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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference :-
C.O. 885
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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO
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would like the benefit of their assistance if there be no objection, only it will be understood.
Mr. SEDDON: 1 understand, Mr. Chairman, that this refers only to derence questions.
Sir EDMUND BARTON: ́i thought it was general.
The SECRETARY OF STATE: I thought of defence, 1 confess. Mr. Seddon, because I did not know that the others would care to be present : hit I imagine there is no possible objection to their being prosent, is there. to hear what is said? Of course they are ali confidential servants of the Crown and they would treat our proceedings as entirely confidential.
Mr. SEDDON : I do not know what effect it may have in respect to other Premiers who have not brought any of their Ministers with them. We might have done so hari it been intimated they could attend the Conference.
Sir WILFRID LAURIER: My colleagnes did not come with any such object. They are here for the same purpose as Mr. Seddon an! Sir Edmund Barton are here. For my pari, I would think I would derive great benest from having their assistance in any discussion that may take place.
Sir EDMUND BARTON: I think their assistance would be of value 10 all of us.
Mr. SEDDON: I take exception to it. I think it was intended the Cov- ference was to consist of the Prime Ministers of self-governing Colonies. I think we should adhere to that. We are dealing with defence. Defence Ministers being here, I see no objection to their attending while that is being discussed, but on the general questions that come up for discussion I do see objection to others being present.
Sir ALBERT HIME: Defence is the subject for discussion te-lay.
The SECRETARY OF STATE: That is so, yes. I understand, Mr. Seddon, that your objection does not apply to Sir Frederick Borden, who is Minister of Defence.
Mr. SEDDON: I have not the slightest objection on this defence question to the Minister of Defence being here. We arranged that. But now it is proposed that they should be here when other subjects are discussed. To that, of course. 1 take exception.
The SECRETARY OF STATE: I do not think it can be done unless there is a unanimous feeling in its favour. Therefore shall Sir Jolin Anderson call Sir Frederick Borden and Sir John Forrest in ?.
Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I have received word that Sir Frederick Borden cannot attend this morning.
The SECRETARY OF STATE: Then, gentlemen, I think Lord Selborne, as representing the Admiralty, would like to make a statement upon the views of the Department.
The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: Mr. Chamberlain and gentlemen, the Admiralty has circulated a memorandum which I think you all have before you. We endeavoured in the memorandum to confine ourselves to setting forward the nature of the problem which the Admiralty has to face on behalf of the Empire, and to indicate the extent of the burden which is thrown on the mother country. I need not say that I shall be happy to answer any questions that any of the
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Colonial Premiers here present might wish to ask in elucidation of the general principle, and the facts stated in the memorandum. I would propose, if Mr. Chamberlain and the Promiers agreed, that when the Admiralty come to a detailed discussion with any Colony or group of Colonies, that those discussions should be held separately. The Admiralty is entirely at the disposal of Ministers if they will bo kind enough to visit us and discuss the problem with us so far as it concerns their own Colony. To-day I will merely endeavour to lay emphasis on two points which are contained within this memorandum. The first on which I would lay the greatest possible stress is, the reason why wo have eliminated from this memorandum any allusion to the word "defence.' There was a time in this country, not so very long ago either, when naval strategists regarded the naval problem mainly from the point of view of defence. That, I submit, is altogether heretical. The real problem which this Empiro has to face in the case of a naval war is. simply and absolutely to find out where the ships of the enemy are, to concentrate the greatest possible force where those ships are, and to destroy those ships. That is the only possible method of protecting this Empire from the efforts which other navies may make to damage her commerce or her territory. It follows from this that there can bo no localisation of naval forces in the strict sense of the word. There can be no local allocation of ships to protect the mouth of the Thames, to protect Liverpool, to protect Sydney, to protect Halifax. If we make any such attempt of the kind we should only be inviting disaster.
I will give you
an instance of what I mean. We have a well-known British squadron -the Channel Squadron. Does that mean that in case of war, that squadron would necessarily remain in the Channel? I think, if you ask me, the least likely place for that squadron to operate in, is the Channel. It would be sent to the Mediterranean or elsewhere, wherever the greatest concentration of our ships might be required to meet the ships of the enemy. In further illustration of this point I would direct
attention to the recent French naval action to which, I think, allusion is made in the memorandum. The President. of the French Republic has recently issued a decree largely strengthening the naval forces of Frauce in far Eastern seas, and placing the cruisers, though divided into two squadrons, under the command of one admiral. Now, the design of that movement is obvious, and I have no doubt whatever that, regarded from the Freuch point of view, it is quite sound. It is, to concentrate as much strength as they can afford in cruisers so as to inflict the utmost damage on our commerce in time of maritime war. We have a powerful squadron on the China station; we have another squadron on the Cape; another in the East India; another in Australasian waters. This French squadron might be able to destroy some of these detached squadrons of ours if they did not mutually support each other.
If we anchored, as it were, these squadrons on the respective stations to which they are attached in time of peace, it would be perfectly possible for these combined French squadrons to deal with each of them separately and independently, and to inflict an immense amount of damage upon us, and then, of course, when once our men-of-war had been disposed of--then, and not till then, would they turn their attention to the trade. You must remember that, gentlemen, nothing would suit us better than that the French should ignore our ships of war and turn their attention to the trade from the beginning. That would mean the dissemination of their forces, and we should be able to catch them in detail and deal with them. But they would dỡ no such thing. Their first effort would be to destroy the sheep dogs, and then they would prey on the fluck. It follows from a consideration of those principles that whatever local distribution of forces may be advisable and feasible in time of peace, in time of naval war there must be only one authority with full power and responsi bility to the Empire to move the ships, to concentrate them where they can deal the most effective blow against the forces of the enemy, and that any separation of responsibility, any diminution of the power of that central authority, any risk of hesitation or delay in making a conjunction of the squadrons where they can deal the most effective blow, might have disastrous
consequences.
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