PUBLIC RECORD
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C.O.
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It is not to be lost sight of, that if, through unforeseen circumstances, the Canal should come into the possession of a hostile maritime Power having free access to its northern entrance by sea, it might be a source of danger to our Indian Empire, by the facilities it would afford for placing ships and organizing an expedition in the Red Sea. This points to the necessity of strengthening our position in the Red Sea, for which purpose Aden should be made thoroughly secure as an advanced base for any operations it might be necessary to undertake “ in that sea, whether by the fleet alone or by the fleet in combination with troops from India.
The general result of these inquiries and considerations is that the security of the route by the Suez Canal might, under certain contingencies, become very precarious, and the risk attendant-on sending commercial ships through it so great as practically to preclude its use; in which case the long sea route would be tjie only one available, and the annual value of the trafe passing the Cape of Good Hope, if our Eastern trade is not to be reduced below its present value, would amount to 150,000,0007, exclusive of that of the shipping in which it would be carried.
This, however, only represents one part of the question. The Cape route is not only of importance in connection with the commerce of Great Britain, but assumes a far higher degree of importance to the Empire at large, as being essential to the retention by Great Britain of her possessions in India, Mauritius, Ceylon, Singapore, China, and even Australasia. It is by this route alone that reinforcements of troops, and all that is necessary for their support, could, under the contingencies alluded to, be sent from the United Kingdom with any degree of certainty or security; they would, in fact, have to follow the same route as they did during the Indian Mutiny. Even, however, if such an extreme case as that involved in the mutiny of 1857 were excluded from the consideration of the question, the uninterrupted supply of men and material to meet the ordinary demands of our Eastern garrisons and squadrons is of such importance that the integrity of this route must be maintained at all hazards, and irrespective of cost. This, however, will be but a small percentage upon the value of the interests involved, and will not exceed that which would be caused by even a moderate rise in the rate of insurance.
The distance from England to Cape Town is close upon 6,000 miles, for the whole of which distance there is not a single British protected port-unless Gibraltar, which is not in the direct line, be regarded as such-to which a British ship could run for security. The harbour of Free- town, Sierra Leone, is absolutely without defence, and the roadsteads of St. Helena and Ascension, though covered, it is true, by a few guns, are still so open as to afford no security against such a fire from modern artillery as might be used to destroy vessels anchored in them, without risk to the assailants.
The voyage eastwards from the Cape is under somewhat better conditions, there being harbours in the Mauritius at a distance of 2,340 miles, and in Ceylon, 2,100 miles further ou, for the protection of which works of defence have been erected.
We have taken a great deal of evidence as to the improvements effected of late years in the manner of conducting the distant trade of the Empire. While recognizing the rapid strides made in ocean steam navigation by the increase in the size of commercial ships, in their speed, in economy of consumption of fuel, and consequently in their power to make long voyages without the necessity of obtaining fresh supplies of coal, we are of opinion that a very large proportion of the traffic to the East must continue to be carried on in steamers which will have to be provided with coal at intermediate ports on such a long voyage as that round the Cape, and more especially so if occasionally they should be compelled to go at their utmost speed for some hours to escape capture. The coal-carrying power of ships of war, morcover, is generally so limited, and their duties are such, that they require replenishing from stores near their cruizing stations; therefore, looking at the question alone of coal supply, it is evident that the Cape must be maintained as a coaling station. Having regard also to the stormy nature of the scas which have to be traversed in reaching the Cape, it is essential that even the largest and best ships, whether of your Majesty's or of the mercantile navy, should have the means at the Capo of repairing the machinery upon which their motive power depends.
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These various considerations have led us to the conclusion that in addition to any protection which may be afforded by ships of war in blockading enemy's ports, or by cruisers patrolling the ocean for the protection of commercial ships, it is essential that there should be a port at the Cape, thoroughly defended, in which ships may at all times find a safe refuge, and be repaired and refitted, and obtain supplies of coal in security,
Such a port should, if possible, combine facilities for these purposes both for ships of war and for trading ships; and should be made a secure base from which the operations of any squadron charged with the protection of commerce in the adjoiuing seas may be conducted.
The Cape Peninsula, about 32 miles in length from Green Point on the north to Cape Point on the south, is a rugged mountainous district, connected with the continent by a low isthmus about 13 miles in breadth, between Table Bay on its north and False Bay on its south.
Simon's Bay, which affords a secure anchorage at all seasons of the year, is on the east side of the peninsula in False Bay.. It has been used principally by your Majesty's ships, for the con- venience of which a small establishment has been formed upon its shores by the Admiralty. It is not a port strictly speaking, but a roadstead; it possesses no wharves, but the naval establish- ment affords facilities for executing such small repairs as can be done without the use of a dock. The anchorage is secure, and ships can be generally coaled by means of barges; but supplies have to be brought to it from Cape Town, 22 miles distant, with which it is not as yet connected by railway.
Table Bay was until recently so open and exposed to heavy gales that serious losses occurred to ships anchored in it; but notwithstanding the bad reputation it had acquired, the commerce of Cape Town, encouraged by railways from the interior, has steadily increased, so that the Colonial
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Government have been induced to undertake extensive works. They have thrown out a break- water to the distance of 550 yards from the shore, which is being extended 600 yards further, for the protection of the anchorage. The portion already constructed has stood the test of some of the heaviest weather on record without injury, and has proved its efficiency to protect the entrance to the basins, and ships lying within and near it. The Colonial Government have also constructed large floating basins, which are being greatly extended, and jetties alongside of which the largest ships can coal. A graving dock also, 500 foot in length and 70 feet broad, capable of taking in ships drawing 26 feet of water, will be completed next year. These extension works, on which the Colonial Government propose to expend £350,000 in the next eight or ten years, are avowedly undertaken, not only for the frade of South Africa, but to make Table Bay a port of call, and à coaling station for the largest steamers in the Australian trade.
We are fairly justified, therefore, in assuming that Cape Town will ere long be provided with every convenience for coaling with rapidity and with all the appliances necessary for repairing, refitting, and docking commercial ships of the largest size, which would also be available for war- ships of the classes of the Swiftsure" and ")
“Northampton."
At Simon's Bay, on the contrary, there is no tendency to improvement for commercia purposes; and unless the Imperial Government are prepared to undertake works on a large scale, and of an expensive character, the means for execating such repairs as require the use of a dock will only be found at Cape Town.
As regards defence, neither Simon's Bay nor Table Bay can be so protected by works that ships lying within them will be absolutely secure against injury from the distant fire of artillery. The protection that can be given to ships in Table Bay is, however, superior to that which can be given to ships in Simon's Bay, unless the heavy expense he incurred at the latter of building an irou fort on the Roman Rocks similar to one of those erveted at Spithead. As the docks, establishments, and stores, including the large quantities of coal, necessarily stored at Cape Town for purposes of trade, render Table Bay of incalculable value to British commerce, it is evident that that port must be defended in the interests of the Empire at large, and of its trade with the East, whether Simon's Bay be defended or not. It is hardly necessary to add that the capture of Table Bay would place an enemy in a very commanding position on the great sea route to India and the East.
Under these circumstances, we have given our most careful consideration to the question whether, as Table Bay must be defended, it might not supersede the necessity for maintaining the naval establishment at Simon's Bay, and of erecting works there for its defence, We have had the advantage of hearing the opinions of Sir Bartle Frere, and of Admirals Sir Francis Sullivan and Sir E. Commerell, who have both commanded on the African Station; also of Colonel Pasley, the Chief of the Admiralty Engineering Department, and of Sir John Coode, under whose advice the extensions of the harbour works at Cape Town are being made. From their evidence it appears that the harbour works at Cape Town, even when completed, will not supersede the larger space and the superior natural advantages of Simon's Bay as an anchorage; and that Simon's Bay must, therefore, be accepted under existing circumstances as indispensable to your Majesty's navy.
To assist us in considering the measures to be taken for the defence of the Cape Peninsula, we have had before us a Memorandum, prepared under the direction of the Secretary of State for War, in which the question has been treated under the supposition that it would be sufficient to erect batteries to provide against a naval attack, and that sufficient protection against an attempt to turn the batteries, and take them by a force landed at a distance, would be afforded by a force of 4,000 men, composed of imperial and Colonial troops. These troops, being stationed partly at Cape Town and partly at Simon's Bay, would occupy and fight the batteries at both places, and would also be able to provide a sufficient field force to operate against an enemy advancing against either position.
In order to permit of this force being used to the greatest advantage, a system of telegraphs, combined with the construction of roads through the peninsula, is proposed.
We have taken advantage of the presence in this country of Captain Mills, C.M.G., the Under Colonial Secretary, to obtain from him a statement of the Colonial forces which may be avail- able in the Cape Peninsula, and we find that there is a body of about 1000 volunteers of all arms, who were enrolled originally at the time of the Indian Mutiny, when your Majesty's troops were removed, and who then took over and discharged all the military duties at Cape Town. They discharged similar duties in 1878 and 1879, when your Majesty's troops were employed in military operations in the interior of the country; and some of them have since been engaged against the Basutos. This force, therefore, has not only received a fair amount of training, but has gained experience, so that it may be regarded as a military body which could safely be intrusted to act in combination with your Majesty's troops.
As regards the question of general defence, we have to observe that any attack would be of a very sudden nature, and probably on the first outbreak of war, when there will have been little or no warning of danger or time for preparation, and before Imperial troops could be dispatched to reinforce the garrison and place the peninsula in a state of security. The power, also, which a force attacking from the sea has of making feints and of being transferred from one point to another with great rapidity and without warning, renders it essential that the important positions of Cape Town and Simon's Bay, which are so distant from each other that they must, to a great extent, be self-dependent, should be secured against attack at all times.
These considerations make it imperatively necessary that a permanent garrison should be kept in the Cape Peninsula, of sufficient strength to man the coast batteries, to hold Cape Town and Simon's Bay, and to prevent the possibility even of a temporary occupation of the peninsula