50
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference :-
TELEFIC.O.882/11
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC-
COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH—NOT TO
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extent of five and a-half million dollars. After full discussion we unanimously agreed that the proposal made by Mr. Kwik could not be entertained, and I have telegraphed to H.M. Consul- General at Shanghai as follows:-
"Please inform Kwik that the Hongkong Government is unable to adopt his suggestion."
As, however, it is important to know what are the real intentions of General Wu, I have also telegraphed to H.M. Consul-General at Hankow asking for any reliable information which he may be able to give me on the subject, and I will in due course report his reply.
3. The Chinese provinces adjacent to Kuang-tung are Fukien. Kiang-si, Hunan and Kuang-sí. As regards the possibility of an attack from Fukien I may refer you to the third paragraph of my secret despatch of the 23rd December,* to my secret despatch of the 29th December, and the close of the third paragraph of my secret despatch of the 6th January. There is little prospect of any such attack. I have no reliable information at my disposal concerning the present condition of Kiang-si and Hunan; but there is no good reason to suppose that either of these provinces is now under the control of General Wu Pei-fu: and in any case it is doubtful whether an attack from Fukien, Kiang-si and Hunan, even if directed by General Wu in person, would be assured of success within three months. As regards the province of Kuang-si, which is not mentioned in Mr. Kwik's message. there is much more likelihood of an attack upon it from Canton than of an attack from it upon Kuang-tung. I therefore remain of the opinion, which was shared by all present at the conference of the 13th January, that the prospect of the present Canton Government being overthrown by a hostile Chinese General operating from a neighbouring Chinese province is remote. There is also, we think, no prospect of a blockade of the West River delta being instituted by the Chinese Navy, and in this con- nection I may refer you to the first paragraph of my secret despatch of the 23rd December.*
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4. It remains to consider what disruptive forces may be at work in Canton itself to-day. Firstly, there is reason to believe that Mr. Sun Fo, who has just returned to Canton, is hostile to Borodin and to Bolshevist propaganda generally, and that he does not approve of the anti-British boycott in Kuang-tung. Next. there are indications that General Cheung Kai-shek does not see eye to eye with all members of the present Canton Government. several of whom have been busily disclaiming Communism their political faith. There is also little doubt that the great mass of the Cantonese are heartily sick of the Russians and of the boycott and would be glad to resume normal trade relations with Hongkong. Lastly, it seems inevitable that the Strike Com- mittee should prove to be a thorn in the side of the Canton Authorities. I am, therefore, not without hope that internal dis- sensions at Canton may result in the dissolution of the Strike Committee and end the boycott.
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5. We discussed at the conference of the 13th January the expediency or otherwise of coercing the Canton Government by a blockade of the West River delta with British Naval force, and
• No. 2, † € 2803/26 ; not printed,
↑ No. 4.
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we unanimously agreed that it would be unwise to do so because: (u) it is certain that such a blockade, while it lasts, would ipso jacto destroy such British trade as, in spite of the boycott, still exists between Hongkong and Canton; (b) it is not certain that such a blockade would succeed in bringing the present Canton Government rapidly to terms; (c) it is very probable that the effect of the blockade would be to strengthen anti-British senti- ment all over China, whereas such anti-British sentiment is at present more or less localised in Kuang-tung; and (d) a blockade, even if successful in its immediate object, would leave behind a legacy of hate that would be more permanently injurious to British trade in China, and particularly to the trade relations between Hongkong and Canton, than is the present boycott.
6. You are in a better position to judge than I am what prospect there is of all the Powers, or at least of the Great Powers and especially France, the United States and Japan- co-operating with Great Britain in an attempt to coerce the pre- sent Canton Government by naval or military force. But I fear that, even if such co-operation were achieved, and if it success- fully terminated the existing anti-British boycott in Kuang-tung, the other Powers would continue to leave Great Britain to bear the chief burden of the consequential Chinese (and particularly Cantonese) animosity.
7. It has been suggested to me that the League of Nations might be moved to censure the conduct of the present Canton Government; but, whatever diplomatic value such censure might have, I am inclined to think that in practice the Canton Govern- ment would pay even scantier heed to the League of Nations than it now does to Peking. Still less would the Canton Strike Com- mittee, of which the Canton Government is not the acknowledged master, be likely to call off the boycott in deference to such an admonition. If, however, there is in your opinion any prospect of the League of Nations passing such a censure, the attempt should be made; for, although it might not have the practical result of lifting the boycott, the censure would certainly be a moral blow to the Canton Government. Before moving on these lines it would be important to ascertain what attitude the Chinese repre- sentative on the League would take up.
8. Our final conclusion at the conference of the 13th January was identical with that previously reached in Executive Council on the 4th January and set but in the seventh paragraph of my secret despatch of the 6th January.* namely that there is no means of ending the boycott except by holding out until the present Canton Government is overthrown either by internal disruption The former or by the attack of some hostile Chinese General.
There is also the contingency is more likely than the latter. possibility that the Canton Authorities may in time find it, for reasons of their own, impossible to tolerate the continued exist- ence of the Strike Committee or to retain their Russian advisers. 9. This despatch confirms and amplifies my telegram of the 13th January.†
I have, &c..
* No. 4.
C. CLEMENTI,
Governor, &c. +C1148/26; not printed.