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actually on, a main trade route? It is impossible to look at the map without realising the extreme importance which may hereafter attach to this place. (2.) The place has been ridiculed as a second or third rate watering-place. Suppose it was no more! Suppose it had no good harbour! Even then, from its con- spicuous healthiness, its good sanita- tion and its sulphur springs, it would be worth keeping as a sanatorium for the many Englishmen in the Far East, naval, military, civilians, merchants, missionaries. If we are going to make as much of our Empire hereafter as heretofore, why should it be a subject for ridicule that in the Far East we have a place which is thoroughly healthy for Englishmen ? And why should it not pay its way even in pounds, shillings, and pence, if utilised in this manner?
(e.) Weihaiwei is not a negligible place if we mean, as I hope we mean, to continue employing Chinese soldiers. The men of the Chinese Regiment are men of fine physique, and this healthy station in North China is a natural headquarters and recruiting ground. (f.) A small reason for keeping the place is that, as already stated, the island is the private property by purchase of the British Government. As Mr. Hare points out, the British Government is, in respect of the island, in the eye of Chinese law, the tenant in perpetuity of the Chinese Government. But the two reasons which, to my mind, out- weigh every other are—
(g) the bad effect of going back, and (h) leaving Germany in possession of the
field in North China. It must have a bad effect on Eastern minds if we parallel the Port Hamilton case again. China- men come to us and enrich our Colonies, because they feel sure of us, and are safe under our rule. It is a very dangerous thing for us to give them the idea that we are shifty and evanescent as com- pared with the Power which is in evidence by our Bide, viz., Germany, and which has obviously come to stay. Moreover, retrocession from the British to the Chinese Government is handing back from a good to a bad government, which wants strong justification; and it is essentially for our national interests that in North China, as in South Chins, it should be seen what British rule means.
Thirty years ago, I suppose we had no rival in China. Now, if we give up Weihaiwei there will be no European Power but Germany in evidence in North China at present, if we are to believe the English accounts which we have received, unfavour- ably contrasted with ourselves, but aggressive to
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the last degree. It seems to me that to retire from Weihaiwei would be to give up North China to German domination, with endless prejudice to the future.
Mr. Hare, who has been quoted above, dealt with the comparison of Weihaiwei and Hong Kong, exploding or trying to explode it, and argued as follows- before the present complications had arisen:~
(1.) Weihaiwei is an unfortunate possession, as
it could only be fortified and defended at prohibitive cost; but it is out of the question to abandon it altogether, as England is pledged to retain it.
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(2.) Inasmuch as the Government cannot go
back on the public assurances Germany that England will not make railways inland, Weihaiwei, in spite of its fine harbour, cannot be made a commercial port.
(8.) All the leased territory and the sphere of influence should be given up except the island and about three square miles of the mainland, ie, except the actual harbour and enough land for
sanatorium.
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(4.) In return for handing back this territory, China should be asked to cede Chusan,
to be strongly fortified at the mouth of the Yangtze.
Chusan was put forward in old days as the alternative to Hong Kong, and the advocates of it were inclined to deolare Hong Kong to be valueless, just as Weihaiwei has been decried. It is, I take it, absolutely out of the question that any further part of China should be asked for or ceded, though the words of the German treaty might be quoted which empower them, in lieu of Kiao-Chau, to ask for the cession of a more suitable place; and, as Mr. Hare points out, Chusan has been twice occupied by the British in the Chinese war, and the Chinese signed a treaty not to cede it to any other foreign Power, so that, he argues, England has historical claims to Chusan. On the other hand, the first contention of Mr. Hare, that England is pledged to retain Weihaiwei, would no longer hold good if the Russians lose Port Arthur, as the condition on which Weihaiwei was taken would then be cancelled. But it might be possible-8 point to which I will refer later to give up part of Weihaiwei, as suggested in his third proposition, without demanding any quid pro quo.
The comparison of Hong Kong and Weihai- wei cannot be set aside completely. Hong Kong seemed to many more unpromising than Weihai- wei has seemed, because far more unhealthy. Hong Kong has never had any revenue from Customs duties any more than Weihaiwei; it has never hitherto had any railway connexion inland;
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