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يلشيا
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference :-
། ། ། །
C.O. 885
8
214
the United States between the Atlantic and Pacific; both Germany and France have concentrated in European waters, where therefore, the greater part of the British battleships are massed, leaving a detachment only on the China Station to "contain or hold in check any hostile force in those seas while the decisive struggle is being fought out clsewhere.
•
Our possible enemies are fully aware of the necessity of concentrating on the decisive points. They will endeavour to prevent this by threatening our detached squadrons and trade in different quarters, and thus obliging us to make further detachments from the main fleets. All these operations will be of secondary importance, but it will be necessary that we should have sufficient power available to carry on a vigorous offensive against the hostile outlying squadrons without unduly weakening the force concentrated for 'the decisive battle, whether in Europe or elsewhere.
The immense importance of the principle of concentration and the facility with which ships and squadrons can be moved from one part of the world to another-it is more easy to move a fleet from Spithead to the Cape or Halifax than it is to move a large army, with its equipment, from Cape Town to Pretoria-points to the necessity of a single navy, under one control, by which alone concerted action between the several parts can be assured.
In the foregoing remarks the word defince does not appear. It is omitted advisedly, because the primary object of the British Navy is not to defend anything, but to attack the fleets of the enemy, and, by defeating them, to afford protection to British Dominions, shipping, and commerce. This is the
ultimate aim.
To use the word defence would be misleading, because the word carries with it the idea of a thing to be defended, which would divert attention to local defence instead of fixing it on the force from which attack is to be expected.
The traditional role of the British Navy is not to act on the defensive, but to prepare to attack the force which threatens-in other words, to assume the offensive. On one occasion England departed from her traditional policy, and acting on the defensive, kept her ships in harbour unrigged and un- manned, with the result that the Dutch fleet sailed up the Medway and burnt the ships of war at their moorings.
The strength and composition of the British Navy, or of any British squadron, depends, therefore, upon the strength and composition of the hostile forces which it is liable to meet.
The great increase which is now being made in the strength of the principal navies is shown in the following table, in which all small vessels are omitted :-
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The total estimated National Expenditure for 1902-3, exclusive of war charges, amounts to 129,159,000, of which the Navy Estimates account for 31,255,500, or about one-fourth, which is equal to a contribution of 158. 1d. per head of the population of the United Kingdom. If this were divided equally per head ainong the white population of the Empire, the charge por head would amount to 128. 04. For the actual naval expenditure per head in the several parts of the Empire, see Appendix A.
The annual value of British trade, which it is the ultimate object of the Navy to protect, amounted in 1900 to:--
Trade of United Kingdom with foreign countries
British Dominions be-
yond the Seas
95
Total trade of United Kingdom
Total trade of British Dominions beyond the Seas with
foreign countries and among themselves
Of this last about one-third is estimated to be inter-colonial.
665,895,000
211,555,000 877,450,000
327,500,000
It will be seen that about one-fourth of the total trale of the empire is not directly connected with the United Kingdom,
The question may with advantage be further considered with reference
to :--
1. European Waters.
2. Atlantic Ocean.
3. Eastern Sens and Pacific Ocean.
The greater part of the Navies of France, Germany and Russia are con- centrated in European waters, the numbers elsewhere being :
Battleships
Uraisers
Fracee
Germany.
Busi
Great Britain.
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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
France.
Germany,
Russia.
United States.
1902.
1007.
1909,
1907
1902.
1907.
1902.
1905.
Battleships, first and
second class.
27
35
13
26
17
25
10
18
Cruisers
47
65
28
43
20
33: 26
11
Estimated total personnel required on mobilisation. Personnel on active list
64,000 78,000
51,300
31,800 42,000 | 45,600 | 53,000 | 32,500*| 48,000
33,400
-
60,000
*This was the number in the Spanish-American War.
The corresponding figures for the British Navy in 1902 are:-
Battleships (first and second class)
Cruisers
Personnel required to man war fleets
Effective personnel on active list
-
33,000
44
-
127 129,704
-
113,292
To meet the increase in foreign navies- great additions will be required in the immediate future to the British Naval force.
The main portion of the British Navy must therefore be concentrated in those European waters which will probably be the scene of the decisive battles.
The foreign Powers whose naval forces in the Atlantic Ocean. require consideration are:-
Franco. United States.
The whole naval force of France the Atlantic is now under one command, with bases at Martinique in the West Indies, Dakar on the West Coast of Africa, and porte in France.
A squadron based on Martinique would threaten all our West Indian trade, as well as those parts of the British Dominions which lie in those seas.
The trade which passes within striking distance of Dakar cannot be placed at a less value than 140,000,0007, per annum, of which about one fourth is with South African ports, one-third with Australasia, and one-fourth with *South America. South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand are therefore each interested in the maintenance of a aquadron on the West Coast of Africa sufficiently powerful to dominate any French force operating from that point.
E 11528.
Gg.
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