CO537-(205_1260-1262) — Page 199

00 168

sacks as a result of

civil war in South

'obable. In the event

er, strong military and

1

frontier would be

it the influx of armed

of Hong Kong lies in the 'ational navel and air

nflict in the Pacific. Isession which has very

for garrison duties in

ie total forces avail-ble

of the small size of the

.t is essential to keep

stations such as Hong Kong rcements from elsewhere

*y.

der modern conditions

.nst attack by a major power inland.

Me should not,

forcos or defences which

overrun and lost,

a case might be made out

the ill armed forces

other pover, is likely

ever, the J.I.C. state that

a in the next ten years is

ve do not consider it necessary

1 assessing the scale of forces

1 peacetime.

herefore, consider that, as our

ld be regarded as an

defences are concerned.

> use Hong Kong as an

in a war in which the strategic

10. We should, therefore,

notice the necessary scale

aval attack from a distance.

y for the provision at short

ences, including anti-submarine,

Ceв, should be made beforehand.

lopend on the general

30 in particular on the

Kong being required cs on

No uscful forecast* of

iven,

(46) 42mil Meeting

00169

9.

Short Term Policy. In a recent telegram

C.-in-C.,

Hong Kong, has urged the retention of the existing garrison for the following main reasons:-

Ref.:

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

1

restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet

i note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' farms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright

N

10.

(a)

The present inadequacy of the Police Force.

(b)

The increased security burden as a result

of unsettled conditions following on

enemy occupation;

(c)

The prosent economic distress.

(a)

The "open" frontier which allows the

(e)

(r)

passage of large numbers of undesirables.

The continued movement of large numbers of

Chinese troops through the Colony.

The fact that the Nationalist Forces in

Kwantung are constantly driving Communist, alias bandit, forces of anything up to 500 in strength against our land and sen frontiers.

We consider the development of a properly organised

and armed Police Force will enable some of the above duties, now handled by garrison forces, to be taken over by the Police.

Even when the Police Force has been reformed we shall not be able to dispense with the deterrent garrison in view of the opinion held by both the C.-in-0., Hong Kong, and by the J.I.C. regarding the possibility of attack by the Chinese War Lord.

to:-

The Forces for this purpose should also be adequate

(a) Provide an armed backing to assist the Police

in maintaining internal security.

(b) Control the frontier.

(c) Protect shipping against piracy.

(d) Uphold British prestige and not as a deterrent

to Chinese aspirations.

11. Reduction of Garrison. We are unable to forecast the possible timing for the reduction of our garrison which must in the first place depend on the formation of an adequate and efficient police force and subseruently on the situation in China,

We consider that reductions should be made in accordance with the following phases: -

Phase I

-

Phase II

-

This will last until the Police

Force is adequate and efficient.

This will continue as long as China

romains in its present unsettled state. A deterrent garrison only will be required.

14

12.1202

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L

1

cms

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leallel Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrig