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yrnes Describes Early Differences

7ith Stalin Over United Nations KERAD UNE

ound, at Yalta, Marshal Had Not En Read Plan Of Roosevelt, Churchill

This is the fourth article in a serialization of James F. Byrnes's "Speaking Frankly"-six of fifteen chapters of the book published by Harper & Brothers. Copyright, 1947, by James F. Byrnes Founda- tion (A Charitable Trust).

By James F. Byrnes

Former Secretary of State

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In October, 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull had taken with him to Moscow the first proposal that finally developed into the Dumbarton

for Oaks plan United Nations organization. He and the President believed it would be far easier to obtain agreement on a plan for a peace organization while the war was still in progress. How right they were!

At the conclusion of the Dum- barton Oaks conference, in the autumn of 1944, the only major point remaining at issue was the formula for voting in the Security Council. The Soviet delegation had insisted that all decisions in the Security Council must be by a unanimous vote on the part of the major powers. We agreed that no decision committing our military forces to action should be taken without our consent but did not believe the right of veto should extend to all matters.

Devised a Compromise We finally had devised a com- promise formula which we hoped the Soviets could be persuaded to accept, and the President sent it direct to Marshal Stalin on De- cember 5. At the same time, the State Department prepared and delivered to the Soviet and Brit-

James F. Byrnes, who was

PARIS EDITION.

United States Secretary of State Compromise Formula Put Before Soviets on Voting Procedure in the Council

from July, 1945, to January, 1947, attended every major meeting with the Russians, from Yalta, in February, 1945, to the Paris Peace Conference and its conclu- sion in New York at the end of last year.

At the Yalta Conference, Mar- shal Stalin secured agreement from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on

his claim to separate votes in the United Nations for Byelo- Russia and the Ukraine. This fact became public only some months later, when it was re- ported for the first time by the New York Herald Tribune. In tomorrow's installment of "Speaking Frankly,” Mr. Byrnes reveals for the first time the full story of how President Roose- velt asked in return for extra votes for the United States. Churchill and Stalin agreed, ́al- though President Roosevelt later decided not to claim the extra votes.

ish Embassies in Washington lengthy statements in explanation and support of the President's proposal.

It was on the second day of the

conference that Secretary Stettinius formally presented our proposal, and the President then asked for its immediate considera- tion. In supporting the plan, the President referred to the agree- ment reached at Tehran in which the three heads of government declared: "We recognize fully the supreme responsibility rest- ing upon us and all the "United Nations to make a peace that will command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peo- ples of the world and banish the Scourge and terror of war for many generations."

Conflicting reports of the ex

change that followed were pre- sented in the Security Council of the United Nations in the spring of 1947 by the Soviet and the British representatives during a discussion of the veto power and its relationship to the control of atomic energy. Because of this, and because the veto, power has remained one of the most contro- versial issues of the United Na- tions structure, it may be of interest to present here the major portion of my shorthand record · of the views expressed on the veto issue at Yalta.

Exchange of Views

Since the United States, as the author of the proposal. had clear- ly stated its position, the ex- change was almost entirely be- tween Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. It follows:

Prime Minister: "The peace of the world depends upon the last- ing friendship of the three great powers but His Majesty's Gov- ernment feel we should be putting ourselves in a false position if we put ourselves in the position of trying to rule the world when our desire is to serve the world and preserve it from a renewal of the frightful horrors which have fallen upon the mass of its inhabitants. We should make a broad submission to the opinion of the world within the limits stated. We should have the right to state our case against any case stayed by the whinese, for in- stance in the case of Hongkong. "There is no question that we could trot be required to give back imese if we Hongkong to did not feel that was the right (Continued on Page 3, Col. 5)

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(Continued from Page 1) thẳng to do. On the other hand I feel it would be wrong if China did not have an opportunity to state its case Tully, in the same way, if Egypt raises a question against the British affecting the Suez Canal, as has been suggest- ed, I would submit to all the procedure outlined in this state- ment. I would do this without fear because British rights would be preserved under paragraph 3 when our veto would kill action if we chose to use it.

"I presume, Mr. President, if Argentina raises а question against the United States, that the United States will submit to all the procedure of the last five paragraphs and would not vote on the issue. However, the United States could raise its fundamental objections in respect to all the measures to be taken under para- graph 3..

Britain's Position "His Majesty's Government see no danger from their point of view in associating themselves with the proposals of the United States. We see great advantage in the three great powers not assuming the position of rulers of all the rest of the world with- out even allowing them to state. their case. It would not be right for us, with the great power we possess, to take that position, de- nying them the right to state their case, and to have) measures taken to adjust difficulties short of the powers set out in para- Traph 3, on which

If we are not co friends and col Security Council..

The Mar

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Prime Minister: "-and France." The Marshal: "Yes, and we will keep a united front. I must apologize to the conference. I have been very busy with other matters and had no chance to study this question in detail.

are

"We are accused of attaching too great importance to the pro- cedure

We how to vote.' guilty. We attach great impor- tance to the question of voting. All questions are decided by votes and we are interested in the deci- sions and not in the discussions. Suppose China is a permanent member and demands Hongkong be returned to her. I can assure Mr. Churchill that China will not be aque They Will have some friends in the Assembly. That would be true of Egypt in the case mentioned."

Prime Minister: "I could say 'no.' I would have a right to say that the powers of the World Security Organization could not be used against us if we remain- ed unconvinced."

The Marshal: "There is an- other danger. My colleagues in Moscow cannot forget the case which occurred in 1939 during the Russian-Finnish War, when Britain and France used the League of Nations against us and eventually expelled us and isolat- ed us.

Time Given for Study The President: "It is entirely satisfact for the Marshal to t time to study the

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read to come to any conclusion. I think that the Dumbarton Oaks decisions have as an objective, not only to secure to every nation he right to express its opinion. but if any nation should raise a question about some important matter, it raises the question in order to get a decision in the matter. I am sure none of those present would dispute the right of every member of the Assembly to express his opinion.

wit

that "Mr. Churchill thinks Chida, i. 15 Tamed the question of vas-wo aldi be content only ressing opinion frere. He ma be mistaker/ demand a decision in the matter and so would Egypt. Egypt will not have much pleasure_in_ex- pressing an opinion that the Suez be returned to Canal should Egypt but would demand a deci- Therefore, sion on the matter. the matter is much more serious than merely expressing an opin- ion. Also I would like to ask Mr. Churchill to name the power which may intend to dominate I am

Great the world.

sure Britain does not want to domm- ate the world. So one is remov- I am sure ed from suspicion. the United States does not wish to do so, so another is excluded from the powers having inten- tions to dominate the world."

Stalin Promised Study Mr. Churchill: "May I answer?" The Marshal: "In a minute. When will the great powers ac- cept the provisions that would absolve them from the charge that they intend to dominate the world? I will study the document. At this time it is not very clear to me. I think it is a more serious question than the right of a

days he hau not familiarized him self with the subject. he could not be greatly interested in the United Nations organization. It was all the more impressive since this certainly was the only pro- posal on the agenda with which he was not entirely familiar. My concern remained even though at the next day's meeting Mr. Molo- tov announced the Soviet Union's acceptance of our proposal, which was later adopted in substantially the same form at San Francisco.

DH. Smith

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power to express its intentions of the Mayle 534-

the desire of some

dominate the world."

Prime Minister:

power

to

"I know that

under the leaders of the three powers as represented here we may feel safe. But these leaders In ten may not live forever. years' time we may disappear. A new generation will come which did not experience the horrors of war and may probably forget what we have gone through. We would like to secure the peace for at least fifty years. We have now to build up such a status, such a plan, that we can put as many obstacles as possible to the coming generation quarreling among themselves."

The Marshal: "I think that the task is to secure our unity in the future, and. for this purpose, we must agree upon such a cov- enant as would best serve that The danger in the purpose. future is the possibility of con- flicts among ourselves. If there be unity, then the danger from Germany will not be great. Now we have to think how we can create a situation where the three Dowers here represented, and China-"