CO537-4999 — Page 136

22. Public Relations.

This must largely be a matter for the Governor who undoubtedly has a most difficult task in view of all the conflicting interests contained in the mixed population and its activities. From his experience the prosent P.R. O. ought to be

able to meet tho position. Ho was attached for "special duties" during the late war to the Staff at Chungking and in a private conversation with him (which unfortunately was too late for me to have a further discussion with the Governor) I learned that he considers it impossible for his small staff to

do really effective work in the conditions under which they work and also that stringent economy had

provented the adoption of a project for a 50,000 edition of a news-sheet, which however started with 500, has risen to something over a thousand; copies of this nows-shout are posted at public open air stations and fairly largely read. I rather gathored from the Governor, however, that the present P. R. O. would not "set the Thamos on fizo".

23.

Personal Impressions and Conclusions.

I loft the Colony firmly convinced of the importance of adhering to the decisions already taken to send further reinforcements to Hong Kong. I held that view before my visit because of the significance which it scomed to mo Hong Kong would possess in demonstrating our will to resist aggression and in,

lot us hope, arresting the onward rush of

Communism in South East Asia. After examining the terrain itself I believe a military defence of Hong Kong can be successfully mado, though I do not by any means minimise the difficultios. The high mountains on tho Chinese side of the Now Territorios which dominate the frontion itself undoubtedly imposod handicaps on the defonders, but those are more than offset by the difficulties which would confront a Communist Chinoso Army against prepared positions and guns sited, trained and ranged. The circumstancos in 1949 are wholly differont from those of 1941, the memory

of which still lives in Hong Kong. There is no doubt today of our control of the soa; we shall have an integrated schome of land defence including air support on an ado quato scale; and we shall have fighter defences backed by an carly warning system which, oven taking into account the limited depth and size of the territory, should be able to dual effectively with such air attack as it is likely to cot. I consider that under these conditions the defence can succood against the probable scale of attack. So far as I have doubts they concorn such things as

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