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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference :-

TUTTI C.O. 885

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO

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out in this connexion that I believe there are two or three rifles in use in the Imperial Army, and they do not all fire the same cartridge.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Is that so?

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: I have heard that. At any rate, there are two very different rifles which are, I believe, in use. However, I will not enter into a controversy, but simply say this, that the distinguishing mark between this rifle and the service rifle is that it is a straight pull rifle. That is simpler, and there is no reason why a man who has used the service rifle, either the Lee-Metford or the Enfield rifle, could not learn to use it in five minutes. I proved that myself. I went to the rifle range last year, and used the Ross rifle after five minutes examination of it with perfect case, although I had not seen the rifle before. So I do not see any great difficulty in that. One objection made is that the parts are different, and it would be necessary to have a separate supply. I am told by Sir Charles Ross that there is no reason in the world why each soldier should not be supplied, when going into the field, with the only two or three parts which can possibly be damaged, and the rifle could be restored without delay. However, I have said enough on that.

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Now, it seems to me that the whole result of all this discussion comes to this; that we should have in the different Colonies as efficient a force as possible. The suggestion made that there should be a special force known as an Imperial force, for service abroad, is one that I cannot subscribe to, because, I believe, in the first instance, it would have a derogatory effect upon the Militia itself, and I am quite confident, from what I know of the Militia of Canada, that to have such a force, receiving special favours, specially equipped, specially drilled, and trained would have an unfavourable effect upon the Militia at large. I would propose, as an alternative, that the force, if necessary the numerical strength of the force, be reduced, and that the whole force that we have be made effective and efficient. think the experience of the South African war has proved conclusively the strong desire on the part of the Colonies to assist the Mother Country in the event of any emergency arising. Now, the point is to have such a force as will be ready at a moment-I agree entirely with the Secretary of State for War--to have an efficient force which could be called upon for service at any moment. It seems to me that there we come to one and the same point, and upon that we absolutely agree. I do not think it is necessary that a set of men shall be labelled that they are set apart for any particular service, but that our Militia should be made absolutely effective, or our Volunteer forces, so that when the moment arrives, we can take part, and assist the Imperial Army.

Now, I may venture to say as the character of the force in Canada has been somewhat called in question in this paper, that we have done a great deal towards making our forces effective. Let me say as an illus- tration of what we can do, that we fitted out a force-I am speaking now of our own Canadian contingent, for which we did everything-in the short space of 14 days. The first contingent was fitted out, equipped, and embarked, composed of 1,000 men, drawn from 3,000 miles of country from one end of Canada to the other, fully equipped, and I believe satisfactorily equipped. That was the first force which was sent out from Canada under Colonel Otter to South Africa. A few weeks after we fitted out a force of 1,200 men, 600 of Field Artillery, and 600 mounted men, within something like a month, or it may be, three weeks. Well, I think that that is a pretty fair answer to the charge that the Militia force is utterly inefficient, or is not, at any rate, an efficient or an effective force. We have, within five years, improved our head-quarters' staff. We have created an Army Medical Service there, which I think, is a very good one, and compares perhaps favourably with any other Army Medical Service Corps. We are now engaged in organising, and have an officer here at this moment, being educated to take charge of, and to organise an Army Service Corps in Canada, which we hope to make efficient. We have established a reserve of officers. We recoguise the

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We have

fact that it is of the utmost importance to have educated officers, a Royal Military College, which I am sorry to say has not secured many officers to our own Militia, but it has sent many distinguised officers to the Imperial Army. We hope, however, having passe à Pension Act, that now we will be able to offer something to the young mon coming out of the Royal Military College, and that in the future we shall have each year additions to our permanent forces from the Royal Military College.

We are constantly addressing our efforts towards increasing in every possible way the efficiency of the forces, and in one word in conclusion, I wish to repeat what I have said before, that I am personallyware of the fact, and I know that the Militia of Canada is in the utino-t sympathy with the objects we have in view here, but that I conscientiously believe that we are going on as well as and as rapidly towards that end as we can possibly do, in our own way, and that efficiency of our military forces-at any rate, I speak of Canada is the goal to which we shall look, and that in time, a very short time, I believe, we shall be able to show you that wo have ar efficient force.

I would like to say one word as to the expenditure. When the Confedera- tion was formed in 1867 there was a tacit understanding between the authorities, between the Government of Canada of that day, and the Imperial authorities, that we should spend one million dollars a year on the Militia of the country. That expenditure has gone up to two millions. To-day we are spending one million and three quarters. I am not now at all referring to the South African expenditure, or to the fact that at the present moment We are garrisoning Halifax at a cost of one thousand dollars a day, but I mean the ordinary expenditure on revenue account. This one million and three quarters, and the additional expenditure on capital account brings it up to two millions--

Sir EDMUND BARTON: Dollars?

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Yes; two million dollars. It seems to me that that shows fairly well that we appreciate the importance of defence, and that we are moving in that direction, perhaps not as rapidly as we ought, but at any rate, we are moving in that direction, and I speak for the Canadian Militia, and for the feeling and sentiment among all classes of people in Canada, and say that I am sure that if any emergency arises, you will always find the Militia and the country ready to do what they have done, and even inore, and that we shall have reached each year a greater stage of efficiency, which will enable us to co-operate more readily and with still better results.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: I am sure we are all obliged to the Secretary of State for War for the clear and informative statement which he made, and which in itself must be of very great advantage to the whole of the Conference. And the considerations he has deduced from the war itself are specially instructive. I suppose, notwithstanding the opinions we have so often heard expressed outside, there will be no one at this Board that will not recognize the difference between fighting men under the conditions of the Boers, and meeting a highly equipped European army, and there are those who might be able perhaps to meet the Boers at their own game in some instances, without having the amount of training which, under different conditions, and on a different field, would be necessary to meet a European force. I am also impressed with one necessity, which appears as a minimum of requirement, in Mr. Brodrick's statement, and that is the necessity for endeavouring to assimilate the arms and the equipment of the various parts of the Empire, at the very least.

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As to the rest, I share Sir Frederick Borden's doubts as to the possibility of raising, to put the matter as nearly as I can in Mr. Brodrick's words, "a force "to be set apart, a force to be specially trained ready for any emergency, to be treated as part of the armed forces of the Imperial service, and the men to be absolutely pledged to that service." I think, with Sir Frederick Borden, that there will be very great difficulty with the Colonial services in carrying

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