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36
No. 57.
Governor Sir J. Pope Hennessy, K.C.M.G., to the Right Hon. the Earl of Kimberley.
(Secret and Confidential.) My Lord,
(Received August 11.)
Government House, Hong Kong, July 5, 1880.
I INCLOSE, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a letter I received from Colonel Gordon on his arrival here yesterday morning, in which he refers to the defence of Hong Kong. When he came to see me in the afternoon I had an opportunity of hearing his views somewhat more in detail on the question of enlisting Chinese in the Colony to supplement the regular forces. He is probably the best living authority on the subject, and it was satisfactory to find that he concurred in the views I expressed to Sir Michael Hicks Beach in my despatch of the 6th of last March.*
2. He suggests beginning with 250 Chinèse infantry, and organizing this force so as to admit of its increase to 1,000. He also recommended an artillery corps of 100 or 200 Chinese.
3. I read to him paragraph 13 of my despatch of the 6th March, in which I express the opinion that the Chinese of Hong Kong should form the material for its defence in the shape of soldiers, and, having told him that I did not yet know your Lordship's views on the point, I said I should be glad to learn whether he would be disposed to undertake the task of organizing the defence of the colony on that basis, if your Lordship should ultimately think proper to favour such a suggestion. He said, if not otherwise employed, be would willingly do so.
4. The idea of his entering the colonial service with that object is, of course, at this moment, a merely speculative one. He is now on his way to Peking, and is likely to be employed by the Chinese Government. Even if he made no engagement with the Chinese Government, he mentioned a difficulty which might arise if he were offered employment in Hong Kong, namely, that the officer in command of Her Majesty's regular forces, as long as any Imperial troops were kept in the colony, should not be his master, and that he should in fact be directly under the Governor. No doubt all local corps are directly under the control of the Governor, as pointed out in the Duke of Newcastle's Circular despatch of the 6th April, 1863, but, nevertheless, difficulties may occur as long as there were two commanding officers in the colony. On the other hand, the special duty of Colonel Gordon would be to raise and establish a local corps, without the idea of permanently retaining the command.
5. The first part of the inclosed letter of Colonel Gordon refers to an important question which has only an indirect concern for the Governor of Hong Kong, but writing to your Lordship in this somewhat unreserved form, I may perhaps be excused for saying that I believe the interests of England are more on the side of keeping China strong than of allowing her to be weakened. My few years' experience of this part of the East convinces me of the soundness on this subject also, of Colonel Gordon's views.
I have, &c.
My dear Sir John,
(Signed)
Inclosure in No. 57.
J. POPE HENNESSY.
Hong Kong, July 4, 1880. THANK you very much for your kind invitation, which, however, as my stay will be very short, I will not take advantage of, but I will call on you this afternoon.
Before doing so, I will explain my position. The day after 1 resigned my appoint- ment with Lord Ripon I received a telegram from Hart, saying, "the Peking Government wished me to visit them." I asked our Government "for leave of absence beyond the end of this month" (which I already had) "to the end of year;" they replied that they did not know why I was going; I replied, "Neither did I;" so they said, "In the ignorance they were, they disapproved of my going to China." I replied "that I would not involve them," and offered my resignation. At Galle the Government telegraphed "Your leave is granted;" so that is how matters stand now.
I had meant to have written your Excellency a memorandum on the question of the armament of China. Our Government will have to face this question ere long.
1. Is it our policy to help China to organize her forces,-I mean by help, only countenance her in this direction. China would never accept, nor would it be desirable for our Government to do more than countenance.
• No. 203 in Miscellaneous No. 39.
37
N.B. A strong armed China would be certain to be extremely independent towards every foreign nation; she might denounce the opium trade.
2. Supposing it is not the policy of our Government to countenance the organization of China's forces, can we be sure she will not organize them, in spite of us, and will not the same result, an armed China, result?
Again, could we afford to let Russia assume an ascendency at Peking, which would be the issue of Russian military successes against China ?
We have to consider this question once for all, and, of course, on the decision will depend the action I may take.
Were China not threatened by Russia, she had better be left weak.
As she is threatened, it is better she was strong, even if we have to put up with her airs.
The question of Kuldja is of small import, and the Chinese, no doubt, if the war was localized there, would be a match for the Russians; but it is at Peking where China is exposed, and there only.
China did not care for us till we moved on Peking; we were welcome to stay at Canton or Shanghae as long as we wished.
In fact, China would be glad if Russia attacked those ports, for she would hope complications would arise with foreign Powers.
If you look at the map, you will see Russia has chosen a spot near the Corea; she will work up the Coreans against China, and then be able to approach Peking in alliance with the Coreans.
The place d'armes of Russia will be Vladivostok, and if you look at the map you will see how extremely disagreeable it will be for China to have a Sebastopol there with Corea near, likely to be allied with Russia against her. If China can hold her own for some months, till October, or temporize till then, and then, without putting herself too much in the hands of Europeans, get in some 200,000 breech-loaders, it would be a tough job for Russia to defeat her, provided China prevents Corca joining Russia.
China is not bound by the Declaration of Paris against privateers, and she would with her wealth engage fast vessels, which would even damage Russian trade in the Baltic !
There is a matter, your Excellency, which presses even more immediately than the relations of Russia and China, i.e., the state of defence of Hong Kong.
I do not know what has been done in this way, but, judging from the little that has been done at Singapore and Galle, I fear Hong Kong is also undefended.
Do not think I am intruding in stating what ought to be scen to, even if, by doing so, I am recommending faits accomplis.
The whole of the landing places around the isle ought to be examined by a mixed naval and military party, and works designed for their defence, estimate of cost, &c., all worked out, and so arranged that they could be executed at a moment's notice.
The tongues of land at A, vide sketch,* the isles of Chunghue, Tamtoo, Coweechow, and, whether on Chinese territory or not, ought to be examined, works designed for them, &c., and the armaments sent from England.
In case of war China would not be considered, and these points which defend the channel would be occupied.
With respect to the force required for the defence of Hong Kong, a nucleus of Chinese troops ought to be now formed. They would be perfectly trustworthy, if under officers who have some tact; they ought to be under a stricter discipline than Europeans in some matters, and a laxer discipline in others. They, each man, ought to be obliged to supply two guarantees for their behaviour; they ought to be allowed their women, whether they are married or not.
My opinion would be dead against their being put under Generals commanding the troops, who only indirectly should oversee them. I never have found a regular General who was capable of commanding foreign levies. Probyn and Fane's horse succeeded because they were in a great measure free of Generals' interference. Nothing is more petty than the mind of the generality of general and staff officers when in contact with a mercenary force.
I would begin with 250 Chinese. I would have but few European instructors, and those men who would not bully the poor devils because they do not understand English. The non-commissioned officers should be Chinese. I would so organize the force that it could be increased to 1,000. I would also put 100 or 200 in artillery.
All rubbish of goose step, right face, left face, &c., which our regular drills delight in, ought to be left untaught.
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* Not printed.
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