002 10
Chinese army of up Southern War Lord is
is tossibility at
h on Hong Kong as
inrost or civil
mittce Report
by the J. I. C.
the C.-in-c.
potential onemy
in
, and the possible forms
ding thidir report
maintained at Hong Kong.
on wore maintained,
.sed. Their report
in-C., Hong Kong regarding
There are indications,
sc will not confine
plomatic means in
a for the recovery
the New Territories,
e air raids on port
ns (which might have
1 morale) and limited
ily likely in the future
Jak out with the Central
.bility of this within
10 remote cs to be
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
2
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leader, copyright
restrictions Further information is given i
, including aircraft
t in all probability
Incicl War Lord, should
to challenge the rule of any case the possibility
Provincial War Lord
attack is by infiltration gents into the Chinese
strikes, civil unrest and well be carried out in nterruption of food and Colony from China, to lend
1 campaign for recovery
to and from Hong Kong
came up to and including rs can be smugled into antitios.
00211
Ref:
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
ins
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of Nation:
note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright
(f) Piracy is probable at all times and is
likely to increase the situation developed as in (d) above.
() sporadic querilla attacks as the rosult
of internal unrest or civil war in South Chim are most improbable. In the event of civil war, however, strong militery and police natrol of the frontier would be necessary to prevent the influx of crnod deserturs.
Scale of Defences Requirod
5.
The strategical importance of Hong Kong lies in the fact that it may provide an Operational nivel and air base in the evont of future conflict in the Pacific. In addition it is a british possession which has very great commercial value.
6.
We We do not consider that under modern conditions Hong Kon, could be defended ccinst attack by a major Fower in occupation of the Chinese mainland. If in any future war China were hostile or overrun by a hostile Tower wo should not be able to use it as a base and preparations aro not therefore necessary to defend it in this eventuality.
In the period under review a acso mi ht Le made out. for dofonding Hong Kong einst the ill armed forces which China, unsupported by any other power, is likely to havo available, The desirability of holding Hong Kong would, however, finally depend on political and strategic considerations. Since the I. C. state that the possibility of war with Ching in the next ten years is so rumote cs to bo negligiblo, we do not consider it necessary to allow for this eventuality in assossing the scale of forces to be maintained in Hong Kong in peccutime.
7.
Je consider that the primary duties of the forces
stationed at Hong Kong will bo :-
(a) To provide un crmed breking to resist the
Police in maintaining internal sucurity,
(b) to control the frontior;
(c) to protect shipping against piracy;
(a) to uphold Iritish prostige, and as a
deterrent to Chinese aspirations.
-3-
7
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.