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THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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The Committee wore informed that the memorandum was attempt to present fairly and objectively the arguments for and against the initiation of negotiations by His • Majesty's Government, though som. of the opinions expressed were not wholly accoptable to the Foreign Office on the one hand or to the Colonial Office on the other. A point of importance was the question whether, assuming it was accepted that it would be visor for us to refrain from taking the initiative, a public statement should be made to the effect that we intended to retain Hong Kong.

MR. MACDOUGALL, (Colonial Secretary, Hong Kong) said that the local Chinese in Hong Kong felt considerable doubt as to whether we intended to remain in Hong Kong. Until this question was resolved they would be in a dilemma and would have to re-insure with both parties. It was most important that some lead should be given to the local Chinese. The effecs of uncertainty were to be scon in the difficulty of proceeding with projects of capital development etc.

These

MR. LAMB (His Majesty's Embassy, Nanking) said that the great mass of Chinese people were not interested in Hong Kong; it was the politically minded few who were responsible for the agitation for rendition. people kopt the question alive by press propaganda, in which our aims and activitios were greatly distorted. He personally felt that we should be faced with a Chinese demand for the rendition of Hong Kong within a period of two or three years. He did not consider that the Chinese would agree to any proposals which drew a definite distinction between the loased territorics on the one hand, and the codud territory of Hong Kong itself on the other. As to the question of making a pu lic announcement in order to reassure business circlos in Hong Kong, he felt on balance that this course would be undesirable as being likely to bring the Hong Kong questions in the forefront of public fooling.

The Committe. then turned to a debailed consideration of F.2.0. (46) 122. The following views were expressed by departmental representatives.

(a) Admiralty

LEN. LOMAITRE did not agree that the arguments for and against our taking the initiative were finely brl need. Ho considered that the arguments were duciduly jainst our doing so.

(b) Board of Trade

The

MR. MCGRIMOK supported the Admiralty view. Board of Tr do hoped that Hong Kong would become more important now that Shanghai had been returned to China; but our commercial position there would probably not be so strong under revision of the lense as it was at present.

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