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to organize torpedo corps under somewhat similar conditions. The number of men required under the proposed system at each of the four places would be 25 constabulary, 100 naval brigade, and 20 torpedo men-total 145, or 580 in all. In addition to these, he proposed field forces numbering 600 at cach place, or 2,400 in all, and a volunteer torpedo corps numbering 40. He calculated the annual expense of maintaining these forces in time of peace at 17,5007.; but in time of war this estimate would be increased by such items as the pay of the armed constabulary, who might have to be replaced by substitutes, of the additional men required for the naval brigades, and of the permanent crews of the torpedo-boats. The volunteer force would have to be brought up to its war establishment, and provision made for the payment of the men whilst employed on military duties, as well as for the general expenses of maintaining the defences ready for immediate action." He sees no reason to doubt "that, under an improved organization, it will be quite practicable to keep down the total expenditure within the amount of this year's estimate, and at the same time provide, not only for an efficient scheme of defence against foreign aggression, but also for maintaining the volunteer force generally at its prescut strength."
Colonel Scratchley's Report is dated the 1st March, 1880. The Premier informed the Governor on the 16th April that the general tenour of his recommendations met with the approval of the Government; and on the 1st September he further stated that a sum of 9,000l. had been voted, of which the greater part was available for the formation of earthworks, and that the Government contemplated applying it to this purpose as soon as the plans were received. He added that the financial state of the Colony rendered it impracticable to incur the whole of the expenditure which the completion of those works would involve. Colonel Scratchley, reporting in September, 1881, states that he has now furnished the designs, which are being considered; and that he proposes visiting New Zealand early next year in order to inquire more fully into the matter. He says, in conclusion, that at the present time the harbours of the Colony are practically defenceless against the attack of hostile vessels.
Having thus summarized the evidence which has been brought before us in respect of each of the Australian Colonies and New Zealand, we will proceed to state the general conclusions at which we have arrived.
It is, in our opinion, plainly necessary to maintain at each fortified place a small body of fully trained artillerymen permanently enrolled. This was the unanimous opinion of the Commission and Military Committee, and of the witnesses, not only from New South Wales, but from Victoria and South Australia. There were and probably will be, differences of opinion as to the organization of such a force; the period for which the men should be engaged, the numbers required, and so forth; but these points must be locally decided, and we need do no more than refer to them.
We consider it further desirable to create a reserve of men who have passed through the permanent forces as an economical means of increasing, in times of emergency, the number of efficient gunners. Upon this point there was also an unanimity of opinion in New South Wales; and it appears that the same view was entertained in Victoria and South Australia, though in New South Wales it was considered that the reserve might be partly composed of volunteer militia.
It is clear from the evidence that, however good the volunteer forces may be, they cannot become efficient without daylight drill and periods of continuous training. Where the value of labour is high, as it is in Australia, the time required for these military exercises cannot be given gratuitously, and it follows that, without payment for their time, it is impossible to raise forces upon which dependence could be placed in time of war. Any military expedition directed against Australia would be composed of regular and disciplined troops, which the colonial forces could not hope to meet on anything like equal terms, unless their first line of defence be organized with as near an approximation to the efficiency of regular troops as they are able to attain. For these reasons, it is desirable that each Colony should maintain a limited volunteer militia force, comprising, if possible, artillery, engineers, and infantry, sufficiently trained, and paid for the time devoted to training.
From a purely military point of view we apprehend that it would be best to have a sinall permanent infantry force, which would not only be well officered and well drilled, but would serve as a model and school for the volunteers. But, as we have before observed, the great object is to secure permanence in the defence forces, and it may be doubted whether that would be obtained by establishing a force, the maintenance of which would be exposed to attacks on the ground of economy. We believe, upon the whole, that the organization of a volunteer militia, enrolled and paid, as in South Australia, for actual work done, and supplemented by an unpaid volunteer force, infantry and mounted, would be most likely to meet the requirements of all the Australian Colonies, and to acquire a permanent character. This latter force would cost the Colony nothing except, perhaps, a small capitation fee, and a sum for instruction, arms, and ammunition.
All the witnesses agree in describing the existing volunteer forces as composed of men of good physique, with zeal and every disposition to perfect themselves in drill. Existing defects would be best remedied by the establishment of a school of instruction for officers, on the principle of the Military College in Canada. But in the present circumstances of the Australian Continent an efficient school could hardly be created and maintained except by the joint action of the several Colonies. This is a question which will need much consideration; but if approached with judgment, it ought not to present any insuperable difficulty. It is satisfactory to find that the
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Sydney Commission were unanimous in recommending not only a school for instruction for the Colony of New South Wales, but also a central school, on a plan somewhat similar to that in Canada. If such a school were established it would, we think, be desirable, as in the case of Canada, to offer commissions in your Majesty's service to a limited number of cadets.
We believe that the colonial forces would derive the highest advantage from the presence and superintendence of an experienced officer of rank and distinction, either stationed for a certain number of years, not exceeding five, in Australia, or sent out from England from time to time. Upon the whole, Colonial opinion seems in favour of the former plan, and we concur in thinking it the best. The charge should, of course, be divided amongst the several Colonies, and the officer should be chosen by the military authorities in this country, with special reference to his personal qualifications for the post. All the witnesses agree in believing that such an appointment would be welcomed in the Colonies, and would more than anything else tend to raise the tone of discipline and bring about uniformity in organization and equipment.
To avoid misunderstanding, it would be desirable that the scope of the duties of such an officer should be distinctly defined and agreed to by all the Colonies interested. Speaking generally, his duties should be to conduct periodical inspections of the local forces, and of the military establishments in each Colony; and to advise and act as referee of the several Govern- ments in military questions and questions of discipline. In time of peace he should not perform any act of executive command, nor in any way interfere with the Cominandants. In time of war he should assume supreme direction of the military affairs of the Colonies.
We have already alluded to the services of Sir W. D. Jervois, and we desire now to draw attention to those of Colonel Scratchley, who has been actively engaged during the last four years in superintending the construction of the works, inspecting the local forces, and generally advising the Governments of the several Colonies on matters connected with their defences. The success which has attended the mission of these two distinguished officers-marked, as it has been, by conspicuous zeal and ability in carrying out a difficult and delicate task-affords strong presumptive evidence of the feasibility of such a measure as we propose, and points to the advantage which the Colonies derive from the presence of well selected Imperial officers.
Although it may not be expedient to press upon the Colonial Governments to take steps at once to secure joint action of the different colonial forces, the advantages gained by troops, whether permanent or volunteer, occasionally meeting and training in concert, are so manifest that such an officer would doubtless feel it his duty to advise an experiment in this direction. Such advice, given with tact and judgment, and shown to be practicable, would have weight with the Colonial authorities.
The advantage derived from competent officers and instructors from the Imperial service being attached to colonial corps having been brought to our notice, we think that applications to the Imperial Government for the services of such officers or instructors, whether military or naval, should receive prompt compliance; their services to be in all cases for a limited period, during which they should be paid by the Colony where they may be serving.
We think it most desirable that an efficient torpedo corps should be maintained in each Colony. A torpedo corps and artillery stand in the same category, and are of first importance in any system of defence. We agree with Colonel Scratchley in thinking that, whilst maintaining the character of the corps as a military body, efficiency in purely military drill is not necessary, but that, the nature of the work being exceptional, more training is required than for the ordinary military exercises.
There are other points in connection with the land forces which have been brought to our notice but those above referred to seem to us the most important, and, indeed, essential to their efficiency.
We will conclude our observations by stating that there are some ports, the cost of defending which it is hardly reasonable to expect a single Colony to bear, and with regard to which we think the Australian Governments might well consider the expediency of providing the defence in common. King George's Sound in Western Australia is a strong case in point. The harbour is an admirable one, and the evidence we have received shows that, though of considerable importance from a commercial point of view, it is not of much nee to your Majesty's ships. But we do not anticipate that the Colony of Western Australia would be able to provide and maintain defences at her sole expense, although Colonel Scratchley is disposed to think that she could do so with some assistance.
With regard to the larger question of the naval defence of Australia generally as an integral portion of the British Empire and of Australian commerce on the high seas, the time, in our opinion, has arrived when the Colonies may reasonably be expected to take upon themselves some share of that defence a burden hitherto exclusively borne by the mother-country.
Looking to the fact that only one Colony has availed itself of the powers given by the Colonial Naval Defence Act, and that the vessel acquired by Victoria as a sea-going ship has practically been converted into a vessel for harbour defence, we do not suggest that these Colonies should maintain sea-going ships of their own for action beyond their territorial waters. To such a plan there are many objections; and even if the Colonies were willing to undertake the heavy expenditure of purchasing such ships, it is doubtful whether considering the rapid changes in the construction and armament of sea-going vessels of war, they would long continue to be efficient.
But we see no reason why the Australian Colonies should not make a moderate contribution in money towards the cost of that squadron which is maintained by the mother-country for the protection of interests common to the Colonies and herself.
How the amount of contribution should be calculated is a matter of detail and would require further discussion; but speaking generally, it would seem that each Colony should pay a sum
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