CO537-(205_1260-1262) — Page 274

I

7

00228

MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Jimited.

LEE

Copy

No. 6

AN

Lanning Staff

we have examined an

lef, Hong Kong of the

i the New Territories

equired to defend Hong

decide the possible and that which the

on is based on the

s is unlikely for

ny cose he considers

ible against a major mainland of China.

made for defence

ely to attack policy of the

'ecover the colony

In their efforts they

port from the U.S.A.

security of Hong Kong

rge numbers of agents

on to organise civil

Je

o carry out attacks

This threat is not

ril war breaks out in

ecember, 1945.

00229

Ref.:

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet,

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright

N

(a) A direct land assault by a Chinese army of up

to 75,000 men, led by a Southern War Lord is a potential threat.

(e) Piracy on local shipping is a possibility at

all times.

(f) A guerilla army might march on Hong Kong as

the result of internal unrest or aivil wer in China.

Summary of Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Report

in

We attach et Annex I a report by the J.I.C. which they examine Seotions II and III of the C.-in-C. 's appreciation. These sections oover potential enemy forces available to attack Hong Kong, and the possible forms of attack open to the enemy.

This report shows that :-

(a) The J.I.C. agree with C.-in-C., Hong Kong regarding China's aspirations. There are indications, however, that the Chinese will not cofine themselves to purely diplomatic means in bringing pressure to bear for the recovery of Hong Kong.

(b) A direct land assault on the New Territories,

coupled with ineffective air raids on port or military installations (which might have some effect on civilian morale) is only likely in the future if oper hostilities break out with the Central Govermont. The possibility of this within the next ten years 16 so remote as to be negligible.

(c) Modern arms and equipment, including aircraft

and transport, would not in all probability

be available to a Provinciel War Lord, should one arise in S. China to challenge the rule of Chiang Kai-shek.

(a) The most likely form of attack is by infiltration

of a large number of agents into the Chinese population to organise strikes, civil unrest and boycott. This might well be carried out in conjunction with the interruption of food and other supplies to the Colony from China, to lend weight to the political campaign for recovery of Hong Kong.

(e) The movements of Chinese to and from Hong Kong

cannot be controlled; arms up to and including L.M.G and small mortars can be smuggled into the Colony in large quantities.

-2-

L

Ref:

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet.

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh: