}
to the press no suggestion that such a tendency is, in fact,
or that we want it
developing/: on the contrary, our propaganda should harp on the
complete domination of the C.C.P. by the Kremlin and the
consequent subordination of Chinese interests to those of
Russia.
4.
J
H.M. G. 's policy of recognition of the Chinese People's
Republic imposes on us until further notice in this propaganda
two limitations: first, that all our emphasis should be on
the attempts of Russia to obtain the subservience of China,
and advantages at Chinese expense; we should not criticize
behaviour of the Chinese Communist Party and Government in
acquiescing to the Kremlin's behaviour, and second, that the
greater part of our propaganda should be carried out as far as
possible at one remove from official British agencies of
information.
5.
The propaganda concerning Russian policy towards
China can be richly illustrated from the precedents of Soviet
behaviour towards her Eastern European satellites, the
economic advantages which she appears to be seeking and gain-
ing in Manchuria, her projection of traditional Russian
imperialist policy in the Far East as a whole, her tough
commercial methods, her technique of economie exploitation
under ideological cover, and the numbers and personal
behaviour of Russian technicians, advisers, intelligence
agents, commercial negotiators and officials who are
infiltrating into China.
6.
In South-East Asia, the propaganda task is really
divided into two parts (though Malaya is a special case):
propaganda towards the Overseas Chinese communities on the
one hand, and propaganda towards the indigenous Asian peoples
on the other.
The task of propaganda towards Overseas Chinese
communities is now severely complicated by the emergence of
Communism/