CO537-4998 — Page 272

4.

TOP SECRET.

The Foreign Office consider that the extension of Communist control to South China will increase the strength of Communist influence in other countries of South East Asia. They state further that the Chinese Communist leaders pay at any rate whole-hearted lip service to Moscow. Thus every Communist advance in the area increases the potential ability of Russia to threaten our position in the Far East and hence our long term strategy.

5.

The Commanders-in-Chief, Far East consider that, in countering the Communists, a half-hearted policy will achieve nothing, To the Chinese mind little is effective save strong action, firm direction and the visible signs of power. Nothing effective will happen to counter Communism unless a firm lead is given.

Conclusions

6.

7.

General.

From our examination at Annex we conclude that:

(a) The success of Comunism in China may materially

alter the basis of our Far East strategy.

(b)

(c)

(a)

(e)

The first essential is for all the interested countries to agree on a political policy which could then be supported by unified military action if required.

Until all interested countries have arrived at an agreed policy, the only military action we ourselves can take is to ensure the maintenance of law and order within British territories and to provide such litary aid as is possible to those Governments which are prepared to check the spread of Communism in the Far East.

Once political agreement has been reached, the establishment of military consultative machinery will be of great value in co-ordinating the fight against Communism.

Until military consultative machinery has been established, ad hoc arrangements should be made for frontier control and for the exchange of intelligence information.

Hong Kong. From our examination, at Appendix to the Annex, of the plans for the defence of Hong Kong we conclude that:-

(a)

The most immediate threat to the Colony is a vast influx of refugees, the repercussions of which might be so serious that it must be prevented.

(b) The military authorities must be prepared to

concentrate at present on aiding the Civil Government in meeting the immediate refugee threat, since the possibility of external aggression is more remote.

(c)

Should these two threats arise simultaneously, there are at present insufficient forces in the Far East to meet them.

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