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CONFIDENTIAL. '

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APPENDIX IV.

Memorandum on Sea-Power and the Principles involved in it.

The importance which attaches to the command of the sea lies in the control which it gives over seu communications.

The weaker sea-power is absolutely unable to carry to success any largo military expedition over sea. The truth of this is shown by reference to the history of the past.

In ancient times the Greek victory of Salamis threatened the Persian communications across the Dardanelles, and doubtless this danger contri- buted to bring about their retreat into Asia.

The failure of the famous Syracusan expedition was due to the defeat of the Athenian fleet, and had its modern counterpart in the failure of Admiral Graves off the entrance to Chesapeake Bay in 1781. In both cases the

army had to surrender because its communications were cut. The defeat of Nikias dealt a heavy blow to the supremacy of Athens, and may. perhaps, be said to have been one of the principal events which led to her downfall. The surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown was the prelude to the independence of the United States.

The main cause of the failure of the expedition of Napoleon to Egypt was the defeat of the French fleet at the Nile, which was the first step towards cutting his communications with France, and the subsequent surrender of the French army.

On the other hand, the advantages which accrue to the stronger sea-power, after it has won the command of the sea, are equally illustrated by historical example.

The fall of Quebec and the conquest of French Canada was mainly due to the fact that our superior seu-power closed the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the French and opened it to us. In any similar struggle in the future, this route will be as vital as in the past.

The expedition to Egypt under Abercromby in 1801, the Peninsular war, the expedition to the Crimea, the South African war just concluded, are all instances of great military enterprises which could only have been carried out by a nation holding the command of the sea.

The command of the sea is determined by the result of great battles at sea, such as Salamis, Actium, Lepanto, those which led up to the defeat of the Armada, and those between the Dutch and English in the 17th century, in which each side concentrated his whole available force for the decisive struggle.

To any naval Power the destruction of the fleet of the enemy must always be the great object aimed at. It is immaterial where the great battle is fought, but wherever it may take place the result will be felt throughout the world, because the victor will afterwards be in a position to spread his force with a view to capturing or destroying any detached forces of the enemy, and generally to gather the fruits of victory, in the shape of such outlying positions as the New Hebrides, Fijis, Singapore, Samoa, Cuba, Jamaica, Martinique, the Philippines, Malta, or Aden, which may be in possession of the enemy,

his shipping and commerce, or even to prosecute such oversen campaigns as those in the Peninsula and South Africa.

Stress is laid on the importance of the great battle for supremacy, because the great development of the navies of France, Germany, the United States, and Russia, indicate the possibility that such battles may have to be fought in the future. It is the battleships chiefly which will have to be concentrated for the decisive battle, and arrangements with this object must be made during peace.

The geographical conditions and the varied interests of the maritime powers prevent such complete concentration in modern times as was practicable in the past. Thus Russia divides her battleships between the Baltic and Pacific;

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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C.O. 885

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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