CO537-(205_1260-1262) — Page 186

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Ref:

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

CO 537/1260

de that this copy in her mommabon is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archivos leathe to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh:

restrictions. Further information

(a) A direct land assault by a Chinese army of

up to 75,000 mon, led by a Southern War Lord is a potential threat.

(e) Piracy on local shipping is a possibility

at all times.

(f) Guerilla army might march on Hong Kong

as the result of internal unrest or civil war in China,

Summary of Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Ruport

3.

We attach at Annex Il a report by the Joint

Intelligence Sub-Committee, in which they examine Sections II and III of the Commander-in-Chief's appreciation,

This report shows that :-

(a) The J. I. C. ngrec with C.-in-C., Hong Kong

regarding China's aspirations. Thore arc indications, however, that the Chinese will not confine themselves to purely diplo- matic mocns in bringing pressure to bear for the recovery of Hong Kong.

(b) A direct lend assault on the Now Territories,

coupled with ineffective air raids on port or military installations (which might have some effect on civilian morale) and limited mining from junks, is only likely in the future if open hostilities break out with the Central Government. The possibility of this within the next ten years is so remote as to be negligible.

(c) Modern arms and equipment including nircraft

and transport, woull not in all probability be available to a provincial War Lord, should one arise in S. China to challenge the rule of Chiang Kai-Shok. The possibility of an attack by a provincial War Lord can also be excluded as long as a garrison of approximately its present size is available to not as a deterrent.

(a) The most likely form or attack is by

infiltration of a large number of agents into the Chinese population to organise strikes, civil unrest and boycott. This might well bo

carried out in conjunction with the interruption of food and other supplies to the Colony from Chinc, to lend weight to the political campaign for recovery of Hong Kong.

(c) The movements of Chinese to and from Hong Kong

cannot be controlled; crms up to and including L. K.G. and gmall mortars can be smuggled into the Colony in large quantities.

Annex I of J.P. (46) 10 should be attached

to this paper since no amendment has been made to this Annex,

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