and political importance. If unprotected, or, as at present, insufficiently protected, Singapore cannot fail to attract the attention of an enemy.

40. For the immediate interests of your Majesty's ships it would suffice, as we have already stated, that the Inner Harbour be well protected. But the prosperity and wealth of the Colony are so dependent upon the security of the port, native town, and roadstead, that in our opinion, a larger scheme for the defence of the harbour and roadstead should be carried out, and we think that the Colony may well be called upon to contribute substantially to the first cost and maintenance of the works and also to the garrison.

41. The population numbers 91,000, and consists mainly of Chinese and Malays, the European and American residents numbering 275. The value of imports and exports in 1880 amounted to £7,420,000.

42. The only existing defence is Fort Cornwallis, an obsolete work at Georgetown. We think it inexpedient to establish small isolated defences, and cannot recommend such for Penang.

43. It has been suggested that the two companies of infantry now at Penang should be withdrawn to Singapore. In our first Report we pointed out that small detachments in isolated positions, afford no protection against attack from seaward, and that, in the event of war with a maritime Power, it would become imperatively necessary to withdraw them. We think that the principle applies in the case of Penang, and that the two companies ought to be withdrawn. Prompt means should be taken to organize a police so that the European troops may be withdrawn without delay. Penang being in telegraphic communication with Singapore, and only thirty-six hours distant by steam, assistance could speedily be obtained, if required on an emergency.

Hong Kong.

44. Hong Kong is at once the chief centre of British trade in the China Sea, and the only possession of your Majesty from which that trade can be protected; 26,801 vessels, with an aggregato burden of 4,185,845 tons, and crews numbering 421,887 hands, entered the port during 1880. Hong Kong is distant from Canton, 80 miles; from Singapore, 1,440 miles; from the French port of Saigon. 940 miles; from Shanghae, 800 miles; from Yokohama, 1,560 miles; from Vladivostock, 1,700 miles; and from Vancouver Island, 5,700 miles. We have no hesitation in saying that Hong Kong must be adequately defended and garrisoned, and no time should be lost in making it strong enough to withstand for some time, alone and unaided, the attack of an enemy. 45. The harbour, which lies between the island and the mainland, is a safe anchorage, and can be made secure as a first class naval station and port of refuge. A commercial dock, called the Aberdeen Dock, already exists, and is capable of receiving a large iron-clad, but is, unfor- tunately, outside the proposed lines of defence. We believe that it is intended to construct other commercial docks within the harbour, and we would suggest whether, by some arrangement with the owners, they might not be made suitable for the requirements of the navy.

46. The defence of Hong Kong has been the subject of frequent inquiry. Some improve- ments have been made in the land works and armaments since 1878, and an iron-clad ship, the "Wyvern," has been stationed in the harbour; but even now the defences are in a very unsatisfactory condition.

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increasing trade through Torres Straits. Colonel Scratchley, in his Report, dated the 31st of Decomber, 1881, states that it is expected that in a short time the mail steamers (carrying cargo, mails and passengers) will run every fortnight, and that in the course of a few years nearly all the trade between Queensland, the East and Europe will be diverted northward, instead of passing, as at present, vià Melbourne, the Cape, and the Suez Canal.”

48. The width of Torres Straits between Cape York and New Guinea is 70 miles, but the navigation is greatly obstructed by reefs, and two channels only are at present in use. These lie on either side of the group of islands of which Thursday Island is one; but it is stated that there are other chamels, and that there is probably a deep passage near the coast of New Guinea which, if properly surveyed and marked, would be available for the largest vessels. Westward of Torres Straits the navigation is comparatively easy, and to the eastward two main routes are available, passing respectively inside and outside the Great Barrier Reefs, which extend almost continuously for a distance of 1,300 miles, in a direction generally parallel with the coast of Queensland.

49. Colonel Scratchley, who is supported by naval authorities, urges the importance of fortifying Thursday Island, with the double object of providing a safe depôt of coals for your Majesty's ships, and of preventing its occupation by an enemy.

50. We are unable to concur in this recommendation. The trade through the straits is undoubtedly increasing, but at present is not, in our opinion of suflicient value to justify the expenditure proposed. Moreover, Thursday Island, although a point of observation from which ships of war might get to close the straits, does not commail the passages now in use, and might be altogether avoided by using one of the unfrequented passages to the north.

V. THE ROUTES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, THE EAST COAST OF NORTH AMERICA, AND THE WEST INDIES.

The East Coast of North America.

51. The trade of the United Kingdom with the United States and Canada exceeds £119,000,000 in annual value, of which a large proportion is food and raw material supplied to the United Kingdom.

52. In the event of war with any other maritime power than the United Sates, the evidence points to the conclusion that merchant ships would require protection only near the coasts at either end, trusting to their own speed for the intermediate portion of the voyage.

53. War between Great Britain and the United States would mainly depend upon naval operations, in which case the fortified ports of Halifax and Bermuda would be of the first impor- tance to your Majesty's navy as coaling stations, and to merchant ships as harbours of refuge. The consideration of the defences of these two stations having been withdrawn from us by your Majesty's Government, we have only to refer to the evidence already taken, and to add that it scens to us very desirable that Halifax should be placed in telegraphic communication with Bermuda, and Bermuda with the British West Indies.

54. We annex somo correspondence on the subject of Newfoundland, but, both with reference to the protection of ports in this Colony and on the Atlantic const of the Dominion of Canada, the question is so intimately connecte with that of the strength of Halifax, that we must necessarily leave the subject to be considered by your Majesty's Government.

55. The Imperial Government by undertaking to keep up a fleet and maintain the fortresses of Halifax and Bermuda affords so large a measure of protection, that the defences of the purely mercantile ports need not be of a very extensive character.

The West Indies.

56. British trade with the West Indies amounts to €21,000,000 annually, an additional trade may be expected upon the completion of the Panamá Canal.

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Thursday Island.

47. Witnesses from the Admiralty have drawn our attention to Thursday Island-one of a group of islands in Torres Straits, situated 20 miles north-west of Cape York, the northernmost point of the Australian Continent. It is a Settlement of the Queensland Government, and was selected as a convenient harbour of refuge and port of call for ships engaged in the rapidly-

Jamaica.

57. Jamaica is the centre of British interests in the West Indies, and in Jamaica, Port Royal is the port best adapted for a naval station. We have a Memorandum from the War Office on its defence, from which it appears that the existing works are insufficient for its security.

58. Considering the central position of Jamaica, and that it is the nearest British territory to the Panama Canal, 560 miles distant, we are of opinion that the defences ought to be so organized as to make it a secure coaling station.

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