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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference :-
TREENIC.O. 882/11
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO
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or factious member for so long a period as five years, the limitation which I have in view would, I think, be a useful safeguard. As a corollary to this proposition some tightening up of the present rule governing the absence of Nominated Members under Clause XIV. of the Letters Patent dated 11th September, 1913, would appear to be necessary. I am inclined to think that any such member absenting himself from the sittings of the Council during six consecutive months of a session or absenting himself from the Colony for a period of more than twelve consecutive months should be liable to forfeit his seat.
Clause 2 (b). The intention of the motion is to include the Governor among the twelve Official Members, as was explained in the course of the debate of the 1st September. I consider, however, that in this Colony the Governor should not be so included, but that he should retain his present position with the possession of a dual As regards the question of official vote, i.e., an ordinary and a casting vote. membership generally, I am inclined to think that a reduction of the present ex-officio membership and a corresponding increase in the number of Nominated Official Menibers might be advantageous. There are now as many as eight ex-ollicio members, exclusive of the Goernor, whereas in both Ceylon and Jamaica, which may perhaps be taken for comparative purposes in this context, the ex-officio membership of the Legislative The introduction of an arrange- Council is limited to five, exclusive of the Governor. ment of the same kind in this Colony (e.g., limiting the ex-officio membership to members of the Executive Council, i.e., the Officer Commanding the Troops, the Colonial Secretary, the Procureur-General and the Receiver-General; with the addition of, say, the Collector of Customs or Director of Public Works, and leaving the remaining seven Official Members to be nominated at the discretion of the Governor) would allow a greater freedom of choice by which the efficiency of the Council would, in my opinion, stand to gain.
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measure.
Clause 2 (c). I do not think that it would be inapt to describe this Clause as a bargain on equal terms between the "coloured "and Franco-Mauritian parties. The addition of an extra member for Port Louis is undoubtedly designed to give the coloured" electors another representative in the Legislature while the Franco- Mauritians look for a corresponding gain by the creation of an extra seat for the district of Plaines Wilhems, which at present returns a Franco-Mauritian member. Apart from its bearing on Indian interests, this measure is, to my mind, open to objection as an artificial arrangement. As is evident from the debates, it is clear that the principle of representation in proportion to population cannot be invoked in favour of the It seems to me that, if membership for Port Louis or Plaines Wilhems is to be increased, the increase should be based on some system of regional representation, as for instance the creation of an extra seat for the suburban as distinct from the urban area of Port Louis or the division of Plaines Wilhems into two constituencies, one covering the rural districts, and one covering the urban areas comprised by the townships of Curepipe, Rose Hill, Beau Bassin and Quatre Bornes. Such an arrange- representative by the ment, however, might result in the return of a "coloured " urban areas of Plaines Wilhems as well as by the suburban area of Port Louis, and the bargain which underlies this Clause of the motion would thus be disturbed. In view, however, of the numerical strength and influence of the Franco-Mauritians in Curepipe and Quatre Bornes this result would not be by any means a certainty; but in any case I would prefer such an arrangement as less artificial than the one contemplated
in the clause.
"k
('lause 2 (d). In considering the position of the Unofficial Nominated Members paramount under the existing constitution it has been argued that only on questions of “ importance" could Government demand the support of such members, and in 1923 two of the Elected Members of Council put forward the view that it was only in matters of imperial importance that this condition applied. A record of the discussion is contained in a note* by Sir Hesketh Bell, of which a copy with enclosure is annexed. From this note it is evident that under the existing constitution the position of the Nominated Unofficial Members has given rise to divergence of opinion and practice, and. while it is clear that Government has only to increase the number of Nominated Official Members at the expense of the Unofficial in order to be certain of a majority, such a solution may frequently be undesirable on grounds of policy. The difficulties of the situation were brought home to me in the earlier part of the year when I had to deal. with the question of appointing three Nominated Unofficial Members to replace certain absentees. For obvious reasons I was desirous of appointing persons who would carry weight as representing important interests and my choice fell on Mr. S. Fouqueraux, Mayor of Port Louis, whose municipal functions bring him into touch
*Not printed here.
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with representative sections of the community, Mr. E. Rouillard, a well known-sugar broker and member of the Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture, and Mr. E. Leclezio, K.C., a barrister with an extensive connection and familiar in particular with the affairs of the large Chinese community. These gentlemen were duly appointed as reported in my despatch No. 290 of the 6th June last, but at the outset they were reluctant to accept appointment on the ground that they could not acquiesce in a position which might commit them to vote, on occasion, not on their individual judg- ment, but in accordance with the dictates of Government. They argued, with some justice, that the representative character of their appointments would thus be largely negatived. Eventually an informal arrangement was reached by which each of them undertook to absent himself from any meeting at which a vote might be taken on a measure considered by Government to be of importance but unacceptable to him individually. It is obviously undesirable that Government control should have to be regulated by personal bargaining of this description, and 1 have mentioned the matter in order to emphasise the unsatisfactory features of the present situation. The Clause now under consideration has the effect of removing all the difficulties which have hitherto been felt as regards the freedom of vote of the unofficial nominees.
Reverting to the discussion of questions of “ paramount importance," so far as I am aware, no authoritative definition of the term has been laid down, and the opinion given in paragraph 5 of your predecessor's Confidential despatch of the 29th May, 1924.† is decisive on the point. As the decision in this matter must, in each case, be left to the Governor, who is bound to justify his action to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the latter part of this Clause appears to require recasting on the lines of Articles LIV. and LV. of the Ceylon (Legislative Council) Order in Council
of 1923.
Clause 2 (e). Maintains the status quo.
Clause 2 (). It is interesting to note that this measure is foreshadowed in paragraph 11 of the unpublished memorandum included in the report of the delegate appointed by the Government of India to study the question of local Indian labour, which formed the subject of my Confidential despatch of the 22nd September last.‡ The real significance of this proposal did not escape the notice of the Indian delegate, Mauritius Mitra" of the 4th September, and it is also vigorously criticised in the
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as will be seen from the Press cuttings enclosed in this despatch. It is clearly an Revisionists to gain ground at the expense of the attempt on the part of the Indians. As the Indian delegate points out, Indian shareholders are very few in number, and the measure is thus calculated to benefit only the non-Indian sections of the community. If the Indians could learn to abandon the extreme commercial individualism to which they are at present addicted, and could acquire the habit of combining for business purposes, the measure contemplated might ultimately be mani- pulated by them to their own advantage and to the discomfort of its present advocates. But apart from racial considerations the measure appears to me open to criticism. On page 5 of his report the Procureur General states that the provision regarding the registration of shareholders constitutes a safeguard against the improper transfer of shares for electoral purposes. At the same time the arrangement contemplated might lead to abuse in the following manner. For example, a shareholder owning shares to the extent of Rs. 60,000 in a Company holding estates in three-separate electoral districts might distribute these shares in lots of Rs. 3,000 value each to twenty different individuals within the prescribed time limit, simultaneously arranging for the subsequent re-transfer of the shares, and thus acquire control over twenty votes exercised in three separate districts. As shares could thus be transferred at a negligible cost and the re-transfer would not necessitate the registration of any document, there is a possibility of devices of this kind being attempted on a large scale. Moreover, the value of any local shares is subject to considerable fluctuation, with the result that the original face value of a share may be entirely out of relation to its actual value at the time when the shareholder comes to exercise his vote as such. It is true that no condition as to actual as distinct from purchase value is attached to the voting qualification at present conferred by the ownership of moveables to the value of Rs. 3,000, but I feel consider- able doubt as to the soundness of the principle involved in this clause. I need hardly emphasise the fact that this Clause is the crucial one, and that its disappearance would completely spoil the revisionist scheme in so far as it attracts the Franco-Mauritian element and. through them, the majority of the present Unofficial Members.
Clause 2 (g). This Clause is of minor importance, and I should explain, with reference to paragraph 4 of your despatch under acknowledgment, that it is not the intention of the resolution that the Governor should, in ordinary circumstances, be
* 32903/25: not printed.
† No 2
50560/25: not printed.