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Bench, can neither hope for promotion nor fear anything that may happen to them, knowing that the votes of the two Houses of Parliament and the Government would protect them. I believe that is what has inspired the confidence. Well, I admit the difficulty, and, while in some respects it might be desirable that the appointment should be temporary, yet I think we ought to consider that with the other big question. There is a greater responsibility in the appointment when it is an appointment for. life-a much greater responsibility.
The Right Hon. J. CHAMBERLAIN: One more question I should like to ask you. Supposing such an appointment to be made to-day, would the gentleman, however eminent and distinguished, who received the appointment to-day retain the confidence of the Australiaus twenty years later, when he had come and been resident in this country for the whole period?
His Honour Mr. Justice HODGES: I think so.
The Right Hon. J. CHAMBERLAIN: And he would still be considered the Representative of Australia, although he had become an Englishman for, say, twenty years?
Ilis Honour Mr. Justice HODGES: I think so, provided he did not take part in any legislative functions. That is one of the things that is very strongly held in Australia—that Judges have nothing whatever to do with political questions.
The LORD CHANCELLOP : So that an appointment to the Peerage would not be in aid of your view, but rather against it!
His Honour Mr. Justice HOBCTS: I would. An appointment to the Peerage would be specially objectionable to the whol of the Colonies. They would say it would be a danger; that the man would be out of touch with the people of Australia altogether, and, if out of touch with the people of Australia, he might, in his positioni in the House of Peers, say things which would be especially objectionable to tam, and they say, apart even from that danger, they do not want and they do not desire that there should be any mixing up (you know your Lordship's case is diffcient); but, otherwise, we do not like in Australia the mixing up of the judicial with tire legislative.
that
The LORD CHANCELLOR: Then you see what occurs to one immediately is your view, being in favour of one Court, you would be altering the constitution of the House of Lords,
His Honour Mr. Justice IIODGES: Yes.
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The LORD CHANCELLOR: Because those learned Judges who are Peers stili take part in the legislative, as well as the judicial functions of the House of Lords.
His Honour Mr. Justice IIODGES: Yes, and I understand, of course, the constitution of one Supreme Court of Appeal would not affect the right of those gentlemen to discharge those duties, but it would prevent any who came from other part of the world from taking part in them.
any
The LORD CHANCELLOR: They would not be quite on equal terms; there would be two different classes of Judges.
The Right Hon. J. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes.
His Honour Mr. Justice HODGES: I think they would be in all probability. The Right Hon. J. CHAMBERLAIN: You began by saying that desire that there should be absolutely no distinction, that they should all be upon the was your same footing. Of course, under this, whereas one would be a Judge of Appeal, a life Peer in the House of Lords, another would be plain "Mr. Justice who is a Member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
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His Honour Mr. Justice HODGES: I think Australia would regard the Court as entitled to greater respect on that account.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: I understand that you are not giving any final opinion now; you would desire further time to consider.
His Honour Mr. Justice HODGES: Really, to deal with the question I would like a little time, because I did not anticipate our getting anything like as far this morning. I think most of my co-Delegates here did not know what was going to be done this morning, and we are rather taken aback at being asked the question at all at the present time. I thought very likely we might have settled the mode of procedure, what was going to be done, and ascertained whether anybody had any resolutions to propose, and, if so, what they were. I did not think we were going any further. If I had I would have brought the sections and the references to the sections.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: It is a comparatively simple matter. I suppose you had some view in your mind as to what would be desirable.
His Honour Mr. Justice HODGES: Yes! Oh yes! You see, my Lord, as you get one view, if one cannot get what one desires one begins to think how near one can get to it. Of course, I wanted to see how far I can work the others into acceptance of the views which would be agreeable to Australia. To plunge into the whole matter was more than I was prepared for.
Mr. ROSE INNES: The great point in South Africa is this: we do not want the right every subject has to appeal to the Sovereign interfered with in any way. We want a direct appeal to the Crown's person, because we think that the prerogative of the Crown, the influence of the Crown, the prestige of the Crown, is a very impor tant factor in binding the Empire together, and therefore it is merely as a matter of sentiment we wish to see an appeal to the Sovereign direct in Council. I think that all loyal Colonists take that view. And in regard to local matters at the Cape especially, I think it is valuable that the appeal should be to the Sovereign. There are many important questions involving land, areas of land, native reserves, the rights to those which come before the Supreme Court. We think it very important that wo should sometimes be able to tell a native Chief, that in addition to his appealing to three impartial Judges at Cape Town, he can go to the great Chief over the sea and be protected. And that will never be done by a Court which, after all, would be a branch of the Legislature.
With regard to a new Court altogether, subject to what I may hear here, we still think that the Privy Council is the body that we should prefer. Briefly for the reasons I have endeavoured to set out, and for other reasons I will not elaborate, that is the view which we take. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is the body that we should prefer to see maintained. Of course, we consider whatever Tribunal is created, whether it is a new Court, or the House of Lords, or a Judicial Commission, it can be made as strong as necessary; that is only a matter of administration and expenditure, and therefore we see no difficulty in arriving at as strong a Tribunal as is necessary to deal with all appeals from all parts of the Empire. I do not wish at this stage to offer any detailed remarks with regard to any improvements in the constitution of the present Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, because I do not feel myself qualified, not having the same knowledge as those who practise here, to offer suggestions on that point. I would rather hear what others have to say. But I would offer a negative criticism, and that is this: that the present arrangement by which certain Judges of Colonial Courts are made,members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is not a good one. Whatever may be good, that is not good, because necessarily the meagre resources of a Colony are limited; certainly ours are. I am speaking for Cape Colony now. We are bound to send the best man we can to the Judicial Committee. He is bound to be one of our best Judges; the very best Judge if possible. Ilis Majesty's Government would select our very best man; they would always take the very best man. You are bound to take a Judge. You could not take a man practising at the Bar; he would not have the means or the time. And the result is we send our best man, and we discharge as well as we can his necessarily neglected duty. If he leaves Cape Town and comes here the Supreme Court loses his services; if he remains there, then his service is of no value to the
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