CO537-4998 — Page 249

ANNEX

PLANS FOR THE DEFENCE OF HONG KONG

IN THE PRESENT EMERGENCY

The appreciation by the Commanders-in-Chief, Far East, contained in telegram SEACOS 872 of the 15th December, 1948, in amplification of C. I. C. (F.E.) (48) 8(P), has been considered in the Colonial Office in the light of recent telegraphic correspondence with the Governor of Hong Kong. From this correspondence it is clear that certain of the suggestions and assumptions of the Commanders-in-Chief as to the extent to which the civilian security forces could be able to deal with the internal security problems which might arise, without very substantial support from the military forces, are unwarranted. As will be seen from paragraph 4(iv) below, the support required from the military might, in certain circumstances, involve the employment of the whole of the infantry garrison. It is accordingly requested that, when considering the apprecia- tion of the Commanders-in-Chief, the Chiefs of Staff will also take into account the considerations adduced below.

2.

3.

(A)

In their appreciation the Commanders-in-Chief, Far East, assess the forces required to meet possible emergencies in Hong Kong as follows:--

4 infantry battalions, 1 field regiment R. A., 1 dual purpose Coast Artillery/Heavy A. A. Regiment, 1 Brigade Group in re serve available as reinforcement at short notice.

(B) They emphasise the need for freeing the garrison

for its primary task of resisting external

aggression, by establishing an Auxiliary Police Force and an organisation to deal with refugees.

(C) They suggest that the threat to Hong Kong may

develop in the third quarter of 1949.

On the se points the Colonial Office desire to make the following comments:

(i) The Colonial Office notes that of the four

battalions mentioned in 2(A) above one regular battalion will not be at fully trained strength until October, 1949, that the Volunteer battalion will not be operational until June, 1949, and that a theatre reserve is unlikely to be available from Malaya until the end of 1949.

(ii) The Governor considers that the most probable

threats to Hong Kong are an influx of refugees and/or Communist inspired strikes affecting public utility and waterfront labour. The Colonial Office feels that it would be imprudent to base any plans on the assumption that either or both of these threats is unlikely to develop before the date mentioned in paragraph 2(C) above.

2