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Our best chance of success lies in offensive defence and ground must be surrendered unless it is militarily im to do otherwise.
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Retaining control of the FANLING quadrilateral is of major importance.
A better system of lateral roads is recuired further South than the FANLING quadrilateral.
The road, railway and sea route via TAI PO provides adecuate communication for the forces likely to be at our disposal without having to use the alternative route via. EUN LEUNG. The latter route must be denied to the enemy. The bridges, etc., on the TAIPO route must be adequately guarded.
PLAN.
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The range of hills LONG RIDGE - CHEVIOTS - NORTH DO NS must be held but there must be some defence in depth.
Some supplies must be held well forward,
From the defence point of view the peacetime locations of the maior Army units is unsatisfactory and therefore troops must be moved to their battle areas early.
Two entirely separate plans must be made and be clear to overyono, one to cope with purely Internal trouble and one
411 must with a combined internal/external threat. understand the differences.
To deal with the possibility of roads being cut air supply and supply by sea up to TAI PO must be studied and practised.
Any plan must be flexible and provide for adequate reserves to deal with the unexpected.
Intention.
To defeat the enemy NORTH of the FINLING cuadrilateral.
Method.
(a) Infantry.
(1) The battalion stationed at SANAI to hold the
line LONG RIDGE - CHEVIOTS - NORTH DCNS.
(ii) One battalion to be immediate reserve in the area
TAU PASS 538229.
Tasks.-
(I) To have one Company in position holding the
Pass, the remainder of the battalion concentrated immediately SOUTH of the Pass.
(II) To be prepared to counter any penetration of the
LONG RIDGE - NORTH DOWNS position.
(iii) Third battalion less two Companies to be concentrated
in the general area of TAI PO TAU for dealing with any deep penetrations.
/(b)
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