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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
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C.O. 885
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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
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I recognise that in bringing these subjects before you I am bound to show that the Mother Country is doing her part. I do not think that anybody will contend that a nation which keeps 110,000 or 120,000 men permanently abroad under a system of voluntary enlistment, and is prepared to send the same number in the case of emergency. is not doing her share in protecting her Colonies and Dependencies, which are relying upon her assistance. On the other hand it largely held-speaking in this room, by our military advisers it is strongly held that circumstances may occur in which it is most desirable that we should have a call on further troops. Of course we should have a certain number at home, which, if the sea is safeguarded, we should, as we did in the case of South Africa, send out; but the whole secret of success in war is time, and we can never count on having so much time as we have had in the late war. We should never count-either in respect to politics or as to time-on having an enemy who would enable us to make up during the war the deficiencies which we found at the beginning. I should like to speak, if I may, quite frankly to the Conference on this subject. In the Boers we had an armed enemy -not an army-shrewd, and brave, and provided with good weapons; but they neglected at the beginning of the war obvious opportunities- obvious and many opportunities. I am not a tactician, but I have studied the opinions of those who have written and who have given me their advice. I might point out that there were incidents earlier in the war, there
occasions when a powerful and determined enemy, properly organised, could have taken advantage of our early revorsos, and could have moved with great offect upon our communica tions. That was not done. But the forces were not an organised army. Again, in individual battles there were many opportunities of which a determined leader, who had an organisel force at his disposal, would have broken our line-very often a long extended one-and would have put our troops to a much more severe test than even they were put to. I.only mention that fact for this reason, that we bave to consider what will be the effect if we found ourselves pitted against European troops. We should have both these contingencies, which were neglected by the Boers. to look to. My object in mentioning this is to remind you that we had largely to rely-both in our own and in our Colonial levies- on relatively untrained troops. I admit to the full that our levies, that is to say, our yeomanry and other hastily levied troops, differed extremely in their composition and in their military quality. They all improved enormously after some months; but no General commanding the British troops would have been willing, on the conditions in which many of them went out, nor would it have been fair, to put them against European troops, and the same, in a lesser degree, holds good as regards the Colonial force sent to our support. They differed, and they were bound to differ exceedingly, in their military quality, especially at the beginning, and on first landing; but it is not disrespectful to them to say that, with the training which they had received before they landed, there was a considerable number of those troops which no General would have had a right to pit against European troops without further training, and it is exceedingly important to us in laying down our plans of action for the future to know to what extent we can depend in an etnorgency upon Colonial support. Of course, I realise in regard to all these questions that we should not ask for that we should go too far if we asked for any general promise of support in the emergency which has not arisen; but what I do trust very strongly is this: that in case of an emergency, and in case of different Colonies being willing to come to the support of the Mother Country in such emergency, they shoull be in a position to do so with a body of troops, however moderate in number, which could be put in line with our own regular troops against a European Power. I am not, of course, speaking of action on the Continent of Europe, but it will not be necessary for any of us to go far to conceive cases in which in support of our Colonies it might be necessary to send a large British force, and in some cases in quarrels in which Great Britain's interest would be considerably less than that of the Colony affected. Therefore, I am not asking that this should be regarded simply as a donative on the part of the Colonies out of
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loyalty. I ask it rather on the ground of reciprocity, and I ask it also because, if you take some parts of the world in which our interests might be threatened, it must be perfectly obvious that it would not be in the power entirely of the Mother Country to perform her part of the business as effectively without some support.
Take, for instance, the case of China. We have recently come to an agreement with Japan-an agreement which you will recollect, is not one for offensive action, since it only comes into force in the case of aggressive action by other Powers. Obviously in any plan of campaign which might be found necessary to protect our trade with China against encroachment, and against aggression, we should be glad, and we should wish to give Japan, our ally, every support in our power. It is equally obvious that our interests would be strongly threatened in other parts of the globe at the same time. A campaign between two great Powers is not fought out solely on the spot at which the quarrel has arisen.
In the case
of any trouble which threatened our Indian Empire, we are bound to send large reinforcements from here. In the case of war which involved European Powers our striking effect would necessarily be exercised on some of their dependencies. That is all Great Britain ought to be prepared to do; but by propinquity and also from other causes nothing could assist us more than if that quarrel, forced upon us by others, also obtained for us the support of the different Colonial Governments; than that we should be able to count on being able to support our ally in China with a small body, but, at the same time, a well organised body of Colonial force from those Colonies which are nearest and which are most conveniently situated for supporting us in China. Well, now, what is the present position? We have hand a memorandum which I think has been probably read by all the authorities who are present, and which shows that we have nominally of all ranks a very large permanent force in Australia, something like 27,000 men; in Canada, 38,000; in Now Zealand, 17,000; and making up with South Africa, say, probably, some- thing like 100,000 men. Well, what is the military value of the force? That is the question we have to put to ourselves, what is its military value for the defence of the Colonies themselves, and what is its military value for assistance to the Empire at large, to the extent to which it is asked to contribute. Well, I hope I shall not be accused, if I am frank, of in any way disparaging our Colonial troops. I began by saying that all, and more than all, that may be said as to their diversity may be said as to the diversity of the Imperial forces outside the regular army, but the diversity is exactly what Lord Roberts and my other military advisers are engaged in reducing to the best of their ability, so that we may know exactly what we have to depend upon.
Take the case first of all of Canada; Canada has nearly 40,000 men. We know that in no part of the Empire has better fighting material been found in the recent war than among the Canadians, but I see from the last annual Report from the General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia, a report which was referred to in high terms in a recent debate on the Militia in the Canadian Parliament, that the city corps have absolutely no training what- ever in the field duties of a soldier, and that the rural corps "will never be "made even fairly fit to take the field with the limited period of annual
training that they receive under existing conditions."
In the urban corps
it is further stated to be impossible at present to give anything beyond theoretical instruction in the more important duties of a soldier, such as scouting, outpost work, entrenchment and tactical exercises.
As regards
the cavalry the general officer regretted his inability to report that as cavalry they can be considered to be in any instance more than barely efficient. Beyond that, we know that Canada has at present no trained staff, or a system of training of staff officers, and very recently a rifle has been adopted in Canada which, although carrying the same cartridge as our British rifle, is of a different pattern, which in itself we think is a little unfortunate, as breaking the uniformity and the interchangability from the one to the other in case troops are employed together. Anybody who reads the report will see that, however fine might be the patriotic ardour and keenness of Canada at a given moment, troops hastily improvised from such material L2
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