CO537-4998 — Page 251

5.

6.

(vii) contd.

and aircraft patrol in conjunction with canalised coast-watching service backed by mobile army patrols. He emphasises dependence upon current service commitments, provision of suitable patrol craft (not at present available), and the extent to which canalisation of water-traffic (junks, etc.) may be practicable.

The Colonial Office has reached the following conclusions:-

(a) that the military and civil forces available and

being formed would be wholly inadequate to meet a serious threat if it should develop within the next six to nine months;

(b) that it is not practicable, concurrently with

recruitment for the Volunteer Defence Force, to recruit an Auxiliary Police Force, which would in any case not be wholly reliable;

(c) that without disrupting the economic life of the Colony (which might well suit Communist aims and should, at all costs, be avoided) the Volunteer Defence Force cannot remain mobilised for a prolonged period to meet a cold war situation, and should not be mobilised until a really serious situation develops;

(a) that any augmentation of the local forces would

have to be found from Service sources.

It is appreciated that the Commanders-in-Chief have indicated that there are no further forces available in the Far East theatre to reinforce Hong Kong, and that the Ministry of Defence has stated that there are no additional land forces available to send to Hong Kong from outside the theatre. Accordingly, the suggestion which the Colonial Office makes is that the possibility of raising additional battalions of the Malay Regiment should be urgently considered thus freeing other forces for the reinforcement of Hong Kong. It is appreciated that (apart from the necessity of making financial arrangements satisfactory to the Government of the Federation of Malaya) the limiting factors in raising additional battalions of the Malay Regiment would probably be the provision of officers, trained instructors, arms and equipment. But the threat to Hong Kong is potentially so serious that it is suggested that, if this proposal is likely to be of assistance, it should be examined with all urgency by all concerned.

77. Summary

(1) The most probable threats to Hong Kong are:

(a) An influx of refugees, many of whom might be armed. It is imprudent to assume that this threat could not arise within the next six months.

(b) Communist inspired strikes, which might take

place at any time.

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