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two

(c) They suggest that the threat to Hong Kong may develop

in the third quarter of 1949.

3. On these points the Colonial Office desire to make the

following comments:

4.

(i) The Culunial Office notes that of the four battalions

mentioned in 2(A) above une regular battalion will not be at fully trained strength until Octuber, 1949, that the Volunteer battalion will nut be uperational until June, 1949, and that a theatre reserve is unlikely to be available from Malaya until the end of 1949.

(ii) The Guvernur considers that the must probable threats

tu Hong Kong are an influx of refugees and/or Communist inspired strikes affecting public utility and waterfront labuur. The Colonial Office feels that it would be imprudent to base any plans un the assumption that either or buth of these threats is unlikely to develop before the date mentioned in paragraph 2(C) abuve.

(iii) The Guvernur considers that the Chinese members of the

Police Furce cannot be regarded as wholly reliable in the emergencies envisaged though, provided they have adequate military backing, the Police could be relied upon against a mere influx of refugees.

(iv) Except for a few Europeans and Eurasians an Auxiliary

Police Force could only be drawn from Chinese and therefore unreliable sources.

-

(v) The recruitment of a separate force would certainly

prejudice recruitment for the Defence Furce and would generally be most unsatisfactory.

In a recent assessment of the problems of dealing with an

influx of refugees (see 2(B) above) the Governor has, after

consultation with his lucal Defence Committee, reported as

follows:-

(i) Saturation puint as regards food, water supplies,

maintenance of law and urder, etc., will be reached when the present pupulation increases by another 100,000. For a few months a total increase of 250,000 might be supported by rigid rationing etc. Any further addition would spell possible disaster.

(ii) There is no sign of a serious influx yet, but the

frontier should be clused at once as soon as any sign appears.

(iii) This operation will involve the use of wiring to canalise entry points. But serious objections exist to beginning wiring now except in places where it could be done osten- sibly for other reasons.

(iv) Effective closure would require use of three infantry

battalions in addition to available Police and reconstituted Defence Force.

/(v) If

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