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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference:
C.O.882/11
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
| ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO
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outlay by the Imperial Government on the defence of the Colony, but is assessed solely by a rough-and-ready measure of capacity to pay. The progressive increase in the contribu- tion pari passu with the reduction of the garrison to a mere nucleus has of course greatly emphasized in their minds what they undoubtedly feel to be an unfair bargain. I am bound to confess that their view appears to me to be not without justification. maintenance of Mauritius as a defended port is continued almost entirely on grounds of Imperial strategy which are of as much importance to other portions of the Empire, including the United Kingdom, as to the Colony itself. This point of view is clearly stated in O.D.Č. Memorandum 646 M. forwarded with your despatch under acknowledgment. I emphatically agree that a Colony whose strategical position in the Empire secures for it the advantage of the presence of Imperial troops should pay for this advantage by a fair contribution towards the cost of the garrison. I may add that this aspect of the position is one that is thoroughly understood and fully appreciated by the Mauritians and I am convinced that the chief reason why protests against the basis of military contribution have been so infrequent and restrained is that they greatly fear that too vehement a protest might ultimately result in the removal of the garrison. I cannot but feel, however, that it would be more equitable that the amount of contribution should bear some reference to the size and cost of the garrison.
5. I again venture to suggest therefore that having in view the importance of the maintenance of a defended port in Mauritius on grounds of Imperial strategy and taking into consideration the situation and resources of the Colony a reasonable basis of contribu- tion would be that the Colony should pay half the cost of the Imperial garrison or 5 per cent of its revenue, whichever is less. This would I understand at present involve a contribution to War Office funds of something under £30,000, but it would of course represent a very much larger proportion of the actual cost of the garrison than the Mauritious contribution covered when the basis of assessment was last fixed. If at any time in the future the requirements of Imperial defence led to such an increase of the Imperial garrison in Mauritius as to bring the contribution under the 5 per cent limitation to much below half the cost of the garrison the basis of contribution might be again revised; but this contingency appears so remote under present conditions that it might be left out of account.
6. If this principle were accepted as a permanent basis of contribution then I think the occasion should be taken to urge the formation of a local Defence Force as an auxiliary means of defence, the cost of which should be borne by the local Treasury. No precise estimate of the cost of such a Force has been formed but from experience elsewhere I judge that it should not exceed something between £5,000 and £7,000 a year. In this case the total cost of defence to be borne by the Colony would probably be in the neigh- bourhood of £35,000 or about £20,000 less than the average rate of military contribution in recent years. For reasons given in this and my previous despatch of the 20th January, 1931, I submit that this might be regarded as an equitable basis of contribution towards the military defence of the Colony and I believe that it would be accepted as such locally, especially at the present time, which, as explained below, I think to be an especially opportune one for arriving at a permanent settlement of the defence question.
7. There are several reasons why the present time appears to me to be favourable for this purpose. They are:-
(1) That the period of temporary reduction in the military contribution is drawing
to a close.
(2) That the finances of the Colony while still somewhat precarious are showing
definite prospects of an approach to stability.
(3) That the recent grant to the Colony of constitutional concessions which have the effect of creating an unofficial majority in the Legislature has created a favourable atmosphere for a satisfactory settlement.
(4) That the work done by the present Officer Commanding Troops-Major D. A. Hutchison, R.E.-has aroused and maintained interest in the proposal to establish a local force and Major Hutchison's personal influence with the Franco-Mauritians on which I have already reported has helped to create a favourable attitude towards the proposal among many members of this section of the population.
The first two reasons are self-explanatory but the third and fourth are more fully developed below.
8. The acceptance by the Secretary of State of the proposals for constitutional changes made by the Mauritius Delegation which visited London last winter has been welcomed locally as a sign of confidence in the Colony and the recent extensions of Imperial
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preference in the case of sugar have also been an important factor in bringing about an active sense of gratitude and goodwill towards the Imperial Government. The general atmosphere at the moment is accordingly favourable to a reciprocal gesture of loyalty to Imperial interests and would I think go far to ensure compliance with any request for new arrangements considered necessary in the interests of Imperial defence. In dealing with a temperamental Colony such as this it is above all desirable to seize the appropriate opportunity and to "strike while the iron is hot." If the question of a Defence Force is left in abeyance for two or three years the first flush of enthusiasm over the new consti- tutional arrangements and preference advantages will have faded and inevitable differences of opinion will have arisen. Moreover, it may be pointed out that while the grant of constitutional concessions has for the moment created a favourable atmosphere in this respect, when the first enthusiasm has evaporated the new arrangements may even have the effect of making it more difficult to secure assent of the Legislature to the proposal for it is obvious that in this connexion the use of a "Reserve Power" would be of no avail. At the present time, if the proposals which I have outlined in paragraph 5 could be accepted the plan for the establishment of a Defence Force could be presented to the Legislature as concomitant with a revision of the basis of military contribution which has been a standing grievance for many years, and the revision of the contribution might even be made conditional upon the acceptance of the Defence Force proposals; though it would be undesirable to stress this aspect of the position unless necessity arose. I am bound to add that I do not think that the enthusiasm over recent constitutional reforms and preference concessions is such that it would ensure acceptance of proposals involving an increased measure of contribution towards military defence. The feeling on the question of the military contribution is too strong for that.
9. I have already drawn attention in previous reports to the good work done by Major Hutchison in quietly stimulating interest in this question and to the unusual influence which he exercises amongst the Franco-Mauritians of the better class. It would be a great advantage if active steps could be taken to proceed with the question of establishing a local Defence Force before the results of this influence have evaporated. Unfortunately Major Hutchison himself is due to be relieved during the coming trooping season and in the normal course his especially valuable personal influence will not be available for the actual formation of the Force. This is greatly to be regretted but unless I must the ordinary relief arrangements could be waived it appears to be inevitable. admit that my confidence in the successful formation of the proposed Force would have been very much greater if Major Hutchison's personal influence could have been brought to bear in the early days of its existence.
10. It has been agreed that the formation of an Auxiliary Force for local defence, if it can be successfully established, is a matter of first-rate importance in connexion with the defence of the Island. This is of course a purely military question as to which civilian opinion cannot be of any great value, but I venture to express the view that even a non- expert review of the position indicates clearly that such a Force is most necessary and that the present garrison is inadequate to repel a raid on the Island by any force or even a single ship sufficiently large to permit of landing parties delivering attacks at two or more points at once. It is for this reason that I have considered it necessary to face the political difficulties which the raising of a local force inevitably involves.
As previously reported I believe that, with the type of organization which has been suggested, and provided always that the right moment is selected for undertaking the formation of this force, these difficulties can probably be mitigated to a considerable extent; they cannot, however, be eliminated as they are inherent in the conditions of the Colony and the composition of its population. It is all the more important that an appro- priate occasion should be chosen for launching the plan and for the reasons given above I consider that such an occasion now offers itself provided that the conditions which I have suggested can be fulfilled.
I have, &c.,
W. E. JACKSON,
Governor.
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