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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1986
MR WONG THEN REFERRED TO THREE POINTS OF MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE+ BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE DAYA BAY CONTROVERSY.
THE FIRST CONCERNED THE POWERS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE COUNCIL WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN USED TO DRAFT A MOTION IN MUCH STRONGER TERMS, HE SAID.
HOWEVER, MR WONG SAID THAT SUCH POWER OUGHT TO BE EXERCISED IN +MODERATION+ BECAUSE AS +MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, WE ARE HERE TO MONITOR, CRITICISE AND SUPERVISE, BUT NOT TO DIRECT, LESS SO TO GOVERN,+
THE SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL POINT RELATED TO THE GOVERNOR'S DUAL ROLE AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND AS PRESIDENT OF THE LEGISLATURE.
AFTER EXPLAINING THE +UNENVIABLE TASK+ OF THE TWO ROLES, MR WONG SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OUGHT TO BE A MEMBER WHO DID NOT CARRY ANY GOVERNMENT PORTFOLIO AND WAS NOT A SERVING MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.
HE PROPOSED THAT IN THE INTEREST OF SMOOTH TRANSITION TOWARDS THE SEPARATION OF THE TWO ROLES, THE GOVERNOR APPOINT A +NON-EXECUTIVE+ MEMBER AS +DEPUTY PRESIDENT+ TO PRESIDE OVER THE COUNCIL IN HIS ABSENCE.
ON THE THIRD CONSTITUTIONAL POINT CONCERNING THE DUAL EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE ROLE OF MEMBERS, MR WONG SAID THERE WAS A SEGMENT OF PUBLIC OPINION WHICH CALLED FOR A COMPLETE SEPARATION BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATURE.
+ I DO NOT BELIEVE THIS IS A WISE COURSE OF REFORM, + HE SAID. +THE CORRECT COURSE LIES IN AN UNEQUIVOCAL DELINEATION OF THE EXECUTIVE ROLE AND THE LEGISLATIVE-CUM-SUPERVISION ROLE, NOT IN THE ARTIFICIAL SEPARATION OF MEMBERS.
+ BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE EXECUTIVE, IT IS ALWAYS THOSE MEMBERS WHO DO NOT HOLD GOVERNMENT PORTFOLIOS AND ARE NOT EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEMBERS WHO PRIMARILY PERFORM THE SUPERVISORY ROLE,+ HE SAID, AND THEN WENT ON TO PROPOSE THAT ALL STANDING AND SELECT COMMITTEES WHICH WERE SUPERVISORY AND SCRUTINEERING IN NATURE SHOULD COMPRISE NON-EXECUTIVE MEMBERS ONLY.
HE THEN CALLED FOR THE SETTING UP OF SUCH A STANDING OR SELECT COMMITTEE ON ELECTRICITY OR ENERGY POLICY.
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