00 168
sacks as a result of
civil war in South
'obable. In the event
er, strong military and
1
frontier would be
it the influx of armed
of Hong Kong lies in the 'ational navel and air
nflict in the Pacific. Isession which has very
for garrison duties in
ie total forces avail-ble
of the small size of the
.t is essential to keep
stations such as Hong Kong rcements from elsewhere
*y.
der modern conditions
.nst attack by a major power inland.
Me should not,
forcos or defences which
overrun and lost,
a case might be made out
the ill armed forces
other pover, is likely
ever, the J.I.C. state that
a in the next ten years is
ve do not consider it necessary
1 assessing the scale of forces
1 peacetime.
herefore, consider that, as our
ld be regarded as an
defences are concerned.
> use Hong Kong as an
in a war in which the strategic
10. We should, therefore,
notice the necessary scale
aval attack from a distance.
y for the provision at short
ences, including anti-submarine,
Ceв, should be made beforehand.
lopend on the general
30 in particular on the
Kong being required cs on
No uscful forecast* of
iven,
(46) 42mil Meeting
00169
9.
Short Term Policy. In a recent telegram
C.-in-C.,
Hong Kong, has urged the retention of the existing garrison for the following main reasons:-
Ref.:
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THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
1
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet
i note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' farms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright
N
10.
(a)
The present inadequacy of the Police Force.
(b)
The increased security burden as a result
of unsettled conditions following on
enemy occupation;
(c)
The prosent economic distress.
(a)
The "open" frontier which allows the
(e)
(r)
passage of large numbers of undesirables.
The continued movement of large numbers of
Chinese troops through the Colony.
The fact that the Nationalist Forces in
Kwantung are constantly driving Communist, alias bandit, forces of anything up to 500 in strength against our land and sen frontiers.
We consider the development of a properly organised
and armed Police Force will enable some of the above duties, now handled by garrison forces, to be taken over by the Police.
Even when the Police Force has been reformed we shall not be able to dispense with the deterrent garrison in view of the opinion held by both the C.-in-0., Hong Kong, and by the J.I.C. regarding the possibility of attack by the Chinese War Lord.
to:-
The Forces for this purpose should also be adequate
(a) Provide an armed backing to assist the Police
in maintaining internal security.
(b) Control the frontier.
(c) Protect shipping against piracy.
(d) Uphold British prestige and not as a deterrent
to Chinese aspirations.
11. Reduction of Garrison. We are unable to forecast the possible timing for the reduction of our garrison which must in the first place depend on the formation of an adequate and efficient police force and subseruently on the situation in China,
We consider that reductions should be made in accordance with the following phases: -
Phase I
-
Phase II
-
This will last until the Police
Force is adequate and efficient.
This will continue as long as China
romains in its present unsettled state. A deterrent garrison only will be required.
14
12.1202
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L
1
cms
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leallel Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrig