CO537-(205_1260-1262) — Page 187

00 15 7

ult by a Chinese army of

led by a Southern War ial threat.

ipping is a possibility

t march on Hong Kong

internal unrest or civil

ce Sub-Committee Ruport

a report by the Joint

in which they examine Sections II

-Chief's appreciation.

:-

ith C.-in-C., Hong Kong

s aspirations. There are

ever, that the Chinese

themselves to purely diplo- ringing pressure to beer

of Hong Kong.

alt on the Now Territories, ffective air raids on port

llations (which might have ivilian morale) and limited 3, is only likely in the >stilities break out with

?nment. The possibility of next ten years is so remote >10.

1ipment including aircraft

ull not in all probability

1 provincial War Lord, should Jhing to challenge the rule >k. The possibility of an

incial War Lord can also be

as a garrison of approximately

is available to net as a

'm or attack is by

: large number of agents into ation to organise strikes,

boycott. This might well be

'ood and other supplies to thing, to land weight to the

njunction with the

m for recovery of Hong Kong.

incse to and from Hong Kong lod; rms up to and and small mortars can be

Colony in large quantities.

10 should be attached

100 no amendment has been

23

2-

12

cms

Ref.

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright

1

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(f) Piracy is probable at all times and is likely

to increase if the situation developed as in (d) above,

(E) Sporadic guerilla attacks na a result of

internal unrest or civil war in South China are most improbable. In the event of civil war, however, stroń; militcry ană police patrol of the frontier would be necessary to prevent the influx of armod desertors.

Policy for Dufence of Hong Kong

4. We do not consilor that under modern conlitions Hong Kong could be defended agrinst attack by a major power in occupation of the Chinese mainland, We should not, therefore, lock up in Hong Kong against such attack, forces or defences which will either not be required or clae overrun and lost.

5. Circumstances might, however, nrise in which we should require to use Hong Kon as an operational naval end gir base in the event of war in the Pacific, in which China was in friendly hands. In that event mobile defences against attack from a distance by sea or air could be moved into Hng Kong or instilled at short notice, in the same way as would be done for any advanced base from which it was decided to op.rato, plans ant preparations being male to onable the necessary lefences to intre tuce at short notice.

6. The Defence Committed have oproect that our future policy for Hong Kong shoul be to report it as an undefonde port so far as fixel defences are concurrel.

Short term Policy

7. We consiler that, to ensure internal security, as a protection against piracy, m' as n leterrent to an attempt at incursion by Chinese guorillas, som forces will be required at Hong Kong for a consirable time,

The isposition of forces for garrison Auties in. 8.E. Asia must be govorne by th. total forces available for the overall aron, In view of the small size of the forces available in 8.7. Asin, it is essential to keep permanent garrisons in outlying stations such as Hong Kong to the minimum relying on reinforcemonts from elsewhere within the throatre when necessary,

Requirements for Defence of Hong Kong

8.

On the basis of the policy sot cut in the previous paragraphs, we have examined at Amex II C.-in-C. Hong Kong's Retailed recommendations. Our conclusions are:-

*

(a) The British Pacific Fleet base on Hong Kong

shoul? affer sufficient local protection,

in particular for the suppression of piracy

4 other acts of violence. Certain allitional ships coul with advantage be place in reserve nt Hong Kong, which woul be available for service shoul? this be calle for.

+ D.0.(46) 7th Meeting.

-3-

سا

Ref

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL. ARCHIVES

N

restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright