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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference :-
TPELLI C.O. 885
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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO
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APPENDIX V. (4).
Military Forces of the Commonwealth.
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MINUTE UPON THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA, BY MAJOR-GENERAL HUTTON, COMMANDANT.
SIR,
Headquarters, Melbourne,
7th April 1902.
Minute for the consideration of the Right Honourable the Minister of State for Defence.
I have the honour to submit the following Minute upon the Defence of Australia, together with recommendations based thereon:-
I. STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Importance It is, on the one hand, certain that the geographical position of Australia renders it of ses power. less liable to aggression from any foreign Power than most parts of the Empire; but it is equally certain, on the other hand, that Australian interests outside Australía itself are peculiarly open to foreign interference, and to possible destruction by an enemy in time of war. No expedition, whether despatched from an enemy's base in the Eastern Seas or from Europe, could hope to reach its destination until the British Navy had been definitely worsted. It has been publicly stated that the maintenance of sea supremacy may be assumed as the determining factor in shaping the whole defensive policy of the Empire. (Duke of Devonshire, President of Council of National Defence, 3rd December, 1896.) As long, therefore, as Australia remains part of the British Empire so long will the inviolability of her shores and the security of her commerce depend in a large measure upon the power of Great Britain to maintain her supremacy
Possible form of attack.
Attack by large force.
Attack by
■ raid.
centres.
at sea.
Oversea aggression could only be attempted (1) by a raid of two or more cruisers with a small striking force for the purpose of landing; (2) by a largo and woll. equipped force conveyed in numerous transports and escorted by an enemy's fleet.
The latter attempt may, under existing conditions, be considered difficult in the extreme, more especially in view of the military spirit which animates the inhabitants of Australia. No commander would venture to land small bodies of troops on the shores of this continent, knowing well that it would mean but to court disaster and consequent loss of prestige to the nation attempting it. Any force destined for
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aggression would have to be of sufficient strength to conquer and hold either an important strategical position or a considerable portion of territory under the certain condition of jeopardising, if not losing completely, its communications by sea. enable an enemy to undertake, with any hope of success, such operations on Australian territory a large expeditionary force of all arms, fully equipped, would be required. The small landing forco available even from a strong fleet of cruisers would find such a task impossible.
Efforts at oversea aggression upon Australian soil will in all probability, therofore, be reduced to raids by an enemy's cruisers based on his defended ports. Such raids might be undertaken to extort an indemnity under threat of boinbardment, or to destroy commerce, or to obtain coal.
Security of It must, however, be remembered that the present prosperity of Australia, and its Naval bases future commercial development, will largely depend upon its immunity from attack, and of trade and the supremacy of the Navy must be insured at all costs as the primary element of Success. Australia must be prepared not only to protect the Naval base of Sydney and to make secure the important strategical positions at King George's Sound and Thursday Island, so as to enable the Navy to have all that it needs for free action at sea, but the great trade centres also, such as Sydney, Melbourne, &c., must further be rendered secure. It is practically impossible to undertake the local defence of the
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numerous bays, rivers, harbours, and estuaries which an enemy might avail himself of as a harbor of refuge or a rendezvous in time of war. This must be left to the general protection afforded by the Navy. It is, however, necessary to deny access to all cities, towns, and harbours of commercial importance, and to make it impossible for a hostile expedition to establish itself upon Australian soil. To this end careful arrangements must be made to concentrate on any threatened point as many available field troops as circumstances may render necessary. It is hopod that the contemplated extension of railway communication between South Australia and West Australia may be accomplished at an early date, as without such extension West Australia is always liable to isolation in time of war. The Commonwealth has undertaken not only to protect each Stato against invasion, but. on the application of the Executive Govern- General ment of the State, to protect it from domestic violence (vide Constitution Act, sec. 119). security to Complete security for life and capital must therefore be insured not only for the life and population now existing in Australia against foreign aggression and domestic violence, from foreign but that security must be further assured in the eyes of the commercial world beyond aggresion its shores. It follows as a matter of vital importance that the security of Australia and from should be placed beyond doubt, and that the security to capital in this county should domestic be assured in the event of any warlike complications.
property
violence.
principle of
The principles governing defence are not, however, limited to those of a purely Vigorous passive kind. History has shown that the surest and best defence is by a vigorous offence in offence. The successful defence of an island such as Great Britain has in the past the main been insured by means of warlike operations forced on the enemy, and fought out on defence. other than English soil. During the last 150 years, five distinct threats of invasion has been made by England's enemies, and in no instance did England remain satisfied with preparations for passive defence only, but effected her object, and defeated her enemies, by a vigorous and successful offence. The same principle in a very large measure applies to the defence of Australia.
interests.
The defence of Australia cannot, moreover, be considered apart from the defence Defence of of Australian interests. Australia depends for its commercial success and its future Australian development firstly upon its seaborne trado*; and secondly upon the existence, maintenance, and extension of fixed and certain markets for its produce outside Australian waters. It therefore follows that Australian interests cannot be assured by the defence alone of Australian soil. Defence is the primary duty of evory State and of every citizon, yet the defence of Australian interests outside Australian waters is at the present time solely in the hands of the Imperial Government and of the Imperial Army and Navy. It is hardly consistent with the. present development of Australia as a young and vigorous nation to neglect her responsibility for defence outside Australian waters, and in the robust period of her youth thus to rely entirely upon the strong arm of the Mother Country (vide final paragraph of Sec. VI. and - appendix).
.
ments in the
It must be remembered that the rapid and continuous improvements in steam and Political telegraph communications have now destroyed the former isolation of Australia, and develop- modern developments in the East have brought the States of the Commonwealth upon East. the arena of the Old World strife. The last six years have witnessed a momentous change in the balance of power in the East. The rise of Japan into an armed Power of the first magnitude; the acquisition of Port Arthur by Russia; the occupation of the Philippines, and of Guam (Ladrone Islands) and Tutuila (Samoa) by the United States; and of the remaining Samoan Islands and part of New Guinea by Germany; and the annexation of Madagascar as a colony by France, are facts of the gravest significance to Australian interests. The transformation of the United States into an oversea Power by her acquisition of Porto Rico and the Philippines, the development of Japan, the evolution of China, the opening of a Panama Canal at an early date, and the movement of Russia towards a port in the Iulian Ocean with her increasing interest in Persia, all point to the Indian Ocean, the Northern Pacific, and the China Sea as the probable scene of the future struggle for commercial supromacy. Australia cannot in such an eventuality remain unconcerned. It may be assumed, therefore, that Australia will determine not only to defend her own soil, but to take steps also to defend those vast interests beyond her shores upon the maintenance of which her -present existence and her future prosperity must so largely depend.
The Exports and Imports from overses countries alone for the year 1900 amounted to 47,816,4387, and ́ 43,184,9227. respectively, being a total of 90,981,3607.
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