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السلسا
. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
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be closed by naval action. I have discussed this operation very fully with Rear-Admiral Stirling and Commander Fitzgerald, wh believe that the preliminary warlike action might not need the firing of a single shot. This preliminary action would be tak by the British gunboats already at Canton, who would drive all Chinese cargo junks in Canton Harbour down river and refuse them admittance to the port. This would prevent all loading or unloading of cargo from steamers without any direct interference with neutral shipping. All Chinese junk traffic and Chinese steamers bound for Canton would be refused admittance to the port. Only if these measures proved inadequate--and they would most probably serve the purpose within a very short space of time-would warlike action of a more drastic kind be needed; and the local naval authorities consider that the only action neces sary ashore in the preliminary stages would be the garrisoning The fact is that of Shameen as a precautionary measure. Canton and Swatow are denuded of troops and that no serious resistance to determined British action afloat would be at all lik ly under existing circumstances.
12. We believe that there is now a unique opportunity of ending the boycott rapidly, by independent British warlike action, with a minimum risk of an unfavourable effect upon the situation in other parts of China or upon foreign Powers. We agree with the opinion expressed by Sir R. Macleay in his telegram of the 15th September that direct action by ourselves against Canton, if taken now, will not only produce no reaction adverse to us in China, but will be generally welcomed in all parts of the country except those controlled by the Canton extremists. We would go further and say that even in Canton itself the bulk of the people would welcome such action, and that elsewhere in Kuang. tung it would result in an immediate revolt against the present Canton Soviet. Moreover, we believe that firm action now taken by us would almost certainly decide Marshal Sun Ch'uan-fang to take the field against General Cheung Kai-shek, and so save the situation on the Yangtsze. We also feel very strongly that. unless we now help our friends in China and strike at our enemies, British prestige in the Far East will disappear.
13. As regards the attitude of most foreign Powers towards China, it appears to be aptly summed up in the West Indian aphorism-"Do not trouble trouble, lest trouble trouble you." But the local American and French representatives would cer- tainly look on very sympathetically at direct action taken by our- selves against Canton. Commander Moses, the United States of America's Senior Naval Officer on the West River, when I explained to him the action which our Navy was about to take
would give his eyes against strike pickets, exclaimed that he to be able to help. Mr. Tredwell, the Consul-General for the United States of America in Hongkong, has had personal experience of Bolshevism in Russian Turkestan, and is most anxious to see it eradicated from China. I have not yet met Mr. MacMurray, the Minister for the United States of America at Peking, but he is due in Hongkong towards the end of
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September, and I hope then to discuss thoroughly with him the situation in southern China. Of the principal French represen- tatives in China I have frequently met Contre-Amiral Basire, the Commander-in-Chief of the French squadron in the Far East. and I know that he personally would be glad to co-operate with us for the purpose of exterminating Bolslievism in China. I can say the same of Commandant Henrys, the French Senior Naval Officer on the West River. M. de la Prade, the French Consul in Hongkong, and M. d'Anjou, the French Consul at Canton- both of whom I know-would also be thankful to see the end, not only of the Canton Strike Committee, but of the present Canton Government as well. In this connexion I refer you specially to paragraphs 12-15 of Mr. Brenan's despatch to the You will note Foreign Office, No. 82, of the 9th September.
also from the 16th paragraph of that despatch that the head- quarters of the Canton Strike Committee is established at Canton in property mortgaged to the Banque de l'Indo Chine for some $10,000. The debt not having been paid, the bank has fore- closed the mortgage and M. d'Anjou has demanded that the premises be evacuated by the Strike Committee inmediately. Moreover, in a telegram to me dated the 15th September* Mr. Brenan states:-"Japanese and Danish vessels, also a French steamer, have been stopped and searched at the Bogue Forts for The suspected troops and munitions of war from the north." French Consul demanded and secured the release of the French ship by threatening to send a gunboat to her rescue; but incidents such as this frequently occur and are a source of constant irrita- tion to all foreigners trading in Kuang-tung. As Mr. Brenan says in his despatch above quoted, all foreigners (not ourselves only) have "had to put up with the most humiliating treatment at the hands of the strike pickets in respect of their trade and shipping, and are delighted at the turn events have taken.'
14. Immediate action is essential if we are to take advantage of an unusually favourable crisis.
15. This despatch confirms and amplifies my telegrams of the 13th and 16th September.†
DEAR SIR CECIL,
I have, &c.,
C. CLEMENTI,
Governor, &c.
ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 32.
Canton, 11th September, 1926.
The Canton Government are thoroughly worried about our latest naval action. It has had precisely the effect I anticipated.
• Net printed. † C.17529,26 and C.17708 26; not printed.
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