PUBLIC RECORD
OFFICE
Reference :-
RC.O. 885 / 5
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO
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This can only be secured when the discipline, instruction, and practice is similar; without harmony in these respects there is a serious source of weakness. There should. be no question as to responsibility, or as to the relative position of officers.
There should
be a flow of promotion. Neither officers or men should be kept too long on any station An acquaintance with modern appliances and implements of war must be maintained, and they should have a knowledge of the condition of those against whom they may have
to act in war.
The use of inechanical appliances for so many purposes on board modern ships of war, and the increasing delicacy of those appliances and weapons call for highly trained crews.
To secure the strength that is due to training when it exists throughout a whole force, those portions of it to which special duties are relegated, and which, in point of numbers, are relatively small, must adopt themselves to the system that prevails with the majority. The total strength of the personnel of Her Majesty's flect is, including reserves, approximately 102,000.
Practically all seamen in Her Majesty's fleet are entered as boys, and are trained, before going to sea, in special vessels. They enter for 12 years, and subsequently can renew their engagerents for 10 more, and then become entitled to a pension. It is not practical to propose that men of the same rank and position, performing the same duty, and serving in the same ship, should receive widely different rates of pay, or be entered on widely different conditions.
There are ports that require a considerable amount of naval force for their defences- Melbourne for instance. Port Philip cannot be denied to an enemy by batteries and mine fields alone. There a local naval force of very considerable strength is already called into existence.
Some ports only require a few torpedo boats. Queensland possesses gun vessels well suited for service off her coral girt shores.
South Australia has a vessel of another
type altogether that is specially well adapted for the service she was designed to render; and of the efficiency and reliability of these forces I am glad to bear personal testimony.
It is not proposed to make any change in what has been so far well done with reference to such local forces.
Are these
The immediate subject for consideration refers to sea-going vessels of war. Colonics desirous to provide them for the defence of these seas? And in such case how best to give effect to their desire? And I venture to say it is difficult to conceive a more important subject.
These Colonies have no frontiers save those imposed by nature. Should an enemy ever appear he must come from over the sea.
It will be noted that the types of ships recommended are essentially sea-going vessels, that are formidable whatever may be the nature of the opposing force. They are also well adapted to play a prominent part, if needs be, in a local defence; yet they are not of a class that could be readily sent out to distant seas from home at an hour of need; a task that would be well performed by the new fast armoured ships, or by the protected vessels that form a part of Her Majesty's Navy, and which are designed for protracted distant service at sea, and with which these proposed vessels are admirably adapted to co-operate.
I may mention that the subject of the defence given by the Navy to Colonics and commerce, and of the maintenance of armed depôts throughout the world, has recently been prominently before the Parliament in London, and as a result to a special debate 3,100,000Z. was voted in December 1884, for an increase in the Navy, and a large additional vote was granted for defensive works abroad.
The direction of the view taken is sufficiently shown by observing the type of vessel ordered, which is given under the estimate upon which the calculation of 3,100,000l. was made:-One armour-plated, ship, five belted cruisers, 10 “ Scouts," two rams, and 30 torpedo boats.
A reference to the summary of naval estimates for the years from 1881 to 1885 will show the growth of naval expenditure:-1881-82, 10,945,9194; 1882–83, 12,110,426%. ; 1883–84, 10,899,5007.; 1884-85, 11,507,9707; 1885-86, 15,186,5007.
In 1882-83 there was a vote of credit of 1,276,5257., and in 1885-86 au estimated vote of credit of 2,800,000, which sums are included in the above. Equally interesting are the tables of figures which show the total actual and estimated expenditure on ship-
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building and ordnance between 1875 and 1886, which show that the sums varied from 3,772,6017. in 1875-76 to au estimate of 6,102,6527. for 1885-86.
There is no desire whatever. I am assured, to avoid any of the responsibilities due to the maintenance of the Empire, growing as they do grow with its ever increasing popu- lation and wealth, particularly in these great Colonies. I am authorised to say there is a full determination to continue to bear the task.
While we as a nation grow with amazing strides, au ever increasing naval protection is required. Other nations also grow, but in no instance has another nation such a wide- world task; in no instance is the task that falls to their Navy appreciably increased with the growing wealth and population of their country, when compared to the case of the British Empire.
This memorandum is written on my own responsibility. It is but a sequitur to the memorandum and papers which have been written by the Premiers and by others on the same subject within these Colonies. It is what it professes to be, a simple statement of the views of a sailor occupying the position I do, from a national aspect, with Australasia in the foreground.
I now will briefly review matters as they are.
Forts, arsenals, and coaling stations are held on the lines of trade and commerce, on the maintenance of which, it is unquestionable, the whole Empire is deeply interested.
Sufficient ships to perform the duty of police of the seas, and to maintain British interests, are suitably stationed all over the world. In the heart of Europe the Mediterranean fleet is maintained; at home, ships are kept ready for service, to be sent anywhere at very short notice. The Channel fleet, while available for any service, is an invaluable fleet for training officers and men.
The above sketch gives an outline of the policy which is considered to be the very best yet devised for securing that the naval force of the nation will be at the right place at the right time.
Should any
The fleets of other nations are watched; and any augmentation of force that is observed is readily met, when necessary, by counterbalancing measures. hostile fleet leave Europe, we may rest assured it will be followed; and lest such a case should occur, protected coaling stations, naval establishments abroad and Colonial defences, militia and volunteer forces, have their cause for existence.
We must recall that when the fleets of England were far greater than those of France and Spain combined, yet in the great actions fought in the early part of this century our force was inferior to those opposed to us. At this time the power to concentrate is far greater than it was in those days. It is clear the strength of the fleet must not be frittered away, as it would if the component parts were scattereil.
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At home it has often and often been proposed to build ships specially suited for the defence of the Mersey, the Clyde, the Thames, and other ports The answer has always
been on the same line.
If Parliament will place more money at the disposal of the Admiralty they will be able to show it will be best and wisest to spend it on vessels suited for the general service of the country.
An increase to Her Majesty's fleet voted in London would take that direction. It would be spent in construction, in armaments, and, excepting as regards the very important instance of torpedo boats, for the purpose of adding to the strength of the fleet that could be employed anywhere in the interests of the nation.
There is no difference of opinion as to the necessity for protecting the most distant parts of the empire. The question is, how is this best effected? It cannot be better done than by destroying an enemy before he has time or opportunity to act to our disadvantage, but it is certainly wise to take every precaution lest, as in days gone by, a squadron should escape notice and suddenly appear off a distant shore.
What the Admiralty could do besides what it does now would be to give the advan- tage attached to a force that is organised on one system; also it could arrange to supply officers and men trained to modern ships and modern appliances. It can give homo- geneity to the whole force of the nation, and it could do this at a cost far less than would be entailed by any other plan that has yet been devised. But the Admiralty could only be expected to advise expenditure of the sums voted annually in London for naval
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