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22. Public Relations..

This must largely be a matter for the Governor who undoubtedly has a most difficult task in view of all the conflicting interests contained in the mixed population and its activities. From his experience the prosent P.R.0. ought to be

able to meet the position. He was attached for "special duties" during the late war to the Staff at Chungking and in a private conversation with him (which unfortunately was too late for me to have a further discussion with the Governor) I learned that he considers it impossible for his small staff to

do really effective work in the conditions under which they work and also that stringent economy had

provented the adoption of a project for a 50,000 cdition of a nows-sheet, which howover started with 500, has risen to something over a thousand; copies of this news-shoot are posted at public open air stations and fairly largely read. I rather gathered from the Governor, howevor that the present P.R.0. would not "set the Thamos on firo",

23. Personal Impressions and Conclusions.

I left the Colony firmly convinced of the importance of adhering to the decisions already takon to send further reinforcements to Hong Kong. I held that view before my visit because of the significance which it soomed to me Hong Kong would possess in

demonstrating our will to resist aggression and in,

let us hope, arresting the onward rush of

Communism in South East Asia. After examining the terrain itself I believe a military defence of Hong Kong can be successfully mado, though I do not by any means minimise the difficulties, Tho high mountains on the Chinoso sido of the Now Territorios which dominate the frontior itself undoubtedly imposed handicaps on the defenders, but those are mor e than offset by the difficulties which would confront a Communist Chinose Army against preparod positions and guns sited, trained and ranged. The circumstancos in 1949 are wholly different from those of 1941, the memory

of which still lives in Hong Kong. Thorc is no doubt today of our control of the soa; we shall have an integrated scheme of land dofonco including air support on an adequate scale; and wo shall havo fighter defuncos backed by an early warning systom which, oven taking into account the limited depth and size of the territory, should be able to deal effectively with such air attack as it is likely to mout. I consider that under these conditions the defence

can succeed against the probable scale of attack. So far as I have doubts they concern such things as

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