CO537-(205_1260-1262) — Page 243

00202

re known to be in possession ained Parachute Regiment:

not so far had battle

hout American aid, the

d be ineffective against

nd in the unlikely event

eat Britain and China, we

rican personnel would not

e side of China,

t, at present, China has

at line aircraft to which total

pproximately 400 Japanese and

en American planes.

be imposed on their

poor servicing, once

Severe

ion is withdrawn. It is

under these conditions, air

ary operations could not be

ld be limited to sporadic

1 be ineffective in face of

danger of mining by aircraft ligible.

16 Central Government is to

: means.

This policy has

urrender, and was reaffirmed on 24th August, 1945,

Past

.one suggest, however, that Lemselves to purely

'essure to bear for the

:ample, a propaganda campaign

has already been experienced

y been reinforced by a prese splacement of Chinese from he New Territories.

It is

11 be maintained and rnment as a natural prelude omatic means for the

pressure is likely to be

inst the New Territories, a alon is to be expected in

nd on the Frontier of

9.

There might also

ated and limited mining

son Port or Military

ch may, however, have Llian morale.

pirates for personal

.de as the result of civil war in China.

00203

*

Ref:

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

N

restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed "Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leallel

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh

~

Ref.:

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Please note that this copy is supplied subject in the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyngh

restrictions.

Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet

N

(E) Infiltration of large numbers of agents into the

Chinese population to organise strikes, civil unrest and boycott.

(F) Interruption of food and other supplies to the

Colony from China, to lend weight to the political campaign for recovery of Hong Kong.

PROBABLE FORMS OF ATTACK

7. As regards (A) (including mining) and (B), we have already said in paragraph 2 above that the possibility of a major war between China and ourselves is negligible, and, therefore, a direct assault by land could only come from a Provincial War Lord should one arise in Southern China to challenge the rule of Chiang-Kai-Shek. Modern weapons would not be available to such a leader and a direct assault by his forces would be ill-organised, The possibility of such an attack occurring can be excluded so long as a garrison of approximately its present size is available as a deterrent. If, however, the present garrison were reduced to a mere token force for guard duties, etc., an attempt by a China Lord to force his way across the frontier could not be orcluded.

8.

Individual raids by pirates for personal gain take place continually even in peace, time, but are likely to increase in the event of (A), (B) or (F) occurring.

9.

Attack (D) is likely to affect the frontier area, and communications with the colony in Chinese territory (e.g. the Canton-Kowloon railway), rather than in the colonial territory itself. For this reason, and because in the event of civil war there is always the possibility of an influx of armed deserters, strong military and police patrol of the frontier would be necessary.

10, of all forms of attack (E) carried out in conjunction with (F) is most likely, and is also in keeping with Chinese tharacter and history. This type of attack is also the most difficult to meet. The movement of Chinese tnd from Hong Kong cannot be properly controlled and, as an example, Chinese entries into the Colony at the present moment exceed departures by about 30,000 per month. It would not be difficult for the Chinese to match this influx with the smuggling-in of large quantities of small arms and light mortars.

INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION

11.

As regards C.-in-C., Hong Kong's recommendation regarding an intelligence organisation, we agree that a Joint Intelligence Committee should be maintained in Hong Kong; Civil authorities to be represented as well as the three Services. We agree that services of reliable agents for reporting from the mainland are essential, and we assume that they will be operated by an appropriate secret organisation. We suggest further that close liaison be maintained with H.M. Consul-General at Canton and H. M. Embassy in China by the appointment either of an Embassy official to be attached to the Hong Kong Government, or of a liaison officer who would travel between Hong Kong and the Chinese capital.

(Signed) H.A. CACCIA

E.G. N. RUSHBROOKE

C.E.R. HIRSCH (for D.M.I.) R.E. VINTRAS (for A.C.A.S. (I))

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