633
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference :-
TREEC.O. 88
سائنس
882/11
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO
102
presented a serious problem.) The fact that consumption began to increase in the Federated Malay States in 1923 (i.e., as soon as the prosperity began to return), while in the Straits Settlements consumption did not show any signs of increasing until 1925, is perhaps to be explained by the fact that the effects of returning prosperity first began to be experienced in the tin mines and estates in the Federated Malay States.
26. It will be seen that the present rate of consumption (as indicated by the amount of raw opium boiled at the factory) is still considerably below the rate in the years 1919 and 1920, at the height of the last boom, and is about equal to the average rate for the years 1918 to 1921.
27. Moreover there do not seem any grounds for anticipating that the present increase will (like the increase in 1918-1921) amount to anything more than a temporary bulge" in the general downward trend in consumption which is shown in the table in paragraph 5.
28. In the circumstances there does not seem to be any occasion for disquiet in the present situation, or any real grounds for any drastic revision of the approved policy.
29. Although it does not appear to lead to any useful conclusions, it may be useful to place on record here that throughout Malaya as a whole the consumption in 1925 was 10.68 per cent. higher than in 1924, and that this total increase was distributed throughout the various administrations as follows:—
3.58 per cent. higher in 1925 than in 1924.
Straits Settlements Federated Malay States
12.72
""
31
""
"
"
Johore
29.01
2
"J
11
++
11
*}
"}
Kedah
Perlis
12.7 7
+3
+
"T
+1
"
37
1
J1
31
31
Kelantan
"
"
多要
Trengganu Brunei
4.74
19.5 1.7
"
*
"
11
30. To complete the review of the situation it is necessary to take account of the smuggling of opium from China, which is just as much a dominating factor in the situation now as it was at the time of the Geneva Conferences.
31.
Prior to 1921 it was very rare to find illicit opium (in any considerable quantity) on board ships coming to Malaya from China, but in that year they began to increase enormously, as is shown by the following figures which were communicated to the Geneva Conference --
1921
1922
1923
1924 (first 8 months)
Seizures on Ships coming from Europe.
India.
9
China.
43
2
229
TT
14
23
21
7
18
15
8
345
i.e., the really serious increase began in the year in which Malaya began to recover - from the slump in trade.
The amounts of opium (mostly of Chinese origin) seized at Singapore and Penang
were:-
1923
1924
1925
Opium
Chandu
Total
Tons.
(tahils).
(tahils).
(tahils).
6,887
29,438
36,325
1.35
12,613
90,539
103,152
3.84
36,656
275,089 72,380
311,745
11.58
88,420
1926 (January-June) 16,040
3.29
It is safe to assume that the amounts actually seized represent only a small pro- portion of the illicit supplies actually introduced into Malaya, and that the increased demands for chandu have been met to some extent by increased sales of Government chandu, but to a rapidly increasing extent by an increase in the smuggling of opium from China.
32. Smuggling into Singapore increased in intensity in 1925 to such an extent that in May of that year two additional European Supervisors were engaged, with a sufficient number of additional native Revenue Officers to enable the Singapore Harbour Division of the Preventive Staff to be doubled. Two additional preventive launches with a speed of 16 m.p.h. were bought, but it was found that yet another faster vessel was required.
33.
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It would appear from the falling off in the quantity of opium seized in the first six months of 1920 that these measures had some effect. Lately, however several very large seizures at Singapore have been reported in the Times, and it seems clear that, even if the figures of seizures in 1926 do not reach the 1925 record, they will approach it, or at any rate they will be considerably higher than in 1924.
34. It is possible that the set-back to smuggling in the first half of 1926 may (to some extent) account for the sudden steep rise in the purchases of Government chandu this year-the more gradual rise between 1923-1925 being due to increased consumption of illicit opium.
35. With the facts as we know them, however, it seems reasonable to presume that any measures taken to deal with smuggling into Singapore can only have a temporary effect, and that (the demand still existing) supplies will continue to come in from China; but instead of coming to Singapore, they will be landed at some quiet spot on the 1,230 miles of Malayan coast-line which it is impossible to police effectively. In this connexion it will be recalled that the Malayan Opium Committee pointed out in their report that there are: "Innumerable small creeks running far inland and connecting with little-known rivers and country roads, and so to the main trunk roads and railways: hundreds of sparsely inhabited jungle islands and scores of rivers navig able for timber-laden junks and native craft of all sizes and descriptions, in any of which contraband can be concealed with little fear or chance of detection; the whole east coast of Malaya, one long stretch of sandy beach from Kelantan in the north to Singapore island in the south easily approachable except in the monsoon season
all these factors make the effective exclusion of contraband impossible except by the employment of a veritable army of preventive officers.
36. It will be seen from the tables in paragraph 31 that smuggling into Malaya. began seriously to increase in 1923 with the returning tide of prosperity. It is, how- ever, significant that it reached its greatest intensity in 1925, .e., the year in which (1) drastic reductions were made in the numbers of Government shops. and (2) the "Observer" system was in full operation. It seems impossible to doubt that these facts are related, i.e., that the reduction in the facilities for purchasing Government system, chandu and even the very mild form of inquisition involved in the "Observer" have stimulated the demand for illicit opium and that (unlimited supplies being avail- able) this demand has been and is being met by the smugglers (who in any case have the great inducement which is presented by the very high price of Government chandu).
29
37. It seems to be a fair deduction that any speeding up of the adoption of the further measures contemplated under the approved policy (e.g., by intensifying
list of customers the supervision over individuals involved in the
system, or by embarking prematurely on a system of actual registration of consumers); or the intro- duction of any further measures of restriction (e.g., by raising the price of Govern- ment chandu to a still higher figure) would be bound to have the effect of driving still more consumers into the arms of the smugglers, either for the whole of their requirements or to supplement the quantities which they might think they could buy at the Government shops without coming under adverse official notice.
38. Smuggling would still further increase and eventually get completely out of hand, with the result that unlimited supplies of cheap opium would be available, leading to a great increase in individual consumption. In these circumstances, while the sales of Government chandu would no doubt decrease, the official figures of con- sumption would be little more than "eye-wash." In other words the opium situation in Malaya would degenerate into much the same sort of position as exists in Hong Kong, where it has been officially estimated that (in spite of all the efforts of a remark- ably vigilant and efficient preventive service) at least as much illicit, as Government chandu, is smoked.
39. Having regard to the real object in view (ie., the ultimate suppression of the consumption of prepared opium-and not merely a reduction in the sales of Government opium) the adoption of any measures which would be likely to have the effects discussed in the preceding paragraphs, can hardly be deprecated too strongly. In this connexion it seems pertinent to refer to the hold policy under contemplation by the Government of the Netherlands East Indies to deal with the smuggling menace. viz., their attempt to induce smokers to return to the consumption of Government opium. It is understood that they propose if necessary as a last resort to reduce the price of Government chandu. If may be well to forestall a possible criticism by observing here that the honesty of the Netherlands East Indies Government in regard to its opium policy (in contrast with certain other administrations in the Far East) is generally admitted.
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